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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation is comprised of three essays intended to contribute to the 
operations management discipline, specifically within supply chain management. The 
first essay provides a research agenda for studying deceptive product counterfeits, which 
are products that have been manufactured and/or distributed and sold by an entity in 
violation of another’s intellectual property rights and intentionally misrepresented by the 
seller as the genuine article. The proliferation of counterfeits into legitimate supply 
chains presents quality, health and safety and cost concerns for nearly all industries. We 
identify antecedents of vulnerability to deceptive counterfeits for firms and their supply 
chain partners using Situational Crime Prevention Theory and Normal Accident Theory. 
Vulnerability to counterfeiting has negative performance impacts for the firm, its 
customers and society. We propose using the Six Ts of Supply Chain Quality 
Management (Roth, Tsay, Pullman and Gray, 2008) as an approach to select effective 
strategies to mitigate these impacts.  
Essay Two serves as an initial effort to understand how counterfeits can enter 
supply chains. In this essay, we test whether purchasing specialists can serve as effective 
guardians of the supply chain using a scenario based role playing experiment. We explore 
if buyers can detect signals of counterfeits in proposals and successfully avoid the 
counterfeit supplier in the decision process. We additionally examine whether time 
constraints and workload pressure detracts from the ability to successfully process signals 
and avoid the counterfeit. We find that the buyers can successfully detect counterfeit 
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signals and avoid the counterfeit in the selection decision, but don’t find support for time 
constraints and workload pressure effects.  
The final contribution of this dissertation is a methodological essay that explores 
the effect of time pressure on decision making by using a combination of perceived time 
pressure and objective measures of time spent in the decision process to determine if time 
pressure affects the quality of the decision making in a supplier selection decision. We 
find that time constraints and perceived time pressure are related constructs that 
negatively affect decision quality in a supplier selection decision. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Product counterfeiting is the unauthorized reproduction of goods that are 
protected as the intellectual property of another entity (Cordell, Wongtada & Kieschnick, 
1996; Shultz and Saporito, 1996). Practitioner literature, government reports and the 
media frequently highlight serious consequences for consumers, firms, and society from 
the proliferation of counterfeit goods (Phillips, 2005; Parloff, 2009; OEDC, 2009; SASC, 
2012; CBP, 2012; European Commission, 2012). Infiltration of counterfeit parts and 
components is a critical problem for emerging and established markets worldwide. 
Supply chain managers are charged with the responsibility of ensuring a safe and secure 
supply chain, and the purchasing department plays an essential role in this task through 
its work in obtaining required materials for the operations of a supply chain.  
One example of the potential financial impact of product counterfeiting within a 
business to business context comes from the defense sector, particularly in the area of 
electronic components. As highlighted in a Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) 
report in May 2012, the federal government had to spend $4.5 million to remove 
counterfeit parts for one of its missile defense systems (SASC, 2012). In addition to the 
costs of addressing counterfeits that firms face, an even greater concern is one of 
user/consumer health and safety. Perhaps one of the most heartbreaking examples is from 
China, where counterfeit infant formula caused the malnourishment, illness and 
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subsequent deaths of more than 50 children in Fuyang city (McDonald, 2009). In addition 
to the health and safety concerns associated with counterfeits are concerns regarding the 
exploitation of vulnerable populations, including children, in unsafe work conditions to 
produce counterfeit goods for minimal pay in sweatshop conditions (Boniface, 2010; 
Thomas, 2009). The aforementioned examples illustrate a few of the cost, health and 
safety risks, associated with counterfeit goods. There is a combined effort on the part of 
governments, industry groups, and individual firms to address the counterfeit problem. 
Firms are rising to this challenge by investing in ways to control and track their goods 
and supplies, improving traceability of product origins by developing databases for 
reporting, tracking and seizing counterfeit goods; and by educating consumers and supply 
chain partners on how to identify counterfeit copies of their products (Staake and Fleisch, 
2008; Berman, 2008).  
As we examined the extent literature to understand the counterfeit phenomena, 
five research questions emerged that this dissertation seeks to address in order to improve 
the supply chain management discipline’s knowledge in this area. The specific questions 
are:  
1. What are the aspects of supply chains that make them vulnerable to the
infiltration of counterfeits?
2. What are the impacts of counterfeits in supply chains?
3. What can be done to address the problem from a supply chain perspective?
4. How can supply chain and purchasing specialists help firms prevent the
infiltration of counterfeits into supply chains?
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5. What effects do time and workload pressure have on the quality of the 
purchasing decision outcome? 
The dissertation is structured into three essays with three intended contributions. 
In Essay One, we develop a conceptual model to identify the sources of vulnerability to 
counterfeits entering legitimate supply chains and the impacts of counterfeits for firms, 
consumers and society, and offer a proposed agenda for research to understand and 
mitigate the possible negative outcomes that are the result of deceptive counterfeits. In 
developing our agenda, we include relevant theories that can be used as a lens to examine 
this issue, including Signaling Theory (Spence, 1974; Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich, 
2010), Crime Prevention Theory (Speier, Whipple, Closs and Voss,  2011), Normal 
Accident Theory (Perrow, 1984), High Reliability Theory (Weick, 1987) and Deception 
Theory (Bowyer, 1982; Whaley, 1982; Bell and Whaley, 1991). We then use the Six Ts 
of Supply Chain Quality Management (Roth et al., 2008) to offer a typology of relevant 
strategies to help prevent counterfeits from entering supply chains.    
The second contribution of this dissertation, and focus of Essay Two, is to use a 
behavioral operations perspective to examine the role of purchasing specialists as 
guardians of the security of supply chain by conducting a scenario based role playing 
experiment to determine if they can detect signals of counterfeits and avoid the 
counterfeit supplier in a purchasing decision. Following the logic of Crime Prevention 
Theory as applied to supply chains (Speier et al., 2011), we propose that purchasing 
specialists serve as guardians of the supply chain, so it is essential to understand if they 
can detect signals of counterfeits in proposals and avoid selecting offerors whose 
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proposals contain counterfeit signals. This essays extends research on deceptive 
counterfeits into the business-to-business purchasing situation. Prior experimental 
research into the phenomena was conducted in the marketing discipline to address 
consumer behavior in e-commerce situations (Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich, 2010). As 
part of our experiment, we examine if time pressure and workload pressure 
considerations affect the ability to detect the counterfeit signals.  
 The final contribution of this dissertation is primarily focused on understanding 
the effects of time pressure, both actual constraints on time and perceptions of time 
pressure, on the quality and accuracy of decision making. This essay uses data gathered 
during the experiment that is the focus of Essay Two and employs structural equation 
modeling to examine the relationship of perceptual assessments of time pressure and 
measures of the observed amount of time spent in decision making to determine if these 
are strongly related to one another. Additionally, we examine whether these two 
approaches to assessing time pressure are valuable in terms of their relationship actual 
time constraints and decision quality. 
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows. Chapter 2 is our conceptual 
piece, Essay One, entitled “Deceptive Counterfeits: A Supply Chain Quality Management 
Research Agenda”. It is followed in Chapter 3 by our experimental contribution, Essay 
Two, which is titled “Avoiding Deceptive Counterfeits: A Behavioral Experiment 
Informed by Signaling and Crime Prevention Theories”. Our structural equation 
modeling effort on time pressure is the focus of Essay Three, “Objective versus 
Perceptual Measures of Time Pressure: An Exploratory Methodological Note”. We 
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summarize our dissertation conclusions and recommendation for future research in 
Chapter 5. Attached to the back of this dissertation are two appendices containing the 
detailed typology findings from Essay One and the experimental scenarios and 
questionnaire used in Essay Two, as well as a listing of References used throughout this 
work.  
 
  
6 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Essay One: Deceptive Counterfeits: A 
Supply Chain Quality Management 
Research Agenda 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Product counterfeiting, or the unauthorized reproduction of goods that are 
protected as the intellectual property of another entity (Cordell, Wongtada & Kieschnick, 
1996; Shultz and Saporito, 1996), is a critical problem for supply chains in all industry 
sectors in both emerging and established markets around the globe. The challenge for 
supply chain managers is to ensure a safe and secure supply chain, end-to-end, for their 
downstream customers in both business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-consumer 
(B2C) relationships.  
From a B2B perspective, the clearest examples of product counterfeiting can be 
seen in the defense aviation sector, particularly in the area of electronic components. The 
costs for remediation of the problem of counterfeits in these supply chains are staggering. 
As detailed in a Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) report in May 2012, the 
Missile Defense Agency and its contractors had to invest $4.5 million in reworking as a 
result of counterfeiting (SASC, 2012). That is just one defense agency’s costs. Given that 
the SASC identified more than 1800 cases of suspected counterfeits in the U.S. 
Department of Defense’s supply chains, it is evident that the cost grows substantially. As 
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a result of the SASC findings, the U.S. Congress added requirements to the National 
Defense Authorization Act of 2012 that it is the responsibility of contractors (supplying 
firms) to bear the costs associated with correction of counterfeit problems unless specific 
criteria are met (NDAA, 2013). 
In addition to the costs of addressing counterfeits that firms face, the other major 
concern is one of user/consumer health and safety, which is particularly true in the area of 
counterfeit pharmaceuticals. One of the more striking examples of the problem was 
reported in Smithsonian Magazine, detailing how the Chinese-made anti-malarial drug, 
artesunate, was being counterfeited on a major scale, with perpetrators selling blister 
packs that look like the legitimate medicine but that were made solely of flour (Marshall 
and Battambang, 2009). The people who need this medication are in developing countries 
such as Cambodia where malaria is a highly fatal disease. While the legitimate drug is 
produced in China, so too was the counterfeit packaging used to defraud innocent people 
who need this drug. While some of the people involved in this incident were prosecuted 
by the Chinese government, the manufacturer of the counterfeits was never identified, 
and most of the 240,000 counterfeit packs were never recovered, probably making their 
way into the market in Southeast Asia. This is not an isolated incident. In the early 2000s 
in Nigeria, counterfeit medicines for the treatment of HIV, malaria and other diseases 
were sold on the street by “hawkers” (Phillips, 2005).   
As evidenced by these examples, counterfeit products present a host of cost, 
health and safety risks, impacting countries around the globe, so there is a growing focus 
within industry and government on eradicating this problem from infesting licit supply 
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chains. Government and industry groups are trying to work with one another to improve 
enforcement of criminal penalties and to make the distribution of counterfeits more 
difficult, but as the problem is still present, companies need to take actions to secure their 
supply chains from product counterfeit infiltration. Firms are rising to this challenge by 
investing in ways to control and track their goods and supplies, such as RFID 
technologies; by working with anti-counterfeiting initiatives sponsored by governments 
and industry groups, such as developing databases for reporting, tracking and seizing 
counterfeit goods; and by educating their customers on how to identify counterfeit copies 
of their products. 
To support the efforts by practitioners to address the counterfeiting problem that 
consumers, businesses and governments face, there are three basic research questions that 
the supply chain management discipline should seek to answer:  
1. What are the aspects of supply chains that make them vulnerable to the 
infiltration of counterfeits? 
2. What are the impacts of counterfeits in supply chains? 
3. What can be done to address the problem from a supply chain perspective? 
The objective of this chapter is to begin to answer these questions. To do so, we 
develop a conceptual framework for the exploration of product counterfeits in supply 
chains. The framework includes the definition of a construct called “vulnerability to 
product counterfeits” and explores the antecedents of this vulnerability. These 
antecedents are a combination of product and supply chain factors, including aspects that 
are specifically related to conducting supply chain operations in emerging markets. 
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Additionally, our framework offers propositions for the relationship between 
vulnerability to product counterfeits and business performance outcomes, including loss 
of demand and costs of remediation of counterfeits. To answer the third question, we 
present a summary of proposed strategies in extant literature and use the High Reliability 
Theory as the basis for propositions that the Six Ts of Supply Chain Quality Management 
(Roth, Tsay, Pullman and Gray, 2008) can be used as the anchors for strategies to combat 
counterfeits in supply chains.  
2.2  Background 
Sources and Distribution of Product Counterfeits 
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the European Union’s border 
control agents have a long history of seizing product counterfeits and pirated goods as 
part of their inspections for IPR violations. From 2001 to 2011, there were a total of 
550,729 identified cases of IPR violations in the United States and the European Union 
(EU) (CBP, 2012; European Commission, 2012). While this seems a staggering number 
and the trend is increasing, it is likely that many more counterfeits enter markets than are 
seized. Estimates on the magnitude of counterfeiting in the world economy suggest it to 
be 2% of the world trade in goods, amounting up to approximately $250 billion in 2007 
(OEDC, 2009). 
A continued look into these data reveals that a large portion of counterfeited and 
pirated goods originate or are transshipped from China and other countries with emerging 
markets. In the EU, the greatest portion of counterfeit and pirated goods that are seized, 
reported as a percentage of the total number of articles seized, originate from China 
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(72.95% of cases in 2011), with Hong Kong (7.67%), Greece (4.79%) and India (3.29%) 
rounding out the top exporting countries for pirated and counterfeit goods (European 
Commission, 2012). In the US, the greatest portion of pirated and counterfeit seizures, 
reported as a percentage of the total number of cases, come from China (55% of CBP 
seizure cases in 2011), followed by Hong Kong (27%) and Turkey (2%) (CBP, 2012). 
While the US percentage for China seems low for 2011, it is plausible that some items  
originating in China are transshipped via other countries such as Myanmar, Dubai, United 
Arab Emirates, and Nigeria (UNODC, 2008). 
Counterfeiting – A Double-edged Sword for Emerging Markets  
Emerging markets are defined as countries that are experiencing rapid growth and 
advancement in industrialization. International firms are leveraging the opportunities 
within these markets by outsourcing production, distribution and service activities to 
these nations, with the hope of reducing the costs of products made for domestic and 
foreign consumption.  In their efforts to expand into these markets, firms share their 
intellectual property in a variety of ways, from sharing patented manufacturing processes 
and specifications, dyes, molds, and models, to sharing trademarked packaging and brand 
images for use in the production and distribution of products. Unfortunately, the level of 
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection at the national and local level varies greatly 
in these markets. Additionally, worker rights and health and safety protections may not 
be to the level expected in the firm’s home country. 
Companies and governments in emerging markets are eager to grow their 
business and economy, but there are some firms and individuals who are willing to do so 
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at the expense of intellectual property rights of their partners as well as at the expense of 
human rights and consumer safety, and counterfeiting products is one way they achieve 
this goal.  
Counterfeiters do not limit their sales to foreign countries; they sell the goods in 
their own nations as well, putting the health and safety of the local populace at risk. In 
2009, the Chinese government arrested 24 people for the production and sale of 
counterfeit baby formula that led to the malnutrition and deaths of more than 50 children 
in Fuyang city (McDonald, 2009). Additionally, counterfeit producers will force workers, 
including children, to endure long hours for minimal pay in sweatshop conditions 
(Boniface, 2010; Thomas, 2009). The people taking these jobs generally face poverty or 
are the victims of human trafficking.  
The staggering facts about product counterfeiting can leave even the most callous  
feeling somewhat uneasy and disturbed, and while we hope that everyone can understand 
the consequences of the proliferation of the counterfeit economy, the method we chose to 
help address the problem was  to explain how supply chain academics and practitioners 
can begin to examine the antecedents of supply chain vulnerability to counterfeiting as 
well as explain some of the potential effects of counterfeits on supply chains.  
Identification of the gap in supply chain research 
Despite this growing call to action on the part of industry and government, there 
exists only a limited amount of academic research in the supply chain management 
discipline dedicated to explaining what factors in supply chains allow for the infiltration 
of counterfeits; quantifying the risks associated with counterfeits, both the probabilities of 
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occurrence and the magnitude of impact; and the resultant effect on supply chain 
performance outcomes. Other disciplines have examined counterfeiting from a marketing 
and economic perspective, but none from a supply chain security and quality perspective 
(see Tables 2.1 and 2.2 and Appendix A for specific details). 
The overarching intended contribution of this chapter is to serve as a theoretical 
and conceptual development piece that articulates the relevance and contemporary 
importance of studying product counterfeiting in supply chain management research. Our 
specific objectives for this effort are to present an overview of product counterfeiting and 
the magnitude of this problem, discuss the current state of supply chain literature, identify 
the gaps that exist in the area of product counterfeits, present a conceptual framework for 
examining counterfeiting in supply chains, offer a research agenda for product 
counterfeiting in the supply chain management discipline, and recommend potential 
theoretical lenses that can be used to evaluate this issue.  
2.3 Construct Definition and Differentiation  
To examine the current body of knowledge on product counterfeiting, particularly 
as related to supply chain management, we first conducted a review of the literature 
within the management discipline to identify the current state of the discipline’s research 
in this area.  Within the operations management literature, we found a limited initial set 
of investigations related to counterfeiting (Stevenson and Busby, 2015; Cho, Fang and 
Tayur, 2015). We also found calls to study counterfeiting as part of the broader issue of 
supply chain security (Flynn, 2008; Maruchek, Greis, Mena, Cai, 2011). We then 
expanded our research to include works from other disciplines to achieve a more holistic 
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view of the subject. Our review indicates a very limited amount of research that has been 
conducted in the management discipline, but a far greater base of knowledge in other 
fields, particularly in marketing and business economics. The goal of our literature 
review was to serve as a grounding for our key constructs and to identify different lenses 
that might be relevant for exploring this problem from a supply chain management 
perspective. 
Construct Definitions for Product Counterfeiting  
Product counterfeiting is a long-standing problem with one of the earliest attempts 
in history being a stopper for a Roman wine amphora, dated 27 BC, in Arles, France 
(Phillips, 2005), so that locally made French wine could be counterfeited and sold as the 
more expensive Roman varietal. Equally longstanding is the history of currency 
counterfeiting, which demonstrates the need first to differentiate and distinguish our 
focus area, product counterfeiting, from related topics. Counterfeiting, which broadly 
speaking, is the imitation of another item, be it a product, monetary instruments (currency 
or checks) or signatures, is classified as a type of intellectual property rights infringement 
(Staake, Thiesse and Fleisch, 2009).  In addition to counterfeiting, intellectual property 
rights infringements include digital piracy, illicit parallel imports and patent violations 
(Staake et al., 2009).  
 In academic research, a thorough literature review in the area of counterfeiting 
was completed by Staake et al. in 2009, including an assessment of academic and 
industry publications from 1976 to 2006. This review provides definitions for 
counterfeiting and related terms. Figure 2.1 depicts their classification scheme for terms 
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related to counterfeiting. Counterfeiting is a subset of illicit trade and intellectual 
property right infringements that is separate from contraband trade, illicit trade in 
controlled goods and trade in stolen goods. Counterfeiting can occur in the area of money 
and official documents, services and physical goods. It can be of a deceptive or non-
deceptive nature. In deceptive counterfeits, the consumer is unaware that the item is, in 
fact, a counterfeit, whereas with non-deceptive counterfeits, the consumer is fully aware 
of the illicit nature of the product. The counterfeit medicine examples mentioned in the 
introduction section of this chapter are deceptive counterfeits, while the purchase of 
knock-offs of designer purses are examples of non-deceptive counterfeiting. Phillips’ 
(2005) book on counterfeiting  includes a discussion of “brand bandits” and “counterfeit 
alley” examples of non-deceptive counterfeits. While both deceptive and non-deceptive 
counterfeits are important, for the purpose of supply chain quality management research, 
our focus is in the area of deceptive counterfeiting as it impacts the licit supply chains of 
manufacturers, distributors, wholesalers, retailers, and end-users of products.  
15 
 
 
FIGURE 2.1 – CLASSIFICATION OF COUNTERFEITING AND RELATED TERMS 
SOURCE: STAAKE ET AL., 2009 
 
The other notable contribution of Staake et al.’s (2009) work is that it identifies 
four primary research focus areas related to counterfeiting: (1) general descriptions of 
counterfeiting, (2) impact analyses, which investigate the consequences of counterfeits, 
(3) supply-side investigations, which address production settings, tactics and motives of 
illicit actors and how their products enter the legitimate supply chain, and (4) demand-
side investigations, which focus on consumer behavior and attitudes related to counterfeit 
goods. Staake et al. (2009) concede that the amount of academic research related to 
supply-side investigations is limited, acknowledging that very few publications are 
dedicated to these issues, despite the  importance of understanding how this side operates, 
and how licit companies can fight illicit producers. This essay serves to motivate a 
research agenda focusing on counterfeits in supply chains.  
Illicit Trade 
Contraband 
Trade 
IPR 
Infringements 
Counterfeiting 
Services Physical Goods 
Deceptive Non-Deceptive 
Money/Official 
Documents 
Illicit Trade in 
Controlled 
Goods 
Trade in Stolen 
Goods 
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Numerous definitions for counterfeits can be found across industries and 
government agencies (GAO, 2010). Efforts are being made to develop such standards in 
industries and government agencies, both at the national and international level. For 
example, SAE International (2009) has developed AS5553, Counterfeit Electronic Parts; 
Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition. In this standard, two definitions are 
provided. A “Suspect Part” is defined as a part where there exists, through inspection, 
testing or other information, evidence that it may have been misrepresented by the 
supplier or manufacturer. A “Counterfeit Part” has a more stringent definition stating that 
the part is a suspect part that is also a copy or substitute without legal right or authority to 
do so or one whose material, performance, or characteristics are knowingly 
misrepresented by a supplier in the supply chain. This more stringent definition identifies 
the deceptive element of counterfeit as well as the intellectual property rights element of 
these items.  
Other examples of definitions were found in the Aerospace Industries 
Association’s (AIA) 2011 report on counterfeit parts and the World Health 
Organization’s (WHO, 2008; WHO, 2012) task force on counterfeit pharmaceuticals. The 
AIA defined a counterfeit as “product produced or altered to resemble a product without 
authority or right to do so, with the intent to mislead or defraud by presenting the 
imitation as original or genuine” (AIA, 2011). The WHO defined a counterfeit medicine 
as “one which is deliberately and fraudulently mislabeled with respect to identity and/or 
source. Counterfeiting can apply to both branded and generic products and counterfeit 
products may include products with the correct ingredients or with the wrong ingredients, 
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without active ingredients, with insufficient active ingredients or with fake packaging” 
(WHO, 2012). 
These various definitions of counterfeits in industries demonstrated to us that 
there exists a need for a parsimonious and relevant definition of product counterfeits that 
could be used in a broad variety of supply chain management research applications. To 
develop this general definition, we conducted an extensive literature review of numerous 
academic, government and industry publications. Table 2.1 is the summary of the 
definitions we found in our research. From the research conducted by Staake et al. (2009) 
and this list of definitions, a set of characteristics for our definition of deceptive product 
counterfeits in legitimate supply chains emerged.  
Authors Year Definition 
Staake, Theisse 
and Fleisch  
2012 
Counterfeit trademark goods: any goods, including 
packaging, bearing without authorization, a trademark 
that is identical to the trademark validly registered in 
respect of such goods or that cannot be distinguished 
in its essential aspects from such a trademark, which 
thereby infringes the rights of the owner of the 
trademark in question under the law of the country of 
importation (WTO, 1994 TRIPS Agreement). 
Mavlanova and 
Benbunan-Fich 
2010 
Product counterfeiting is the unauthorized 
manufacturing or commercialization of goods whose 
characteristics are protected by trademarks, patents or 
copyrights. 
Sood, Das and 
Pecht 
2011 
Counterfeit electronic part is one whose identity (e.g., 
manufacturer, date code, lot code) has been 
deliberately misrepresented. 
Aerospace 
Industries 
Association 
2011 
Counterfeit parts are defined as a product produced or 
altered to resemble a product without authority or 
right to do so, with the intent to mislead or defraud by 
presenting the imitation as original or genuine. 
Yang and Fryxell 2009 
Counterfeiting-- the unauthorised imitative production 
of products and/or services that are protected by 
owners' intellectual property rights (IPR) in the 
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pursuit of profit. 
Chaudhry, 
Zimmermann 
Peters and 
Cordell 
2009 
Uses Cordell et al.’s (1996) definition - product 
counterfeiting involves any unauthorized 
manufacturing of goods whose special characteristics 
are protected as intellectual property rights, or 
trademarks, patents and copyrights. 
Staake and 
Fleisch 
2008 
Counterfeiting denotes the unauthorized reproduction 
of goods, services, or documents in relation which the 
state confers upon legal entities a statutory monopoly 
to prevent their exploitation by others. Deceptive 
counterfeiting -- refers to cases where a person or 
organization purchases counterfeit goods in the belief 
they are buying genuine articles. Non-deceptive 
counterfeiting shall refer to cases where a person or 
an organization purchases counterfeit goods knowing 
of their counterfeit nature. 
Yang, Sonmez 
and Bosworth 
2004 
Counterfeiting, which means “to imitate exactly 
something valuable or important,”  such as 
counterfeited money, with intent to defraud or 
deceive. 
Cordell et al. 1996 
Any unauthorized manufacturing of goods whose 
special characteristics are protected as intellectual 
property rights (trademarks, patents, and copyrights) 
Shultz and 
Saporito 
1996 
Counterfeiting is the unauthorized production of 
goods that are legally protected by trademarks, 
copyrights or patents. 
TABLE 2.1 – DEFINITIONS OF PRODUCT COUNTERFEITING IN EXTANT 
LITERATURE 
 
The underlined terms in Table 2.1 highlight the common characteristics of 
counterfeit definitions that are applicable to our conceptualization of deceptive product 
counterfeits as related to the field of supply chain management. In these definitions, three 
elements  emerged which constitute the core of our definition of deceptive product 
counterfeit: 1.) unauthorized manufacture  or production of a tangible good, 2.) 
violating/infringing on another’s intellectual property rights, and  3.) misrepresenting the 
nature of the product in order to deceive the buyer into believing that the counterfeit is an 
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authentic item.  Figure 2.2 depicts these three elements, integrating them into a formal 
definition:  
Deceptive Product Counterfeiting is the unauthorized manufacture and/or 
distribution and sale of goods, misrepresenting these goods as genuine articles 
that are protected as the specific intellectual property of an individual and/or 
organization. 
This definition of deceptive product counterfeiting applies to the action of committing the 
counterfeiting. The outcome of this act is the good that constitutes a deceptive product 
counterfeit, specifically defined:  
 Deceptive Product Counterfeit is any product that has been manufactured and/or 
distributed and sold by an entity that is not authorized by the intellectual property 
rights’ owner and is intentionally misrepresented by the seller as a genuine 
article.   
Three Dimensions of Deceptive Product Counterfeiting 
 To ensure a comprehensive and parsimonious conceptualization of this construct, 
we will break this definition into parts and discuss them individually. Figure 2.2 
illustrates the three dimensions of deceptive product counterfeits explained in detail 
below. 
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FIGURE 2.2 – THREE DIMENSIONS OF DECEPTIVE PRODUCT 
COUNTERFEITING 
 
Unauthorized Manufacture 
 The first dimension of deceptive product counterfeiting is the unauthorized 
manufacture or distribution and sale aspect of the act. In this context, unauthorized 
manufacturing or distribution refers to either producing or distributing a good without the 
consent of the intellectual property owner. This includes a variety of types of 
counterfeiting activities, such as reversed engineered “knock-offs,” refurbished items and 
inferior scrap items sold as new items, and factory overruns. Factory overruns occur 
when a contractor with a license from an intellectual property owner produces goods in 
excess of the limit of the licensing or distribution contract granted by the intellectual 
property holder (Staake and Fleisch, 2009).  
While other researchers (Staake and Fleisch, 2009) do not include factory 
overruns and seconds sold on the gray market in their definitions of counterfeits, we 
 
Deceptive 
Product 
Counterfeiting 
 
 
 
Intent to Deceive Purchaser 
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chose to incorporate them because practitioners and industry groups perceive these as 
issues of counterfeiting and include them in their counts of counterfeit goods. Staake and 
Fleisch (2009) are correct in that this is a breach of contract more so than intellectual 
property infringement, but the effect on a firm’s profits, loss of sales, and branding 
impact are essentially the same. As such, we chose to include these for the sake of 
comprehensiveness.  In a similar vein, we included positioning refurbished items as new 
as part of counterfeiting because industry and government entities incorporate this into 
their working definitions of counterfeiting (SASC, 2012; SAE Aerospace, 2009). 
Since supply chains are complex and involve many stages where manufacturing, 
sourcing, assembly, distribution and disposal occur, we incorporate all of these stages 
into our definition because counterfeits could enter the supply chain at any point in these 
activities. The situation becomes even more complex when the supply chain also includes 
product recovery nodes (see Fleischmann, Krikke, Dekker and Flapper, 2000, for a 
description of product recovery activities in supply chains), which allow for additional 
source nodes of materials to be converted into counterfeit items.  
Violating Owner’s Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
Deceptive product counterfeits can enter into a licit supply chain through multiple 
mechanisms, all of which amount to an IPR violation of some form. Any legal entity (e.g. 
individual, corporation or an industry standards group) can hold intellectual property 
rights, including patents, trademarks and copyrights. Intellectual property refers to the 
“creations of the mind, such as inventions; literary and artistic works; designs; and 
symbols, names and images used in commerce” (World Intellectual Property 
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Organization, 2015). Intellectual property is often shared with supply chain partners 
under license in subcontract arrangements. 
A subcontractor can engage in “third shift” manufacturing of factory overruns, 
whereby the subcontractor fills the order for the intellectual property owner using the day 
and swing shift operations in a factory and then “sells” the production capacity of a third 
shift of workers to a counterfeiter, or the subcontractor actually becomes a counterfeiter, 
selling the additional units of production “out the back door” or “off the back of a truck,” 
to use two common euphemisms for counterfeit operations (Parloff, 2006). This practice 
has impacted brand-name companies like New Balance shoes (Parloff, 2006). 
Counterfeits are also produced by subcontractors after their licensing agreements with 
intellectual property owners are terminated or product lines are discontinued (Parloff, 
2006).  
Reverse engineering of components is another source of counterfeits. When 
addressing reverse engineering as a source of counterfeits, it is important to distinguish it 
from reverse engineering for the purposes of making a competitive product (Minagawa, 
Trott and Hoecht, 2007), which is part of how other firms learn and compete in markets. 
Producing an item through reverse engineering, coupled with claiming it is the genuine 
article protected as intellectual property, results in a counterfeit deceptive product.  
Another entry of counterfeits into supply chains occurs in scrap, disposal and 
reclamation activities. Inferior goods are disposed of by intellectual property owners or 
upstream and downstream participants in the supply chain and then repackaged by 
counterfeiters and sold as the original quality item. In all of these examples, counterfeits  
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enter supply chains posing as genuine articles violating an owner’s intellectual property 
rights. 
Intent To Deceive 
The final dimension of deceptive product counterfeiting is that the counterfeiter 
intends to defraud the purchaser of the counterfeit product into believing that the goods 
are the genuine article that is someone else’s intellectual property. This intent to deceive 
is what differentiates a deceptive product counterfeit from a non-deceptive counterfeit, 
the two categories defined by Staake et al. (2009).   
Deceptive product counterfeiting exists when the buyer is unaware that the 
product is a counterfeit good, while a non-deceptive counterfeiting situation occurs where 
the buyer is aware that the item being procured is a counterfeit product. Non-deceptive 
counterfeit situations are often the case in the area of luxury brand name goods, such as 
Rolex watches, Coach and Burberry leather goods, and iPhones. There is a substantial 
literature stream in the marketing discipline that examines consumer attitudes regarding 
non-deceptive counterfeit goods (e.g. Grossman and Shapiro, 1988a and b; Wee, Ta, and 
Cheok, 1995; Tom, Garibaldi, Zeng and Pilcher, 1998). This chapter focuses on 
deceptive product counterfeiting, approaching the topic from a supply chain management 
perspective; therefore, we differentiate deceptive product counterfeits from other types of 
parts quality constructs.  
Deceptive Product Counterfeit – Construct Differentiation 
As illustrated in Figure 2.3, nonconforming, and defective products are concepts 
related to deceptive product counterfeits, but that are distinctly different constructs. In 
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fact, these items can potentially become deceptive product counterfeits if an entity 
attempts to hide the nature of the defect and pass the article off as a genuine, functional, 
first-quality part  protected as another person’s or organization’s intellectual property. 
Because these concepts are on the periphery of our research and related to our subject of 
deceptive product counterfeits, it is necessary to isolate our subject area from these 
related terms. 
 
FIGURE 2.3 – DECEPTIVE COUNTERFEIT CONSTRUCT DIFFERENTIATION 
The concept of a nonconforming product is based in quality management. Such a 
product is one that fails to operate to the expected level of performance as documented in 
the product’s technical specifications and requirements. The ISO 9000 standards  focus 
on controlling and eliminating such non-conformities. APICS addresses nonconformance 
by defining nonconforming materials as “any raw material, part, component, or product 
with one or more characteristics that depart from the specifications, drawing, or other 
approved product description” (APICS, 2015). The American Society for Quality has a 
similar definition for nonconformity, stating that is “the nonfulfillment of a specified 
requirement” (ASQ, 2015).  Another term, often used synonymously, yet erroneously, 
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with nonconforming product is defective product. This concept is actually a legal term 
that constitutes the very core of the area of product liability law. A defective product is 
defined as a product that has the tendency or propensity to do harm to its ordinary user, 
meaning an item manufactured to the expected standards and conforms to specifications 
may still be a defective product in the legal sense if its design has the propensity to cause 
physical harm to a normal user. 
2.4  Theoretical Lenses for Exploring Counterfeiting Within Supply 
Chains 
 The theoretical bases we use to explain why these antecedents are positively 
related to vulnerability to counterfeiting are Normal Accident Theory (NAT), Signaling 
Theory, Deception Theory and Crime Prevention Theory. We then apply Signaling 
Theory, Deception Theory and High Reliability Theory (HRT) to explain why the Six Ts 
of Supply Chain Quality Management (Roth et al., 2008) can be used to moderate the 
relationship between vulnerability to counterfeiting and the performance impacts 
associated with it.  
Normal Accident Theory 
Normal Accident Theory, first developed by Perrow (1984) as part of analyzing 
the Three Mile Island disaster, then later applied to investigations like the space shuttle 
Columbia disaster, states that accidents are inevitable and are a normal occurrence in 
systems that are tightly coupled and complex in terms of the interactions among elements 
of the systems. This systems theory has been applied to a variety of academic and 
industry sectors such as healthcare (Tamuz and Harrison, 2006) and petrochemical 
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production (Wolf, 2001; Wolf and Sampson, 2007). The two dimensions at the core of 
Normal Accident Theory are complexity of interactions and coupling. Complexity of 
interactions refers to the degree of interactions that are unanticipated, unfamiliar events, 
particularly when these events are hard to visualize and difficult to analyze in terms of 
the firm being able to immediately comprehend their impact on processes (Perrow, 1984). 
Tight coupling refers to a large interaction and dependence among processes in the 
system.   
In the discipline of supply chain management, Normal Accident Theory has been 
used to examine supply chain security, disruptions and adverse events (Speier, Whipple, 
Closs and Voss, 2011; Skilton and Robinson, 2009). Speier et al. (2011) propose that a 
firm experiences complex supply chain interactions when its processes involve unfamiliar 
events, specifically when these events are not directly visible and their impact on 
processes cannot be readily and completely comprehended by the firm. They further posit 
that when supply chains are tightly coupled, lacking buffering either in the form of 
suppliers, production centers or personnel, they have less potential to recover from an 
incident than those supply chains with some slack resources and slack designed into 
them. In their application of NAT to supply chain disruptions and security, Speier et al. 
(2011) recognize that some accidents are unintentional and some intentional. This is an 
important consideration when exploring the issue of counterfeiting in supply chains, 
which can be an intentional or unintentional accident.  
Outside parties can target a vulnerable supply chain at multiple points. They could 
target the firm itself, the firm’s upstream suppliers or the firm’s downstream customers as 
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the victims of counterfeiting. If the upstream supplier is targeted and that firm uses a 
counterfeit part in a subcomponent, the supplier will have unintentionally allowed a 
counterfeit part to infiltrate the focal firm’s supply chain. In the case of “third-shift” 
production of counterfeits, the supplier becomes an intentional counterfeiter of products, 
selling the focal firm’s products to customers without paying appropriate royalties or fees 
to the intellectual property owners. While Normal Accident Theory can be used to 
explain how the structure of supply chains can contribute to accidents or, in our case, the 
infiltration of counterfeits, High Reliability Theory can provide insights into how to 
construct processes to be highly reliable, even in high-risk situations.  
High Reliability Theory 
While NAT assumes  that some accidents are inevitable events, High Reliability 
Theory (HRT) posits  that most accidents and disruptions are preventable, stating that, 
even in high risk scenarios (e.g. nuclear power plants, aircraft carrier operations), 
organizations can develop strategies to reduce problems and encourage organizational 
reliability (Weick, 1987). To cultivate a high reliability organization, the firm needs to 
focus on the potential for failure and foster a culture of mindfulness that enables it to 
develop cognitive processes to detect the occurrence of problems and direct attention to 
take the actions necessary to address these problems before they escalate out of control 
(Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2008). High reliability is related to quality processes. In 
their discussion of high reliability organizations, Weick and colleagues (2008, p. 60) 
propose “if high reliability organizing is understood in part as a strategy to deploy 
attention, quality practices could be viewed as devices to direct and channel that 
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attention.” Our view is that employing a strategy of supply chain quality management can 
improve the ability of a firm to detect and resolve issues of counterfeiting before they 
escalate out of control. Employing quality management across the supply chain will 
allow even tightly coupled supply chains with complex interactions to prevent and detect 
counterfeiting issues.  
Roth and colleagues (2008) developed the Six Ts framework for supply chain 
quality management and improvement for the purpose of improving the safety and 
security of food supply chains, as a result of the growing complexity of supply chains due 
to globalization.  According to their framework, implementing traceability, transparency, 
trust and training programs, while considering time and testability factors, can improve 
the quality management of supply chains (Roth et al., 2008). Following the logic of 
Weick and colleagues (2008), it is reasonable to expect that employing quality 
management across the supply chain can focus the attention of managers on variances in 
quality that would be indicative of counterfeit problems, such as identifying illicit 
distribution channels, deceptive packaging and non-conformities in product information 
and labeling. 
Signaling Theory 
As we examine the entry of counterfeits into supply chains, the primary point may  
occur during the purchasing decision. As such, Signaling Theory, (Spence, 1974), 
provides valuable insight into how training might prove beneficial in preventing 
counterfeits. In situations of information asymmetry, agents can convey information, 
either honest or dishonest, that causes a principal to alter his/her behavior (Spence, 1974).  
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This concept has been applied in consumer counterfeit situations by Mavlanova and 
Benbunan-Fich (2010), where they examined consumers’ abilities to process trust and 
deception signals in e-commerce purchasing situations involving potential counterfeits. 
More recently, Stevenson and Busby’s (2015) qualitative research expands upon the 
understanding of the signals used in counterfeits, offering insights into how counterfeiters 
utilize signals by obscuring information, transmitting signals, acting upon demand signals 
from the markets, and exploiting signals. They go on to offer potential strategies for 
addressing the counterfeit threat to licit supply chains. 
Crime Prevention Theory 
In their work on supply chain security, Speier, Whipple, Closs and Voss (2011) 
used a combination of NAT and HRT with situational crime prevention theory and 
disaster management processes to posit that organizations that are able to prevent, detect, 
respond and recover from security incidents can create resiliency and ensure the 
sustainability of their supply chains. They argue that intentional acts against supply 
chains are a result of an opportune target and location, lack of sufficient guardianship and 
an offender willing to seize the opportunity to attack a vulnerable supply chain. 
While being able to detect and eliminate counterfeits as they enter the supply 
chain is important, it is equally important to attempt to prevent the infiltration from 
occurring in the first place. One way to achieve prevention is to understand the ways in 
which a counterfeiter could operate to sell deceptive counterfeits across a supply chain. 
Deception Theory serves as a lens by which firms can understand how a counterfeiter 
might attempt to fool elements of a supply chain into purchasing deceptive counterfeits. 
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Deception Theory 
Deception Theory explains how an entity uses a combination of simulative and 
dissimulative tactics to deceive a target into believing a falsehood (Bowyer, 1982; 
Whaley, 1982; Bell and Whaley, 1991; Johnson, Grazioli and Jamal, 1993; Santos and 
Johnson, 2004). This theory has been applied with signaling theory to understand product 
counterfeiting in consumer e-commerce purchasing by Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich 
(2010). Simulative tactics, including mimicking, inventing a false reality, and decoying, 
are used in an attempt to attract a victim through showing false information to lure them 
into believing a falsehood, while dissimulative tactics, such as masking, repackaging and 
dazzling, are attempts to make the false goods blend into the normal environment, thus 
hiding their true nature (Santos and Johnson, 2004). In the case of deceptive product 
counterfeiting, masking and repackaging are commonly used simulative tactics. In the 
electronics industry, there are documented cases where older circuits have their parts and 
serial numbers removed and newer numbers marked on them in an attempt to make the 
older materials seem newer. Using deception theory to help understand the ways in which 
counterfeiters may accomplish their deceit can be helpful in developing tailored strategies 
to prevent and detect the occurrence of counterfeiting in supply chains. 
There is very limited research on how counterfeiters accomplish their deceit due 
to the illicit nature of counterfeiting (Staake, Theisse and Fleisch, 2008). Minagawa and 
colleagues (2007) conducted case-based research on counterfeiting, imitation and reverse 
engineering from a Chinese perspective, using information from three key informants to 
provide insights into why firms  engage in non-consensual acquisition of technology.  
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Staake and colleagues (2012) used cluster analysis of industry experts’ assessments of 
counterfeited items to derive business strategies used by counterfeiters, identifying five 
strategic groups: disaggregators, imitators, fraudsters, desperados and smugglers. While 
these two studies serve as valuable theory-building opportunities, we believe that the 
incorporation of deception theory in this research area will enable more theoretical clarity 
by providing insights as to “how” counterfeiters conduct their activities, thus enabling 
supply chain managers to select and implement tailored anti-counterfeiting strategies. 
2.5  A Product Counterfeiting Research Framework For Supply Chain 
Management 
 Figure 2.4 depicts our conceptual framework for exploring product counterfeits 
from a supply chain perspective. At the core of this model is the construct we call  
“Vulnerability to Product Counterfeits,” defined here as susceptibility, or a 
predisposition, for having counterfeits enter the firm’s supply and demand chain because 
of a combination of product attributes and supply chain practices, processes and 
characteristics. Our conceptualization of vulnerability to product counterfeits builds on 
existing work on supply chain disruption and supply chain vulnerability, refining and 
applying it specifically to the case of counterfeits. We propose that a supply chain quality 
management approach can be used to mitigate the potential impacts of counterfeits in 
supply chains.  
In supply chain disruption literature, the construct of supply chain vulnerability is 
viewed as a “function of certain supply chain characteristics” (Wagner and Bode, 2006, 
p. 304), a vulnerability that is based on susceptibility to loss due to practices or 
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conditions within an organizational structure (Barnes and Oloruntoba, 2005). In their 
work on relating vulnerability to risk impacts, Wagner and Bode (2006) view supply 
chain vulnerability as a driver of detrimental results to the demand and supply side of 
caused by supply chain disruptions. Later work by these authors articulates the concept 
more precisely, stating there are characteristics of supply chains that are antecedents of 
the chain’s overall vulnerability to disruption, characteristics that affect both the 
likelihood of the occurrence of disruptions and the resulting magnitude of the impact of 
these disruptions to the operation of the supply chain (Wagner and Bode, 2009).  
 
FIGURE 2.4 – THEORETICALLY-DRIVEN CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
VULNERABILITY TO PRODUCT COUNTERFEITING AND MITIGATION IT’S 
IMPACT USING SUPPLY CHAIN QUALITY MANAGEMENT 
 
Antecedents of Vulnerability to Product Counterfeits 
 There are five antecedents of Vulnerability to Counterfeiting identified in our 
model: 1.) upstream supply chain complexity, 2.) customer expectations, 3.) intellectual 
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property sharing, 4.) sourcing factors, and 5.) component desirability. We posit that each 
of these elements increases a firm’s vulnerability to product counterfeits entering the 
supply chain. There are two theoretical foundations from which we derive our 
antecedents. Normal Accident Theory’s constructs of complexity and coupling can be 
applied to explain how supply chain complexity, customer expectations and intellectual 
property sharing create the types of supply chain processes that make it more likely for 
the “intentional accident” of counterfeiting to occur. Similarly, Crime Prevention 
Theory’s concepts of targets, lack of guardians, and willing offender explain how the 
antecedents of component desirability and intellectual property sharing can create 
additional vulnerability to counterfeiting.  
Upstream Supply Chain Complexity  
 Upstream supply chain complexity is comprised of both detail and dynamic 
complexity (Bozarth, Warsing, Flynn and Flynn, 2009) within the focal firm’s upstream 
supply base. Detail complexity refers to the number of components or elements that 
comprise a system, while dynamic complexity deals with the degree of resultant 
unpredictability in the system’s response to a given set of inputs (Bozarth et al., 2009).  
Bozarth et al. (2009) further conceptualize the number of suppliers, long supplier lead 
times, and globalization of the supply base as the sources of increased upstream supply 
chain complexity, with the number of suppliers capturing detail complexity and lead 
times and globalization capturing detail and dynamic complexity in the upstream supply 
base (Bozarth et al., 2009).   
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 As Bozarth and colleagues (2009) explain, the number of suppliers increases 
detail and dynamic complexity by increasing the required number of information flows, 
physical goods flows, and relationships that need to be managed. Similarly, they posit 
that long and unreliable lead times capture both detail and dynamic complexity by 
requiring the focal manufacturing plant to adapt their planning processes to include 
longer planning horizons and increased levels of detail (Bozarth, Warsing, Flynn and 
Flynn, 2009). The final dimension they include is globalization, which they base on the 
work of Nellore, Chanaron and Soderquist (2001), arguing that it increases dynamic 
complexity due to the increase in cultural differences, currency exchange rate 
fluctuations, and longer lead-times, all of which can shift the purchasing firm from 
strictly focusing on price to including other factors in the decision process for selection of 
suppliers (Bozarth et al., 2009).     
We refine their conceptualization by adding three dimensions to their 
conceptualization of this complexity: 1.) operations in emerging markets, 2.) the number 
of upstream outsourced production activities, and 3.) the number of transportation 
methods used in the delivery of goods from upstream suppliers. We add these dimensions 
to capture additional detail and dynamic complexity within the upstream supply base that 
we believe is related to vulnerability to product counterfeits.  
We posit that operations in emerging markets add to dynamic complexity in 
addition to the elements captured in the globalization dimension. The globalization 
dimension applies to operations in both established and emerging markets, but there are 
specific factors related to operations in emerging markets that increase dynamic 
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complexity. In work evaluating counterfeit production in China, Chaudhry, Cordell and 
Zimmerman (2005) and Chaudhry (2006) identify a lack of protection of intellectual 
property rights, a culture where IPR violations are not morally wrong, organized crime, 
and local willingness to purchase counterfeits as explanations for China’s high level of 
product counterfeiting. Similarly, other emerging markets have considerable diversity in 
the levels of intellectual property protection, local corruption and organized crime 
(Chaudhry et al., 2005; Roth et al., 2008). As such, the factors that a firm must consider 
while conducting operations in these markets increase, thereby increasing the dynamic 
complexity of the management of the upstream supply chain.      
 While operations in emerging markets add to dynamic complexity, the number of 
upstream outsourced production activities adds to both the dynamic and detail complexity 
in the upstream supply chain. When production activities are outsourced, the focal firm’s 
products move through the supply chain in various states of completion. There is an 
increase in the amount of information needed regarding the amount of work in process at 
each location and in-transit information between production activities. By decentralizing 
production, the amount of coordination between the focal firm and its outsourced 
production providers is added to the amount of coordination that was required in the 
supply chain without outsourcing of production.  
 In addition to the supply and production nodes within a supply chain, there are 
also transportation nodes and networks, which can vary from very simple to very 
complex. Simple transportation activities include, for example, where the focal firm that 
has its own fleet of vehicles and only operates in a small local area. More complex 
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transportation networks involve multiple modes of transportation (e.g. automotive, rail, 
air, and ship), multiple providers/carriers, and a greater span of distances in the network 
(e.g. interstate, trans-continental, or trans-oceanic), as well as customs and inspections 
processes for shipments between countries. Integrating information from multiple modes, 
providers, exchanges and inspection points adds dynamic and detail complexity to supply 
chain management.   
 As mentioned in our review of NAT, the amount of complexity in a system can 
increase the likeliness of accidents occurring in a supply chain. Following the analysis  of 
Speier and colleagues (2011), criminal activities directed at a supply chain can be viewed 
as a type of accident; therefore, deceptive product counterfeiting would be expected to 
occur  in more complex supply chains, where the odds of the Roth and colleagues’ (2008) 
Six Ts elements being consistently present are very low. Following this logic, we view 
supply chain complexity as an antecedent to vulnerability to counterfeiting since complex 
supply chains have a large number of entry points (locations) and a large number of items 
of supply (targets) that could potentially attract counterfeiters (offenders). 
Challenging Customer Expectations 
 Customers seek parts, particularly replacement items, in the right quantity, the 
with right quality, and in the right timeline. There is pressure in business-to-business 
markets to make products better, faster and cheaper. But this kind of demanding customer 
relationship can unintentionally add to the potential for counterfeits to find their way into 
the licit supply chain. Suppliers want to be customer-focused and responsive to the 
expectations of their customers, meaning they may go the extra mile to satisfy these  
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requirements. When parts or products are needed but not available at the focal firm, we 
posit that the firm will look to other suppliers or entities in the market to obtain what they 
need to fulfill customer expectations. If the lead time for an item is not going to meet 
required delivery dates, the firm may seek alternative sources for the parts, such as trying 
to find the item from a source other than a currently qualified vendor (i.e. gray market or 
aftermarket distributors). While the distributor may genuinely believe he is providing the 
focal firm a legitimate good, it could be a counterfeit part. 
 Demanding customers can inadvertently create situational opportunities for 
counterfeits to enter their supply chains. Based on the  Normal Accident Theory, external 
demands from customers can force the focal firm to operate outside of its normal 
operating environment, increasing the dynamic complexity of its purchasing 
environment, by “thinking outside the box” in order to satisfy and retain customers, 
creating the conditions or “location” for a counterfeiter to perpetuate his fraud. 
 While customer demands are one factor that can create the opportunity for a 
counterfeiter’s illicit activities, there is another factor that is equally or even more likely 
to create vulnerability to counterfeiting. This situation occurs when production activities 
are outsourced or shifted to new production centers and intellectual property is shared 
with these locations.   
Intellectual Property Sharing  
 Intellectual property sharing occurs when the focal firm provides or authorizes 
use of its intellectual property right protected documents, equipment, tooling, and/or 
processes with upstream suppliers, distributors and/or vendors. As mentioned by Berman 
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(2008), Parloff (2006) and Norman (2001), sharing intellectual property can encourage 
the authorized user to misuse the property and engage in third-shift production and 
counterfeiting activities. This problem is compounded by operations in emerging 
markets, such as China, where the level of IPR protection enforcement by the 
government is considered low and organized crime is prevalent  (Chaudhry, 2006; 
Berman, 2008). Considerable research has been conducted in the area of IPR protection 
in outsourcing situations, most in the marketing discipline (Chaudhry et al., 2009, Kumar 
and Ellingson, 2007; Shultz and Saporito, 1996; Chaudhry, Cordell and Zimmerman, 
2005). There is also substantial published research in international business and legal 
reviews. Crime Prevention Theory suggests that a willing offender, opportune target and 
a lack of sufficient guardianship are all potentially  present in situations where 
intellectual property is shared outside of its owner’s direct management, particularly in 
cases where legal recourse does not act to support guardianship of the property rights.   
Sourcing Factors 
 We define sourcing factors as how the focal firm conducts its procurement and 
sourcing activities. This antecedent focuses on how the firm orchestrates its purchasing of 
supplies and materials for its operations. The aspects of sourcing that are posited to 
increase vulnerability to counterfeits include a lack of experience, training and time on 
the part of buyers to enable them to understand and detect counterfeits, as well as the use 
of gray markets, independent and aftermarket brokers, (Berman, 2008) and independent 
distributors (Livingston, 2013). Also included as a sourcing factor is  the use of internet 
auctions and suppliers of parts. The purchasing and supply chain management function of 
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a firm serves as the guardian of the supply chain, guarding against the purchase of 
counterfeit items.  In order to serve as an effective guardian, the purchasing team should 
be trained to detect indications of counterfeits during the purchasing decision process, 
including understanding whether the materials, components or sub-assemblies they 
purchase are potential targets for counterfeiters to exploit. For example, the electronic 
sub-component sector is a ripe target for counterfeiters as a result of the e-waste stream 
and the rapidly changing part specifications.  
Impacts of Counterfeits 
We characterize the impact of counterfeits as the negative outcomes associated 
with the incursion of deceptive counterfeits into a legitimate supply chain. As such, we 
view them as generally negative consequences related to the firm’s operating 
performance, the consumer’s health and safety, and the country’s fiscal well-being. Since 
we are focused on supply chains, we will present a more detailed review of the literature 
in the area of firms after providing a brief summary of information on the consumer and 
societal impacts.  
Before we discuss the impacts, it is important to acknowledge that other authors 
have also articulated that there are positive effects associated with counterfeiting, such as 
increasing competition in the market through technology transfer to emerging markets 
(McDonald and Roberts, 1994). IPR infringements, while not specifically limited to 
counterfeits, are also noted as having consumer benefits (Feinberg and Rousslang, 1990) 
and satisfy market demands, a positive outcome from an economic perspective 
(McDonald and Roberts, 1994). The literature also reveals that from a marketing 
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perspective, companies may experience an increase in brand awareness (Barnett, 2005; 
Yao, 2005). While these positive outcomes are interesting to note, the literature indicates 
that the effects of counterfeits on the legitimate firm’s supply chain are primarily  
negative,  so we focus on the impacts from that perspective. 
Consumer Health and Safety 
From a consumer perspective, there are two general impacts of deceptive 
counterfeiting. First, the consumer is the victim of a fraud, where the counterfeiter 
misleads the customer into believing that he or she is procuring a genuine item when, in 
fact, it is an unauthorized reproduction of an IPR-protected legitimate item. Secondly, 
there are potential health and safety consequences associated with procuring counterfeit 
items. Tim Phillips’ (2005) book Knock Off: The Deadly Trade in Counterfeit Goods 
analyzes how the global counterfeit trade is related to organized crime, corruption, 
violence and even death. One area in particular that is a health and safety concern for 
consumers, as mentioned in our introduction, is pharmaceuticals. Cockburn, Newton, 
Agyarko, Akunyili, and White (2009) provide a detailed discussion of the magnitude of 
the problem in the pharmaceutical industry, citing estimates that 10% of the world’s 
supply is counterfeit and that this results in unnecessary morbidity and mortality. 
Societal Impacts 
While consumer impacts are generally associated with the use of deceptive 
counterfeit goods, country-level impacts are generally conceptualized in terms of the loss 
of tax and tariff revenues associated with counterfeits, both deceptive and non-deceptive, 
in this situation (Chaudhry, Zimmerman, Peters and Cordell, 2009). While there are 
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concerns about how the estimates of lost revenue due to counterfeiting activities are 
generated (GAO, 2010; SASC, 2012), national and local agencies have posted estimates. 
For example, according to a 2004 report, the New York City comptroller’s office 
estimated that counterfeit trade in New York City was $23 billion, resulting in $1 billion 
in lost tax revenues (NYC Comptroller, 2004). 
Firm Operational Impacts 
While the consumer and governmental impacts are important, our focus is on the 
impact to the firm. When a firm’s products are counterfeited, there is a potential for loss 
of brand equity (Wilke and Zaichkowsky, 1999), as well as loss of demand and sales 
(Green and Smith, 2002) since counterfeit items are generally sold below the price of the 
genuine product. This assumes that the purchaser would have paid the firm’s price for the 
legitimate item, were the counterfeit good not available, an  assumption that is not 
necessarily true for non-deceptive counterfeits become  some  would  not purchase the 
genuine item because of the cost (Chaudhry et al., 2008). Different types of goods have 
different price elasticity of demand, but, in the case of deceptive counterfeits, the 
purchaser expects to pay for the genuine article, so they want the real thing and are 
willing to pay the price for it.  
Further, when some another entity is filling a demand that would normally be 
satisfied by the firm, there is a loss of demand to the counterfeit market.  Knowing the 
actual demand losses is difficult since gathering data on illegal activities is difficult, we 
assert that obtaining the firm’s perceived loss of demand from a subject matter expert 
might provide insights in the absence of direct data on losses. 
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Interestingly, studies have evaluated the potential impact of loss of brand image 
and equity, finding that consumers’ perceptions of the original product’s brand image 
was not affected by the proliferation of counterfeits (Nia and Zaichkowsky, 2000); 
however, this study examined luxury brands, which are generally non-deceptive 
counterfeits, so it is difficult to apply these conclusions to deceptive counterfeit 
situations. While brand image may not be affected by counterfeits, profits are generally 
expected to be.  There are no studies as yet that document the perceived loss of demand 
from the firm’s perspective, but the resultant loss of profits associated with lost sales is a 
concern that is often raised in media, interest group and practitioner literature. 
Another impact to the firm that is cited in literature is an increase in costs as a 
result of having to implement anti-counterfeiting measures. There are numerous 
countermeasures available and firms should tailor them based on their specific counterfeit 
risks and potential ways that counterfeiters might attack their supply chain. While these  
increase costs, they are recommended to be perceived as an investment because, if 
effective, these intellectual property protection measures should prevent counterfeit 
proliferation and help the firm prevent loss of market share in the short-term, mid-term 
and long-term (Fuchs and Zhao, 2010).  Intellectual property protection programs may be 
costly, but they are necessary in the battle against counterfeiting. In addition, firms face  
the costs of remediating counterfeits in supply chains. These can be extensive, especially 
when dealing with counterfeits that have infiltrated complex or capital intensive 
investment items or those items that have consumer safety concerns.   
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With so many potential sources of vulnerability to counterfeits and such 
substantial potential impacts, it begs the question of what can be done to “counter” the 
potential for counterfeits entering the supply chain. Academic research has dedicated a 
considerable amount of effort into understanding how firms deal with counterfeiting and 
have provided a plethora of options to consider regarding how to deal with counterfeiting. 
Strategies to Mitigate Counterfeiting – A Supply Chain Quality Management 
Perspective 
 There have been many articles offering strategies for addressing the counterfeit 
problem, but they are not organized in a manner to easily facilitate an examination using 
a supply chain management lens. We will provide a general overview of the strategy 
literature and then apply Roth et al. (2008) Six Ts of Supply Chain Quality Management 
as a structure for developing a typology for organizing counterfeit mitigation strategies. 
This framework is intended to enable managers and researchers to approach the issue of 
quality in supply chains at the strategic level. As mentioned in our discussion of 
theoretical lenses, the holistic nature of the Six Ts (Roth et al., 2008) enables a firm to 
improve mindfulness and detect and prevent quality issues proactively, an approach  
consistent with the mindfulness objectives in the High Reliability Theory (Weick, 1987).  
Strategies for Addressing Counterfeiting 
In their literature review on counterfeiting, Staake et al. (2009) identify 24 articles 
that offer strategies and recommendations for addressing counterfeiting, some of which  
offer general strategies, while others are more specific, recommending strategies tailored 
to specific countries (Chaudhry et al., 2008). This is not surprising, given that a large 
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percentage of the U.S. and E.U. seized counterfeits appear to originate in China (CBP, 
2012; EU, 2012) and China’s recorded of respecting intellectual property rights has been 
assessed as poor by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (2012), putting the 
country at the top of the Priority Watch List. 
Early strategy articles address how firms can respond to the issue of illicit actors 
obtaining firm’s confidential information, allowing them to generate counterfeits (Harvey 
and Ronkainen, 1985; Harvey, 1987; Harvey, 1988), discussing how firms can establish 
relationships with dealers and distributors to collaborate on combating counterfeiting 
(Olsen and Granzin, 1992; Olsen and Granzin, 1993). Some articles take a broad 
approach, offering general strategies to managers of affected firms. For example, Shultz 
and Saporito’s (1996) recommendations include using a combination of product markings 
and labeling technologies, educating customers, encouraging legislation for IPR and 
participating in coalitions.  
More contemporary articles that make strategy recommendations include Berman 
(2008), Staake and Fleisch (2008), Stumpf and Chaudhry (2010), Li (2013), and 
Stevenson and Busby (2015).  Berman (2008) offers a variety of potential courses of 
action, including establishing investigations (internal or external to the firm), using 
product authentication technologies, controlling outsourcing, training customers, and 
monitoring markets for counterfeits. Li (2013) extends Berman (2008), discussing the 
advantages and disadvantages of various product authentication, tracing, and tracking 
technologies, including watermarks, RFID, digital product coding and laser markings, 
among others.    
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Stumpf and Chaudhry’s (2010) cross-country research evaluated managerial 
perceptions of various anti-counterfeiting actions, generating five recommendations for 
approaching the problem from a less U.S.-centric approach, including improving global 
discourse and media attention on what encourages counterfeit production and buying in 
different countries, working with agencies to stop the flow of funding for the illicit trade 
of goods, improving understanding and influencing consumer buying behavior to 
discourage the purchase of counterfeit goods, and considering and testing various  
different solutions to similar problems across nations.   
Typology of Counterfeit Mitigation Strategies Using the Six Ts (Roth et al., 2008) 
During our review of strategies for addressing counterfeiting, several common 
recommendations emerged, ones that are critical to the conceptual framework we propose 
for combating counterfeits in supply chains, particularly since they echo the key 
constructs in Roth and colleagues’ (2008) Six Ts framework: Traceability, Transparency, 
Trust, Training, Time and Testability.  
Traceability 
Traceability refers to the ability to “map” the supply chain (Roth et al., 2008), 
specifically the ability to identify and verify the components and chronology of events 
(Skilton and Robinson, 2009) across supply chain processes. There are ways to improve 
the traceability of parts and products in the chain, including requiring unique item 
identification and product authentication technologies (Berman, 2008; Li, 2013; Stumpf 
and Chaudhry, 2010). Unique physical markings, electronic tracking systems, part 
numbering and serialization are proposed to assist in preventing and detecting 
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counterfeiting in the supply-side of the firm’s supply chain. These would also be 
beneficial for B2B customers who also rely on technologies to authenticate items that 
focal firms provide to the demand-side, thereby ensuring that counterfeit versions of their 
products do not enter the downstream supply chain (Lehtonen, Michahelles and Fleisch, 
2007). Traceability measures must be updated and refreshed, as it is possible for 
counterfeiters to attempt to replicate them, especially the physical ones (Stevenson and 
Busby, 2015). 
Transparency 
Transparency is a measure of completeness of sharing of information via formal 
and informal agreements (Roth et al., 2008) Improving transparency within the firm, the 
supply chain and across industries was also a common theme in the proposed strategies to 
deal with counterfeiting. As previously explained, Stumpf and Chaudhry (2010) are 
proponents of using what has been successful in some countries to assist other firms in 
their efforts. Within the firm, Staake and Fleisch (2008) make several recommendations 
for improving the transparency of information related to addressing counterfeits, such as 
using defined processes to govern response to counterfeits, monitoring processes, 
standardized counterfeit reporting tools, and indicators to evaluate the effectiveness of 
anti-counterfeiting measures. Looking across the supply chain, they recommend having 
suppliers return all scrap, seconds, and intellectual property as part of their contracts 
(Staake and Fleisch, 2008). They also suggest improving transparency between business 
and governmental, including law enforcement, and non-governmental organizations, as 
do Wilcock and Boys (2013). This is consistent with Shultz and Saporito’s (1996) 
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recommendation to use coalitions to help organizations with similar interests in IPR to 
leverage pooled knowledge and resources to combat counterfeiting. In a more extreme 
application of transparency, Minagawa, Trott and Hoecht (2007)  propose working with 
counterfeiters to make them a component of the licit supply chain, rather than a 
competitor of it. 
Testability 
 In situations where complete transparency is not possible or desired, testing of 
products can help verify that products are authentic. Testability refers to the ability to 
detect whether or not expected attributes of a product are present (Roth et al., 2008). 
Testing can be invasive (destructive) testing or non-invasive (such as inspecting 
packaging for signs of tampering or alteration). For items such as electronic components, 
sending samples to independent testing labs is also an option. Sood et al. (2011) proposed 
a methodology for detecting counterfeit electronic parts that includes a discussion of 
testing. Like all counterfeit mitigation and prevention strategies, testing has an associated 
cost and has to be the right fit for a particular firm’s needs. 
Trust and Time 
Complimenting transparency are trust and time. Trust is defined as the 
expectation that supply chain partners will act in good faith, not opportunistically, and 
with honesty in negotiations (Roth et al., 2008; Hosmer, 1995). While “blind trust” is not 
something we would advocate as ideal for supply chains, having a list of “trusted” and 
qualified suppliers, (particularly those with which the focal firm has a longstanding 
business relationship) from which to procure parts or materials might reduce the potential 
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for counterfeit infiltration because these suppliers are motivated to maintain a strong 
business relationship and not violate the trust of a valuable long-time business partner. 
Another aspect of trust that can be used to mitigate the risk of counterfeits is to evaluate 
if signals of trust are present in the purchasing transaction as recommended by 
Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich (2010).   
Complementing the trust consideration is the time consideration. Time, for our 
purposes, characterizes the duration of processes within the supply chain (Roth et al., 
2008) as well as the aspects of time pressure associated with decision making and 
customer expectation. Time pressure is related to poor decision making quality (Hahn, 
Lawson and Lee, 1992). We propose that it is critical to recognize the effects of time 
pressure on decision making quality in supply chain and purchasing decisions, 
particularly if a customer has set challenging delivery schedule deadlines or requires 
rapid responses to requests for proposals.  
Training 
Another consistently echoed theme among the recommendations and strategies in 
the literature is the necessity of training, including training of customers, the general 
public, and stakeholders within the supply chain. For our purposes, training refers to 
ensuring that the purchasing and supply chain management team are trained (Roth et al., 
2008) on the nature of product counterfeits and ways to prevent, detect and eliminate 
them from the firm’s supply chain. Berman (2008), Shultz and Saporito (1996), Stumpf 
and Chaudhry (2010), and Staake and Fleisch (2008) recommend educating consumers 
on the risks of counterfeits, including health and safety aspects, as a means to reduce the 
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level of demands for counterfeiting. They propose a variety of means by which to do this, 
including 1.) publishing information for users on how to authenticate products and detect 
counterfeits (Berman, 2008; Staake and Fleisch, 2008), 2.) providing users with 
information on the risks and impacts of using counterfeits (Stump and Chaudhry, 2010; 
Shultz and Saporito, 1996), and 3.) providing customers with ways to report suspect 
counterfeit parts (Berman, 2008).  
Within the firm itself, training of personnel is posited to be part of an anti-
counterfeiting strategy. Staake and Fleisch (2008) recommend that firms develop 
country-specific knowledge of the market for counterfeits, the import and distribution 
routes, the capabilities of counterfeit producers and the consumer market that would 
procure counterfeit goods. They further recommend that firms should transform the tacit 
knowledge of counterfeiting experts within the firm into explicit knowledge that can be 
shared across business units. Finally, they and others (Wilkcock and Boys, 2013) 
recommend educating purchasing departments on how to spot counterfeit parts. 
Potential Research Opportunities  
To illustrate how the Six T’s framework can serve as a means to categorize the 
counterfeit mitigation options, we constructed the typology in Table 2.2 to demonstrate 
how researchers can organize and analyze various strategies proposed in the literature 
from a supply chain quality management perspective. This table is abbreviated at the 
source level. See Appendix A for a more detailed list that includes the specific strategy 
suggestions in each article. The table identifies the number of proposed counterfeit 
mitigation approaches, revealing several insights for potential research opportunities.  
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TABLE 2.2 – SIX Ts TYPOLOGY OF COUNTERFEIT MITIGATION STRATEGIES 
First, we observe that one or more than one of the Six T’s can be reflected within 
a proposed mitigation strategy. For example, a strategy that maps to several dimensions 
of the Six Ts simultaneously is offered by Stevenson and Busby (2015). They propose 
implementing contracts that include closer relationships, auditing and monitoring. This 
recommendation maps to three of the Six Ts: traceability, testability and trust. Their 
observation is important because it acknowledges the multi-dimensional nature of supply 
chain quality and that a single counterfeit mitigation item can potentially have achieve 
synergistic improvements in supply chain quality. It also serves as a caution that when 
conducting empirical research using the Six Ts framework, it is crucial to invest the 
appropriate amount of construct refinement and development of appropriate  
measurement scales for these constructs to ensure that instruments are reliable and 
provide the necessary convergent and discriminant validity. 
Another interesting observation in this typology is that it suggests that the time 
considerations surrounding counterfeit mitigation strategies have received less note and 
attention in the literature with only six mappings versus the other five, all of which have 
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14 or more. The time element may be an area where opportunities for new research exist. 
Some of the time considerations that could be explored include analysis of the 
relationship between the time between the infiltration of counterfeits and their 
remediation and the resultant cost impacts. Additionally, exploring the influence of time 
pressure on the quality of sourcing decisions where potential counterfeit infiltration exists 
is worthwhile, as it would expand the understanding of the influence of time as a risk 
factor in purchasing decisions.  
2.6  Conclusions 
The issue of counterfeiting is a contemporary, critical issue for supply chain 
management researchers and practitioners alike from both a cost and risk perspective. As 
all supply chains are vulnerable to this crime, it is critical to understand the sources of the 
vulnerability. Only then can we hope to provide insights on how to reduce the realized 
outcomes of this vulnerability, including the impacts to firms, their customers and society 
in general.  The complex nature of counterfeiting and the multiple strategies and 
deception tactics used by perpetrators of this crime against supply chains requires us as 
supply chain researchers to expand beyond the traditional agency and information 
processing theories that dominate our field’s research paradigm and to incorporate 
perspectives from other fields such as economics and criminology. By broadening our 
approaches and utilizing these additional perspectives, such as Normal Accident Theory 
and Crime Prevention Theory, we can gain a more thorough understanding of the 
complete set of antecedents to this vulnerability. 
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 Applying a supply chain quality management lens by employing Roth and 
colleagues’ (2008) Six Ts framework enables us to organize the various options for 
combating counterfeits by applying a structured set of quality considerations to this 
phenomenon. This enables us to provide an organization for orienting our continued 
exploration of this critical issue within supply chain management. 
53 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Essay Two: Avoiding Deceptive 
Counterfeits: A Behavioral 
Experiment Informed by Signaling 
and Crime Prevention Theories 
 
3.1  Introduction 
This essay addresses the importance of Signaling and Crime Prevention Theories 
as a strategy to understand the supplier selection decision process in situations involving 
a potential deceptive counterfeit situation. Counterfeiting is a pervasive problem for 
consumers, companies, and governments. From a supply chain management perspective, 
counterfeit parts are a problem from both a financial and a safety and security 
perspective.  The intended contribution of our research is two-fold. First, we extend the 
experimental research of deceptive counterfeits into the business-to-business purchasing 
situation. Prior experimental research has focused on the consumer purchasing domain 
(Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich, 2010). Second, we seek to determine if time and 
workload pressure affect the ability to detect the counterfeit signals. 
 The costs associated with remediating counterfeits from supply chains and 
compensating customers can be substantial. In addition to the costs associated with 
removal and remedy, there can also be fines for knowingly using a counterfeit part, as in 
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the case with contractors providing supplies to the Department of Defense (NDAA, 
2013). In addition to the costs, there are risks associated with counterfeits as a result of 
the potential substandard construction of counterfeit items, and the health and welfare 
concerns for those using counterfeit goods as well as those producing them. 
 Counterfeiting is a criminal activity that is perpetrated against unwitting victims, 
both consumers and organizations. How can a company protect itself and avoid 
counterfeits from entering its supply chain and, more specifically, what are the signs 
available to the purchasing specialist to help identify a situation where a counterfeit item 
might be offered?  Since the purchasing specialist is the individual in the unique position 
to make a selection decision, it is important that this person be  prepared to defend the 
supply chain against targeting by counterfeit part providers. 
 To explain how a purchasing specialist can detect signals of counterfeits and 
avoid the purchase of them, we employ Signaling Theory and Crime Prevention Theory 
as the theoretical lenses for facilitating our research. Through these lenses we construct 
an experimental test to determine whether buyers can successfully detect and avoid 
counterfeit parts in the sourcing decision process. The buying decision serves as a critical 
moment at which the potential for a counterfeit to enter a legitimate supply chain is  
either realized or avoided. As such, we focus our research on counterfeit vulnerability to 
examine how buyers behave when faced with this scenario. With that perspective in 
mind, we offer the following as specific research questions we seek to answer: 
1. Given a specific level of counterfeit signaling, low or high, will a buyer avoid 
the counterfeit offeror’s proposal? 
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2. Does the amount of time pressure, low or high, affect the quality of the source 
selection decision? 
3. Does the amount of workload pressure, low or high, affect the quality of this 
source selection decision? 
4. Does time pressure interact with the perception of workload pressure to 
negatively affect the ability to non-select (avoid) the counterfeit offer? 
To answer these questions, we present a literature review to define our relevant 
constructs; ground them in Signaling and Crime Prevention Theories; and develop, 
execute, and analyze an experiment to test whether a buyer will select a supplier’s offer, 
given one of three levels of counterfeit signaling (low, medium or high) in the proposal at 
two different levels of workload pressure and two levels of time pressure. 
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows. In the literature review we 
define the concept of deceptive counterfeits, how they can enter legitimate supply chains, 
what strategies companies can employ to avoid and detect them, and finally discuss the 
purchasing decision, which we offer as the critical juncture at which the risk of a 
counterfeit entering a supply chain is either realized or avoided. After the literature 
review, we present our research model and the four hypotheses that we will test using a 
scenario-based role playing experiment. In the Experimental Model and Hypotheses 
Section, we provide a graphical depiction of our experimental model as well as specific 
variable definitions and develop hypotheses for our test. In the Methods Section, we 
describe the population of interest and our sample composition as well as the design and 
execution of our experiment, including pre- and post-design considerations and the 
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necessary checks such as realism and manipulation checks. We provide a summary of our 
analysis in the Results Section and finish this essay with the Conclusions Section, which 
includes a discussion of our findings and implications for practice and research as well as 
limitations and future opportunities to expand the body of knowledge in this area.  
3.2  Literature Review 
 There are numerous definitions for counterfeits as well as deceptive counterfeits. 
A thorough discussion on the construct definition and differentiation can be found in 
Staake, Thiesse and Fleisch (2009) and in the recent working paper by Watson and Roth 
(2015). We use the Watson and Roth (2015) definition as our definition of a deceptive 
counterfeit, specifically defining it as “any product that has been manufactured and/or 
distributed and sold by an entity that is not authorized by the intellectual property rights’ 
owner and is intentionally misrepresented by the seller as a genuine article.” Deceptive 
counterfeits are a very specific subset within the broad domain of illicit trade activities 
(Staake et al, 2009). They are different from non-deceptive counterfeits in that purchasers 
of non-deceptive counterfeits are very much aware that they are purchasing a fake. For 
example, if a person knowingly buys a knock-off of a luxury brand item, such as a fake 
Rolex watch or Coach purse from a street vendor, those purchasers are not deceived in 
any way; therefore, the purchase is a non-deceptive counterfeit. The intent to deceive and 
defraud is what differentiates deceptive counterfeits from non-deceptive counterfeits. 
Applying Crime Prevention and Signaling Theories to Prevent Counterfeits in 
Supply Chains 
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 Counterfeiting is a criminal act against intellectual property owners and unwitting 
businesses and consumers who purchase goods. There are multiple ways that deceptive 
counterfeits can be produced and presented to legitimate supply chains. Three examples 
of sources of counterfeits are 1.) overproduction by subcontractors, also known as the 
third shift or ghost shift (Parloff, 2006), 2.) reverse engineering, particularly if the item is 
not a technically complex product, and 3.) the recycling of earlier versions of an item or 
e-waste/scrap items as is seen in the electronic subcomponents sector (SAE, 2015). 
 With so many potential avenues of entry for counterfeits, how can a company 
secure its supply chain and avoid their infiltration? There are numerous guidelines 
available, and several articles have been published on how to address the counterfeit 
problem from the marketing and brand management academic (Berman, 2008), supply 
chain management academic (Stevenson and Busby, 2015) and practitioner standards 
perspectives (SAE, 2009; Department of Commerce, 2010; Aerospace Industries 
Association, 2011; SASC, 2012). These strategies include everything from legislative to 
law enforcement, to industry standards, to testing of components and minimizing waste 
and reuse opportunities, and finally to training purchasing specialists to identify and 
avoid potential counterfeits (Berman, 2008; Department of Commerce, 2010). The 
strategies relating to what the purchasing firm can do to avoid the entry fall within the 
purview of the supply chain management discipline.  
 As the saying goes, “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of the cure.” This is 
certainly true for the deceptive counterfeit problem. Avoidance is the best option because 
it requires far less investment than other approaches, such as testing or remediation after 
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the problem manifests itself downstream in the manufacturing or distribution process. So, 
if it is better to avoid counterfeits, how can this be accomplished? In this case, the threat 
to the supply chain’s security is a criminal act, so normal quality management theories 
may fall short in addressing the deliberate deceit. Recent work by Speier, Whipple, Closs 
and Voss (2011) applies Crime Prevention Theory to the understanding of supply chain 
security issues. This theory posits that crime is the result of the combination of an 
opportune target, a willing offender and lack of sufficient guardianship.  
Applying this concept to our specific area of concern, deceptive counterfeits, 
suggests that companies with supply chain requirements are the opportune target, willing 
offenders are the counterfeiters seeking to make a profit from the sale of counterfeit 
goods, and the guardianship is the supply chain and purchasing management 
infrastructure. Purchasing specialists are the first line of defense and are one of the 
critical guardians of the quality and security of the supply chain as they serve as the 
interface between the internal operations of a company and the external marketplace. 
 Purchasing specialists need to be mindful of the market and avoid potential 
counterfeits by detecting signals in proposals that a product being offered is not a 
legitimate good but rather a deceptive counterfeit. Signaling Theory suggests that 
individuals involved in a transaction can convey information that is either honest or 
dishonest, causing the other participant to alter his decision making behavior (Spence, 
1974; applied to counterfeit situations by Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich, 2010). Being 
able to isolate those signals from other considerations in a sourcing decision is no small 
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challenge as sourcing is not as simple as choosing  A, B or C; rather it is a complex 
decision making process, one that is critical in terms of supply chain security.  
The Sourcing Decision – The Tipping Point  
Based on the premise that the sourcing decision is the pivotal moment when the 
potential vulnerability to counterfeit can materialize as a realized counterfeit infiltration, 
our research examines some of the factors that influence the buyer’s ability to detect 
signals of a deceptive product counterfeit in sourcing documentation. While Mavlanova 
and Benbunan-Fich (2010) examine this relationship in e-commerce situations where 
consumers are making a purchase in an electronic environment, we have not found 
studies examining buyer behavior in business-to-business (B2B) situations. We seek to 
remedy this gap in the literature by extending this research into a B2B situation.  
While all buyers have some knowledge and ability to evaluate offers in the 
marketplace, the industrial buyer has a larger sphere of influence than a consumer one 
where the potential impacts of the sourcing decision will not only affect him or her but 
also the firm as well as the firm’s downstream customers or product users. To understand 
industrial buyer behavior, we consulted Sheth’s (1973) seminal work, a model of 
industrial buyer behavior, as well as additional contemporary research to identify the 
relevant aspects of buyer behavior to consider in the design of our experiment. 
Industrial Buyer Behavioral Considerations 
  Sheth’s (1973) model of industrial buyer behavior is one of the most 
comprehensive and, arguably, one of the seminal papers in industrial marketing literature. 
This model identifies three aspects as critical influences on expectations of suppliers in 
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organizational buyer behavior: 1.) the psychological world of the individual making the 
decision, 2.) the level of autonomy or jointness in the buying decision, and 3.) conflict 
that can arise as a result of the buying decision making process. For our purpose the most 
critical aspect is the psychological world of the buyer, which includes the buyer’s 
background, information sources, the amount of active search, perceptual distortion and 
satisfaction with past purchases (Sheth, 1973).  
Because we are trying to examine how a buyer’s decision could potentially cause 
a counterfeit to enter a supply chain, our research controls the autonomy of the decision 
making, not allowing the scenario to be a joint one, which, consequently also reduces the 
potential for conflict. That said, we certainly acknowledge the value of jointness and 
teamwork in buying situations as the incorporation of engineering, quality, financial and 
program management viewpoints usually improves the quality of a buying outcome. 
Extending this research to a joint buying decision would certainly be a meaningful 
addition to the body of literature.   
In terms of the psychological world of the buyer, the background of individuals 
refers to the educational background, lifestyle, professional values, and demographics of 
the person (or people, if a joint decision) making the buying decision. Previous 
experimental research in sourcing has examined experience, education, gender and 
industry sector as relevant individual characteristics to consider in sourcing decisions 
(Hall and Roth, 2015). Information sources, which refers to the various means by which 
buying- related information is communicated to a buyer, includes everything from sales 
to trade shows, internet search, word-of-mouth or direct mailings and distribution lists. 
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Active search refers to the amount of effort needed to seek out buying-related 
information, which Sheth (1973) contends is largely relegated to the purchasing 
specialist. 
Related to the seeking of information is the perceptual distortion that can occur 
when evaluating information. Purchasing specialists will potentially view objective 
information differently from engineering or manufacturing specialists (Sheth, 1973). This 
may be particularly true for counterfeiting signals as an engineer is likely to focus on the 
quality aspects of a proposal, while a purchasing specialist would potentially focus on the 
cost and delivery schedule. If counterfeit signals are present in one area and not the other, 
the ability to detect them would be different for an engineer versus a purchasing 
specialist. Satisfaction with past purchases refers to the degree to which a buyer (or 
buying team) perceives that a supplier delivered a product that met the needs of the 
organization. This satisfaction could vary between members of team. For our research, 
we controlled for this variable by explaining that our previous suppliers are not available 
so a new supplier must be found. 
In addition to the endogenous aspects that influence expectations among buyers, 
Sheth (1973) also identifies exogenous factors that can influence the outcome of a buying 
decision, including product, company, and situational specific factors. Product factors 
include considerations such as the cost of the item, its riskiness, and time pressure. Time 
pressure, or the need to make a decision rapidly, is of particular interest to our research. 
Sheth (1973) contends, and we agree, that time pressure will likely result in the buying 
decision being delegated to one individual so that is how we designed the decision in our 
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experiment. In consumer research, time pressure has been shown to adversely affect the 
quality of decision making in purchasing situations (Hahn, Lawson and Lee, 1992), so it 
is reasonable to test to determine if time pressure impacts purchasing specialists. 
Company specific factors include size, degree of centralization and company 
orientation. These are factors that we identified and controlled in our experiment. 
Situational factors, such as price controls, recession, or strikes (Sheth, 1973), also 
influence a buyer’s decision making process. For the purposes of our research we aim to 
assess the quality of the decision making process in a challenging situation. We propose 
that a supply chain disruption is a realistic situational factor to study because it requires a 
company to make a decision on a new supplier in a short timeframe. In addition to the 
buyer factors proposed by Sheth, it is necessary for us to understand what aspects of the 
purchase are of greatest importance to the buyer. 
Supplier Selection Criteria 
 There has been much discussion in the operations management literature on the 
criteria that buying firms use to select suppliers. Some of these criteria are related to the 
product being purchased, such as the price or product quality, while others relate to the 
characteristics of the supplier, including supplier finances, service, or technology 
capability. In research in the automotive industry including manufacturers and direct and 
indirect suppliers, Choi and Hartley’s (1996) factor analysis identified eight supplier 
selection factors based on an initial 26 supplier selection criteria. These were finances, 
consistency, relationship, technological capability, service, reliability and price. Krause, 
Pagell and Curkovic (2001) examined competitive priorities for purchasing and found  
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them similar to the competitive priorities for operations management, identifying the five 
factors of cost, quality, delivery, flexibility and innovation. More recently, in a review of 
multi-criteria decision making for evaluating suppliers, Ho, Xu and Dey (2010) identified 
quality, delivery and price/cost as the most frequently used evaluating criteria. Ho et al. 
(2010) also identified manufacturing capability, service, management, technology, 
research and development, and finance as additional frequently used criteria. Each of 
these criteria were identified in at least 23 papers published between 2000 and 2008.  
 Price is a particularly troublesome aspect of purchasing. By and large, purchasing 
specialists are charged to get the best deal that they can when procuring materials, 
components, sub-assemblies and the like. That said, there is a point where the price is 
simply “too good to be true.” An item that is priced too low or below the normal 
competitive range should raise suspicion in terms of its legitimacy or its provenance. In 
the context of deceptive counterfeits, this is often the case. We specifically modeled the 
price as too low in our high counterfeit signal groups. 
 Purchasing and supply chain managers have a substantial task in evaluating and 
assigning priority to these criteria. While the extant literature identifies quality, price and 
delivery as the principal criteria, there is not necessarily consensus on which of these 
factors is most important. In research combining a survey of perceived importance and a 
discrete choice analysis experiment of supplier selection, Verma and Pullman (1996) 
found that while buyers espouse the importance of quality, they actually select suppliers 
based on cost and delivery. Subsequent research conducted by Gray, Roth and Tomlin 
(2009) found the same to be true in a survey of manufacturers’ outsourcing priorities.  
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Choi and Hartley’s (2001) research, which contradicts these findings,  concluded 
that price was one of the least important considerations in supplier selection, while 
delivery and quality (together comprising a single factor of consistency) were the most 
important selection criteria. One potential explanation for this is that the concepts of cost 
and price, while related, are different from each other.  The lack of consensus in the 
literature is not surprising since the reality of sourcing is that there are situational factors 
that affect the degree of importance of each factor.  
For the purposes of our research, we focused on the selection criteria of cost, 
quality and delivery, as these three factors are the most universally applied to sourcing 
research (Giffi, Roth and Seal, 1990; Gray et al., 2009). We carefully applied counterfeit 
signals to both the cost and quality factors, offering only a little variation in proposed 
delivery schedules in the design of our experimental scenario to ensure it is a 
comprehensive and realistic depiction of a real-world sourcing decision problem. 
3.3  Research Model and Hypotheses 
Figure 3.1 is a graphical depiction of the specific research model we examined 
using a web-based role-playing scenario experiment methodology. It represents a 3x2x2 
factorial experimental design, with three independent variables of interest; 1.) the level 
counterfeit signaling in the counterfeit supplier’s offer, 2.) workload pressure and 3.) time 
pressure. Our dependent variable is the binary outcome representing the avoidance 
(versus selection) of the counterfeit supplier’s offer. In addition to the direct effects of the 
workload and time pressure variables, we also propose that their interaction has an 
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additional moderating effect on the strength of the relationship between counterfeit risk 
signals and supplier avoidance. 
 
FIGURE 3.1 – COUNTERFEIT SUPPLIER AVOIDANCE EXPERIMENTAL MODEL 
 In addition to assessing the actual selection or avoidance of the counterfeit 
supplier, we asked the participants to report the extent to which they preferred their given 
supplier over the supplier they did not select. As a corollary to our hypothesis regarding 
counterfeit signals and their effect on supplier avoidance, we posited that the degree of 
supplier preference would also be positively related to counterfeit signals. That is to say 
that we expected that those in the high and medium level counterfeit signal groups would  
display a greater preference for their chosen supplier because they were responding to 
specific elements of the supplier’s proposal that they find inadequate or unsatisfactory.  
 As depicted in Figure 3.1, the experimental model contained the operational 
independent variable of counterfeit signaling and the dependent variable of counterfeit 
supplier avoidance. We define counterfeit risk signals, our independent variable, 
66 
 
specifically as the combined set of product information, situational factors and 
supporting information available about the supplier to a potential buyer indicating that 
an offered product has a risk of actually being a counterfeit item rather than the genuine 
article. Counterfeit risk signals are poor attempts at deception that a buyer can, if 
properly identified, use to weed out and non-select a potential counterfeit supplier. 
Practitioner literature and expert interviews suggest that missing or incorrect part 
numbers, lot numbers, and incomplete or missing parts traceability information are all 
signals of a potential counterfeit situation (Metz, 2013; Livingston, 2013) in addition to 
the previously mentioned price that is too low.  
 We posit that two types of pressure will also affect the counterfeit supplier 
avoidance, specifically, the variables workload pressure and time pressure. We define 
workload pressure as the set of experimental cues intended to make the participant feel 
that his role as a purchasing specialist is particularly overburdened with many work 
duties to accomplish. We define our second moderating variable, time pressure, as the 
degree to which the time available to make a decision is constrained. Finally, we define 
our dependent variable, counterfeit supplier avoidance, as successfully avoiding selection 
of a supplier offering a deceptive product counterfeit. 
Hypotheses 
 Our first hypothesis describes the predicted negative relationship between the 
level of counterfeit signaling and the decision to avoid a deceptive product counterfeit 
supplier. Our specific hypothesis is: 
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H1: The level of counterfeit signaling will be positively related to counterfeit 
supplier avoidance. 
This hypothesis is based on Economic Signaling Theory, which was originally employed 
by Spence (1973, 1974) to explain job market signals and feedback. This theory was 
subsequently tested in deceptive counterfeit purchasing situations for consumers by 
Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich (2010) and further investigated in exploratory research by 
Stevenson and Busby (2015). Signaling Theory, as applied to counterfeit situations, 
suggests that agents can convey information, either honest or dishonest, that causes a 
principal to alter his/her behavior, particularly in situations where information asymmetry 
exists. In the case of counterfeiting, success depends upon masking attributes of the item 
that would signal it is a fake and highlighting attributes that make the item appear 
genuine (Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich, 2010). We posit that if the signals are 
incomplete or inconsistent with expectations, a purchasing specialist should avoid 
selecting that item.  
Crime Prevention Theory states that sufficient guardianship can help prevent a 
crime from occurring. As the point of entry into a company’s supply chain, purchasing 
specialists are in the unique position to serve as guardians. To effectively fulfill this 
guardianship, they need to be able to detect known signals of counterfeit items. Table 3.1 
lists the potential counterfeit signals that might be present in a sourcing decision. 
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COUNTERFEIT SIGNALS AVAILABLE PRIOR TO SUPPLIER 
SELECTION 
• Part being procured is an obsolete item  
• Independent parts distributor 
• Missing certification and industry standard inspection information 
• Missing/inaccurate part numbers, lot numbers or serial numbers 
• Product type has history of being counterfeited (e.g. microcircuits, 
pharmaceuticals) 
• Supplier is on list of debarred suppliers 
• Supplier reluctance to provide sample item for inspection 
• Item priced below the competitive range of previous purchases 
TABLE 3.1 – POTENTIAL COUNTERFEIT SIGNALS DURING SOURCING 
DECISION 
 
While we cannot use all of these signals in our experiment, we mention them all as 
important considerations for researchers and practitioners alike. For our experiment at the 
medium level, we included the quality aspects of counterfeit risk signals  of 1.) the part is 
an obsolete item, 2.) the counterfeit supplier is an independent distributor and 3.) the 
product type, industrial fasteners, has a history of being counterfeited. Additionally, the 
proposal itself had quality problems, including missing and incomplete information 
regarding lot numbers and industry certifications. At the high level of signaling, we 
included a price that is substantially below the competitive range listed in the scenario’s 
part history information in addition to all of the elements included in the medium level of 
counterfeit risk signals.  
 In a perfect world, purchasing specialists would have ample time and workload 
levels to conduct thorough information searches and evaluations of proposals for each 
item they procure. In reality, purchasing specialists can be overworked or have to make 
decisions under time constraints. As this is the reality for most purchasing departments, 
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we must include these considerations and assess their impact on the quality of decision 
making in purchasing situations. 
 Time pressure exists when a person has a limited time to make a decision. This 
construct has been employed in a wide variety of decision making situations in studies of 
decision making and risk under time pressure (Kocher, Pahlke and Trautmann, 2013, Ben 
Zur and Breznitz, 1981). In the situation most relevant to our research, experimental 
research in consumer purchasing decision making has shown that quality is negatively 
affected by time pressure (Hahn et al., 1992). This is consistent with Sheth’s (1973) 
inclusion of temporal considerations in his model of industrial buyer behavior. Based on 
this information, we believe that time pressure will have a negative impact on the 
purchasing specialist’s decision quality. Specifically, we hypothesize that:   
 H2: The level of time pressure will be negatively related to supplier avoidance.  
Simply put, we posit that time constraining the decision process will result in failure to 
adequately process the signals, thus resulting in lower levels of supplier avoidance in the 
selection decision. 
 Similar to time constraints, feeling overburdened  with a great deal of work can 
cause a buyer to develop coping mechanisms, such as problem-solving skills, shortcuts or 
schemas, to reduce the burden associated with task accomplishment. In these situations, 
techniques to “work smarter, not harder” may be employed to limit the processing burden 
associated with tasks. While these mechanisms may improve processing speed, they may 
inadvertently degrade the quality of decision making by causing the buyer to miss 
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important and relevant information in the decision situation. Specifically, we 
hypothesize:  
H3: The level of workload pressure will be negatively related to supplier 
avoidance.  
Similar to our hypothesis for time pressure, we posit that workload pressure cues will 
negative affect the decision process and result in failure to adequately process the signals, 
thus resulting in lower levels of supplier avoidance in the decision.  
 Our final hypothesis acknowledges that the combination of workload pressure and 
a time constrained decision will act synergistically to further detract from the ability to 
avoid the counterfeit supplier. This interaction will further amplify the noise and detract 
from decision quality. Specifically, we hypothesize: 
H4: Workload pressure and time pressure will interact to further negatively 
moderate the relationship between counterfeit signaling and supplier avoidance. 
We present our 3x2x2 factorial design matrix in Table 3.2.   
Group Counterfeit 
Signals 
Workload 
Pressure 
Time 
Pressure 
1 Low Low Low 
2 Low Low High 
3 Low High Low 
4 Low High High 
5 Medium Low Low 
6 Medium Low High 
7 Medium High Low 
8 Medium High High 
9 High Low Low 
10 High Low High 
11 High High Low 
12 High High High 
TABLE 3.2 – DESIGN MATRIX 
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3.4  Research Methods 
Fundamentally, our research explores the managerial decision making process for 
purchasing specialists dealing with counterfeit situations that affect supply chains. 
Studying the human decision making processes that affect operations processes positions 
our research within the domain of behavioral operations management (Crosan, Schultz, 
Siemsen and Yeo, 2013). Experimentation is an ideal methodology for sourcing and 
purchasing management questions and for exploring decision making because it enables 
the researcher to directly manipulate the variables of interest and draw causal inferences 
while also relaxing some of the dependency on traditional mathematical modeling 
assumptions regarding trust and rationality (Bendoly, Donohue and Schultz, 2006). Our 
experiment is a 3 x 2 x 2 factorial design, with three levels of counterfeit signals and two 
levels of time pressure and workload pressure. 
Target Population and Sample Characteristics 
 As we explored the ability to detect counterfeit signals during a purchasing 
decision, our target population was comprised of individuals who participate in 
purchasing decisions in a business or public sector organization (not consumer 
purchasing). As noted by Sheth (1973), purchasing decisions can be individual or joint 
ones.  Purchasing specialists, contracting specialists, engineers, supply chain managers 
and program managers are potential participants in purchasing decisions. With that in 
mind, we wanted to select a sample of individuals from professional backgrounds that fit 
the profile of our intended population. We requested participation from the Logistics 
Officers Association, which is a professional organization of more than 2700 military 
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officers and civilians in the acquisition, technology and logistics professions. LOA is an 
appropriate sample because it contains individuals who participate in acquiring and 
sustaining defense systems, particularly significant here because the defense sector has 
been identified as a target of deceptive counterfeits. There are additional professional 
organizations that could also serve as representative samples, for example the Institute for 
Supply Management, the Council of Supply Chain Professionals, and the National 
Contracts Management Association. 
Sample Composition 
Table 3.3 details the demographic information of our sample.  As not all of the 
participants answered all of the demographic questions, the table includes a column 
providing a response count for each question. There are some notable demographic 
factors that must be addressed as potential limitations of our sample in terms of 
generalizability. Firstly, our sample was comprised of individuals who belong to a 
professional society, which means they may be more interested in doing their jobs well 
and developing their skills in their fields. Secondly, our sample was predominantly male 
(76% male versus 24% female), which, while not surprising and consistent with the 
demographic composition of the military, does present a concern we must address. 
Previous studies using more general purchasing populations, such as the membership of 
the Institute for Supply Management (Hall and Roth, 2015), indicate that the gender of 
purchasing specialists is more evenly distributed, closer to 60% male and 40% female. As 
such, we specifically tested for gender effects in our models. Our sample was also largely 
college educated, with 96% having a Bachelor’s degree, and 70% holding an advanced 
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degree (Master’s or higher). As these educational attainment rates are higher than those 
observed by Hall and Roth (2015), we also tested for an education effect to assess 
whether this difference is relevant to the sourcing decision.   
Age   Gender 
  N % 
 
  N % 
20-29 27 24.55% 
 
Male 82 74.55% 
30-39 25 22.73% 
 
Female 26 23.64% 
40-49 26 23.64% 
 
Not Reported 2 1.82% 
50-59 19 17.27% 
   
  
60-69 8 7.27% 
   
  
70-79 1 0.91% 
 
Education 
Not Reported 4 3.64% 
 
  N % 
  
   
High School / GED 0 0.00% 
Position Level 
 
Some College 1 0.91% 
  N % 
 
Associate's 1 0.91% 
Top Management 27 24.55% 
 
Bachelor's 29 26.36% 
Middle Management 25 22.73% 
 
Master's  65 59.09% 
Supervisor 26 23.64% 
 
Post Master's 7 6.36% 
Professional 19 17.27% 
 
Doctoral 5 4.55% 
Other 8 7.27% 
 
Not Reported 2 1.82% 
  
     
  
Overall N = 110 
TABLE 3.3 – SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHIC SUMMARY 
Scenario Based Role Playing Experiments 
Because of the potential quality impacts to real-world organizations, field 
experimentation in an applied setting is not possible without negative consequences. As 
such, we were constrained to selecting between a laboratory-based or scenario-based 
experiment. Lab experiments can require substantial investment in facilities and support 
as well as scheduling of researchers and participants, thus making them cost prohibitive 
in large scales. Fortunately, our research involved signals present in sourcing 
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documentation, so we were able to use a scenario-based role playing experimental 
approach. This approach can leverage the paperless world of internet-based research 
software platforms to reduce costs while being representative of the real-world 
purchasing environment, which is largely conducted in the context of electronic 
commerce and involves reviewing online information to enable decision making.  For 
these reasons, a scenario-based role playing experimental approach is a relevant and 
effective method for studying the sourcing decision making process in situations with a 
potential counterfeit hazard. 
While scenario-based role playing experiments reduce the investment burden 
compared to laboratory experiments, it, in no way, should be construed that they require 
less design effort. Because it is important to make the participant in this method feel 
immersed in the experience to elicit the desired realistic response, it is of the utmost 
importance to spend considerable time and effort focusing on the design of the scenario 
and specific vignettes. We followed the design approach recommended by 
Rungtusanatham, Wallin and Eckerd (2011), which offers specific considerations in three 
phases of research: the pre-design, design, and post-design stages.      
Pre-Design Stage 
 The pre-design stage is focused on two areas, becoming familiar with the context 
of the situation that the research seeks to examine and then understanding the relevant 
factors that influence it (Rungtusanatham et al, 2011). We conducted extensive literature 
reviews in the academic and practitioner literature as well as conducted interviews with 
two subject matter experts in the area of counterfeit problems in industrial buying 
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situations so that we could craft a realistic scenario that would be representative of a real 
world purchasing decision.   Our working paper on the theoretical bases for exploring the 
counterfeit phenomena provides a detailed description of our literature review and 
interview findings (Watson and Roth, 2015). Additionally, we examined existing 
purchasing documents available on the world-wide web to understand the typical 
documents that would be used in these purchasing situations.  
Design Stage 
 To develop our experiment’s common module and experimental cues module, we 
followed Rungtusanatham et al.’s (2011) recommendations where we could. We included 
appropriate purchasing language and formats into the scenario and supporting document 
artifacts to make them reasonable and representative of purchasing situation artifacts. The 
deceptive counterfeit phenomenon has not been explored in previous supply chain 
management research so there were no available vignettes to reuse. That said, our 
literature review of the practitioner literature provided us with examples of counterfeit 
items and the paperwork related to them to help construct realistic experimental products. 
Post-Design Stage 
 Once we had initial drafts of the vignettes and questions, we asked purchasing 
experts to provide reviews, and we conducted two rounds of Q sorts to refine the 
language to improve the clarity and reliability of the instruments. After we had 
reasonable instruments, we uploaded them into the Qualtrics online research software and 
conducted three rounds of pilot testing to further improve the instruments. 
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 Our first round of pilot testing involved  a small group (n = 12) of executive 
supply chain management Master’s degree students at a Midwest university using only 
three of our experimental groups. We used this group of students because they were a 
reasonable proxy group for our population of interest, purchasing and supply chain 
management professionals. This group provided initial valuable feedback and 
constructive criticism in terms of realism and the quality of the experiment.  
The next two rounds of pilot testing were conducted using MBA students at a 
university in the Southeast. This second round of pilot testing was based on refinements 
from the first round and included a larger scale (n = 90) to allow us to run all of our 
proposed scenarios. During the second round of pilot testing, we had two levels of each 
of our factors. The results from the pilot test suggested that it would be worthwhile to add 
a third level of the counterfeit signal independent variable so that we could isolate the 
price counterfeit signal (i.e. priced too good to be true) from the non-price elements of 
the counterfeit signal.  
The manipulation checks during the second round identified one error in the 
design. We had included information that one of the offerors was an “independent parts 
distributor” in the low level. Since this is a counterfeit signal, it should not have been 
incorporated. This was subsequently corrected, and the third round of pilot testing 
provided suitable responses on all of the manipulation checks. Our final round of pilot 
testing also enabled us to have a complete run of our final instrument. In the end, all pilot 
rounds were beneficial to improving the overall design, identifying errors, and improving 
the clarity and realism of the experiment. 
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Experimental Procedure  
As mentioned previously, we prepared our experimental instrument and used 
Qualtrics software to enable internet distribution and participation. To assist in the 
recruitment of participants for our research, the Logistics Officers Association sent an 
invitational email and advertised the request for participation on its website and in its 
social media post, “The Logistics Pulse.” As a result of these efforts, we received 245 
responses. Of them, 130 did not agree during the informed consent or did not proceed to 
answer the selection decision question, and 5 others dropped out of the experiment before 
completing all of the answers. After these reductions, our remaining sample was a total of 
110 participants for an approximate response rate of 3.94%, based on LOA’s 2,791 active 
members. Our experiment was activated for three weeks during the fall of 2015, during 
which time one reminder advertisement in “The Logistics Pulse” was sent out. 
Experimental Design Checks  
Manipulation Checks 
 For the purpose of assessing convergent validity, we examined whether the 
participants’ perceptions of our manipulations were interpreted as we had intended.   This 
is consistent with Perdue and Sommers’ (1986) view that manipulation checks ensure that 
the subject in an experiment is actually aware of and responding to the variables of 
interest. To test for whether our manipulations were effective, we asked a combination of 
closed-ended questions and 7-point Likert Scale items. For our counterfeit signal 
variable, we asked whether the part was an obsolete item and if the supplier was an 
independent parts distributor. For the time pressure variable, we asked to identify if there 
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was a timer present in the experiment (only true for the high time pressure groups). 
Finally, for the workload pressure variable, we asked the participants questions regarding 
whether  they felt pressure (these questions were the Likert-scaled items). 
 All of our questions, with the exception of the independent parts distributor 
question, were significant as detailed by the regression summaries in Table 3.4. The fact 
that the independent parts distributor cues were not processed by the participants may be 
more attributable to the fact that the participants in the low counterfeit signal group were 
told that one supplier was a parts distributor while those in medium and high groups were 
told that the supplier was an independent parts distributor. It is possible that the 
distinction between the two was too subtle a differentiation for participants to 
comprehend easily.  
DV IV N F (1, 108) Prob > F R
2 
ManipObs CS 110 9.31 .0029 .0794 
ManipIndPart CS 110 0.20 .6562 .0018 
ManipTime TP 110 514.88 .0000 .8266 
TooMuchWork WP 110 16.83 .0001 .1359 
LargeQuantityWork WP 110 3.40 .0677 .0306 
FeltOverwork WP 110 20.78 .0000 .1613 
TABLE 3.4 – SUMMARY OF MANIPULATION CHECK REGRESSIONS 
Overall, our manipulation checks present statistical support for the fact that the 
participants were responding to the experimental design.  
Realism Checks 
 In addition to checking whether participants respond to intended manipulations, it 
is equally important to ensure that the scenarios in the experiment are realistic and 
represent situations that the sample,  and, by extension, the population of interest, 
encounter in the real world. To ensure our experimental design accounts for this 
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important consideration, we adapted the scale developed by Pilling, Crosby and Jackson 
(1994) to assess the extent to which our scenarios were realistic and likely for our 
participants to encounter in the real world. The answers were based on a 7-point Likert 
scale with 1 being Strongly Disagree and 7 being Strongly Agree. Table 3.5 details the 
specific questions and the means and variances of the responses to each question. 
Realism Check Question Mean Std. Dev 
The scenario described in the study is realistic. 5.66 1.18 
I took my role described in the scenario seriously. 6.23 1.01 
In my work, I rarely encounter the issues discussed in these scenarios. 3.70 1.87 
I am highly aware of the issues raised in this scenario. 5.25 1.70 
TABLE 3.5 – REALISM CHECK SUMMARY STATISTICS 
These results suggest that our participants found our scenarios to be realistic, familiar and 
reasonable and that they took their roles seriously. We do note that some of the 
participants do not encounter these issues in their work. This is not entirely unreasonable 
for our sample as some members of the Logistics Officers Association work in such 
fields as aircraft maintenance and thus, do not directly purchase parts. They do, however, 
manage maintenance actions that utilize the products of business-to-business type 
transactions. 
Common Methods Variance Checks 
 One potential source of error that must be proactively addressed is the issue of 
systematic error associated with common methods bias. To address this potential source 
of bias, we employed two ex-ante items to control for common methods. We inserted 
four items from the General Self Efficacy scale (Schwarzer and Jerusalem, 1990) and one 
question on whether childhood vaccination exemptions should be granted only in the case 
of medical need. We aggregated the responses on the four questions regarding problem 
80 
 
solving from the General Self Efficacy scale (on a 7-point Likert scale for level of 
agreement) specifically:  
“When I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several solutions.” 
“I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort.” 
“I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events.” 
“I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough” 
The response on this scale did not relate to the response on our dependent variable, 
supplier selection. Based on the lack of statistical significance, we can reasonably 
conclude that common method bias, or systemic error as a result of common instrument, 
is not present in our data.   
When examining beyond a simple regression of the vaccination question on our 
dependent variable, if we apply Harman’s (1976) single factor approach to our common 
methods variance questions, we find that each individual factor analysis reveals that the 
five common methods variance questions and the dependent variable do not map well 
onto a single factor (Eigenvalues all less than 1), suggesting that in total, common 
methods bias is not present in our model. Finally, Siemsen, Roth and Oliviera (2010) 
demonstrate common methods variance is less problematic for models that contain 
interaction terms, even in the case where the additional factors have common methods 
variance. As our model contains interaction terms, this provides additional support for 
our assessment that common methods variance is not a problem for our model. 
Model Specification 
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 We analyzed our data using logistic regression in Stata 12.0. Logistic regression is 
an appropriate technique for analyzing relationships involving dichotomous dependent 
variables. Our model included the independent variables of interest, the moderating effect 
of the interaction of time pressure and workload pressure, and the demographic variables 
of interest, specifically age, gender, education level, industry and non-native English 
language. In our models, Counterfeit Signals (abbreviated CS) has three levels, 0, 1 or 2, 
with 0 being Low signaling, 1 being Medium level of signaling, and 2 being a High level 
of signaling. Time Pressure (TP) and Workload Pressure (WP) are binary variables, with 
0 indicating that the condition did not apply and 1 indicating that the condition applied to 
the participant’s group. Finally, the interaction of time pressure and workload pressure is 
indicated as (TP X WP).  
We created multiple dummy variables for our categorical demographic variable 
for Industry Sectors. We had options for twenty industry sectors, but not all of them were 
used, so we created dummy variables only for those reported in the data using the Stata 
command tabulate Sector, generate (Industry) to create dummy variables for the 11 
sectors reported by participants.  
We modeled Education as a categorical variable in ascending order from high 
school to doctoral degree. Binary dummy variables were created for gender (Male = 0, 
Female = 1) and non-native English speaking (Native = 0, Non-Native = 1). Additionally, 
we added variables for capturing purchasing and logistics/supply chain experience, the 
annual purchasing volume (categorical, ascending in $) and the number of purchases the 
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participant was involved in during the last year. The specification of our level 1 model is 
as follows: 
𝑙𝑛 [
𝑝?̂?
1−𝑝?̂?
] = 𝐵𝑖𝑋𝑖 + 𝐵0       (Equation 1) 
where 𝑝?̂? = the predicted probability of i being a case and where i = the individual 
participants in our experiment.  
Our Level Two model is written as follows: 
Bi =  B0 + B1 (CS) + B2 (TP)+ B3 (WP) + B4 (TP X WP) + B5 (Female) + B6 
(Education) + B7 (Educational Services) + B8 (Finance & Insurance) + B9 
(Information) + B10 (Management of Companies and Enterprises) + B11 
(Manufacturing) + B 12 (Other Services (except Public Administration)) + 
B13 (Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services) + B14 (Public 
Administration) + B15 (Retail Trade) + B16 (Transportation and 
Warehousing) + B17 (Wholesale Trade) + B18 (Purchasing Experience) + 
B19 (Logistics / Supply Chain Experience) 
       (Equation 2) 
If, as anticipated, none of the demographic variables are significant, the level two model 
reduces to the simpler structure of: 
Bi =  B0 + B1 (CS) + B2 (TP) + B3 (WP) + B4 (TP X WP)   
       (Equation 3) 
Another equation we used to examine our model is the unweighted effects coding 
version, which allows us to make comparisons of means between our sample groups even 
though the number of participants is not equally balanced across all groups (Cohen, 
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Cohen, West and Aiken, 2003). For this model, we constructed grouping variables, with 
our control group (Group 1) as the reference group, which was coded onto the Group2 
through Group12 variables with a value of -1, while all other groups were coded as 0 and 
1.  The unweighted effects coded model specification, with B0 representing our control 
group, Group1, is as follows: 
Yi = B0 + B1Group2 + B2Group3 + B3Group4 + B4Group5 + B5Group6 + 
B6Group7 + B7Group8 + B8Group9 + B9Group10 + B10Group11 + 
B11Group12 + ri  
While in most cases, using ordinary least squares regression on a dichotomous 
dependent variable produces coefficients that are difficult to interpret, in this particular 
case, the coefficients represented the differences in means compared to the mean of 
Group1, which is simply the proportion of participants who avoided the counterfeit 
supplier in the selection decision. 
3.5  Results 
Logistic Regression 
 We analyzed our data using logistic regression. When we constructed the model 
as detailed in Equation 2, which included the demographics as predictor variables, only 
counterfeit signaling and the supply chain experience demographic variable were 
significant predictors of the selection decision. The logistic regression model results for 
the relationships of interest, including demographics, as specified in Equation 2 are 
presented in Table 3.5.  
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In terms of finding support for our predicted relationships, only one of our four 
hypotheses was supported. We found the level of counterfeit signaling to be a significant 
predictor of supplier avoidance. That is to say, participants had a higher probability of 
avoiding the counterfeit supplier in the medium and high counterfeit groups than the 
participants assigned to the low level groups for the counterfeit signal variable. 
Additionally, we found that the years of supply chain or logistics management experience 
was a significant predictor of counterfeit avoidance. As the years of this experience 
increased, the probability of avoiding the counterfeit supplier increased. 
 Model  
Variable Hypothesis Coefficient Std Error  
Intercept  -2.611 1.847  
CS 1 1.018** 0.294  
WP 2 .895 0.759  
TP 3 -.591 0.773  
TP X WP 4 -.172 1.033  
Female  -.465 0.597  
Education  .134 0.337  
Industry     
1. Manufacturing  -.756 1.201  
2. Wholesale Trade  Omitted   
3. Transportation & 
Warehousing 
 
Omitted 
 
 
4. Information  .170 .869  
5. Retail Trade  Omitted   
6. Finance & Insurance  Omitted   
7. Prof, Scientific & 
Technical Services 
 
-.107 1.016 
 
8. Mgt of Companies & 
Enterprises 
 
-.723 1.07 
 
9. Educational Services  Omitted   
10. Other Services (except 
Public Administration 
 
.749 .912 
 
11. Public Administration  Omitted   
Purchasing Experience  -0.005 0.049  
Logistics / Supply Chain 
Experience 
 
0.058** 0.027 
 
     
N = 98  χ2(13) = 24.97     
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Log Likelihood = -55.114 Prob > χ2      = 0.023** 
  Pseudo R
2
 = 0.185  
    
 
**p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01;  Bold indicates statistically significant regression coefficients 
TABLE 3.5 – LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL STATISTICS 
In terms of a simple regression of the supplier selection variable on the 
unweighted experimental group means, the overall model was found to be statistically 
significant, with the majority of the group means being statistically different from the 
reference (Group1) group’s mean. The summary of this regression is provided in Table 
3.6. In this case, the reported mean is the mean of the Select variable for that Group, 
which can be interpreted as the proportion of participants in that group who avoided the 
counterfeit supplier in the selection decision (the Select variable is coded 0 for the 
counterfeit supplier and 1 for the non-counterfeit supplier), while the coefficients for 
Groups 2 – 12 represent the difference between the unweighted mean of that Group and 
mean of all the Groups, which is the coefficient of the intercept (.554). The overall model  
is statistically significant with an N of 110, 11 degrees of freedom for the model and 98 
degrees of freedom for the residual. The F value for the model (F 11, 98) is   2.82, with a 
p value of .0031, indicating the overall model is a highly significant model.  
The groups with the most substantial difference in selection were groups 2 and 4, 
in which participants were far more likely to select the counterfeit supplier. In these cases 
where the counterfeit signals were lower, the negative coefficient indicates that the 
participants were more likely to select the counterfeit rather than avoid it. This is 
consistent with our hypothesis.  It should be noted that Group 3 was only marginally 
statistically significant at the p < .10 in terms of unweighted mean difference. The small 
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sample sizes of our groups make it difficult to achieve statistical significance in mean 
differences in every group.  
Group Counterfeit 
Signals 
Workload 
Pressure 
Time 
Pressure 
Mean N Coefficient P value 
1 Low Low Low 0.375 8 #  
2 Low Low High 0.000 6 -0.554 0.002*** 
3 Low High Low 0.300 10 -0.254 0.072* 
4 Low High High 0.308 13 -0.246 0.050** 
5 Medium Low Low 0.700 10 0.146 0.296 
6 Medium Low High 0.400 5 -0.154 0.425 
7 Medium High Low 0.818 11 0.265 0.051* 
8 Medium High High 0.769 13 0.216 0.086* 
9 High Low Low 0.700 10 0.146 0.296 
10 High Low High 0.857 7 0.303 0.067* 
11 High High Low 0.750 8 0.196 0.206 
12 High High High 0.667 9 0.113 0.441 
Intercept      0.554 0 
* p <.10, ** p <.05, *** p <.01 
TABLE 3.6 – UNWEIGHTED EFFECTS CODED REGRESSION  
Post-estimation Test for Heteroscedasticity 
 To ensure our model was free of heteroscedasticity, we conducted post-estimation 
testing on our regression model. For heteroscedasticity, we used the Breusch-Pagan / 
Cook-Weisberg test (hettest command in Stata 12.0) for heteroscedasticity, which tests to 
determine if variances are consistent across all fitted values. Not surprisingly, our 
heteroscedasticity tests were not significant for the selection dependent variable (χ2 (1) = 
.09, prob > χ2 = .762).  
Relationship Between Select Decision and Degree of Supplier Preference 
While we find that the level of counterfeit signaling does have a significant effect 
on the avoidance of the supplier, we wanted to examine if there was a substantial 
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difference in the extent of preference between those who selected the counterfeit supplier 
(Select = 0) and those who avoided the counterfeit supplier (Select = 1). A simple 
regression of the outcome of our 7-pt scaled question asking for the extent of preference 
revealed a significant difference in the degree of preference. The regression coefficient of 
Prefer was 1.36, which can be interpreted as those in the group who avoided the 
counterfeit supplier, on average, assessed their preference as higher by 1.36 points on a 7- 
point scale. Table 3.7 contains the specific regression information. 
 Source SS df MS 
 
N = 109 
Model 48.9443 1 48.9443 
 
F(1, 107) = 27.2700 
Residual 192.0649 107 1.794999 
 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
Total 241.0092 108 2.231566 
 
R
2 
= 0.2031 
     
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.1956 
     
Root MSE = 1.3398 
        Prefer Coef. SE T P>t 95% CI 
Select 1.356798 0.259834 5.22 0.000 0.841707 1.871889 
Intercept 3.913043 0.197539 19.81 0.000 3.521 4.304 
TABLE 3.7 – REGRESSION OF PREFERENCE ON SELECTION DECISION 
3.6  Discussion 
 In terms of our a priori model, only H1, the hypothesis that counterfeit signaling 
is positively related to supplier avoidance, was supported. This result is consistent with 
Signaling Theory, which proposes that as the level of signaling increases, the ability to 
detect and process the signal increases. As expected, as the level of counterfeit signaling 
increased, the participants were more likely to avoid the supplier. 
 While we found that the medium and high levels of counterfeit signals resulted in 
supplier avoidance; however, the degree of difference between these two levels was not 
statistically significant, meaning that we can’t conclude that purchasing specialists  
88 
 
specifically avoided an item priced below the competitive range seen in previous 
purchases. As such, further research is required to isolate and test for this specific 
consideration. This is also true for the other signals of counterfeits. It is possible that 
these signals are multi-faceted, and it would be worthwhile to test whether one particular 
signal is more important than the others. Given the ongoing debate we identified earlier 
in the article regarding price versus schedule versus quality, understanding the hierarchy 
of importance of counterfeit signals might prove worthwhile in explaining why 
counterfeits make it into supply chains even in situations where experienced and qualified 
guardians exist.  
 In regards to time pressure, workload pressure and their interaction, we did not 
find statistical support for these three hypotheses. There are two potential explanations 
for this. First, our sample size was small (N = 110) relative to what is desired for a 3x2x2 
full factorial experimental design, thus limiting the power of our analysis. It is possible 
that a relationship might exist but that we are unable to detect it in a statistically 
significant way. Another potential explanation involves our sample group. The members 
of the Logistics Officer’s Association are largely associated with the military, and, as 
such, may demonstrate a greater ability to deal with high pressure situations, both in 
terms of workload complexity and time constraints. While this particular sample may not 
react to time pressure, we did see evidence in our second pilot study that time pressure 
has an impact on the decision process. To resolve this apparent inconsistency, we 
recommend that further analysis be conducted with a broader range of purchasing 
specialists in a variety of supply chains. Finally, the experimental design may not have 
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been substantial enough to trigger a response to the pressure cues. One method to assess 
the quality of these pressure cues in evoking an actual stress response is to conduct a test 
of the experiment in a controlled setting and measure participants’ levels of alpha-
amylase, a hormone produced by individuals experiencing stress, prior to and 
immediately following administration of the experiment to objectively measure if 
participants experience a higher level of stress in the time and workload pressure groups. 
This approach has been utilized in research in management information systems 
(Galluch, Grover and Thatcher, 2015)  
 As our first-order independent variables were not significant predictors of the 
selection decision, it is not surprising that our hypothesis regarding the interaction effect 
of time pressure and workload pressure was not substantiated. Again, this is likely the 
result of the small sample size and its effect on the statistical power of our analysis. 
Limitations 
 As mentioned earlier, there are two primary limitations in terms of the 
generalizability of our findings. First, our sample was drawn from a professional society 
in one industry sector.  As such it may not be representative of the larger purchasing 
population across industries in terms of education, gender and personality traits.  
The second limitation of our research is that we were not able to directly 
determine whether price or quality is more important in the decision. The design of our 
counterfeit signal variable was additive in nature, with price being included at the high 
level in addition to the quality signals in the medium level. To remedy this problem, the 
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counterfeit signal variable should have four levels, with the additional level containing 
price signals only to allow for direct analysis of this relationship. 
Opportunities for Future Research  
This essay represents an initial study on  the behavior of purchasing specialists in 
terms of their responsibilities as guardians of the supply chain. There are several ways in 
which this research can be extended. First, there are several dimensions of Sheth’s Model 
of Industrial Buyer Behavior (1973) which we controlled in our design for the sake of 
simplicity. Several of these factors may influence the quality of decision making in 
counterfeit situations. Most notably, we limited the purchasing decision to a single buyer 
acting autonomously. In many business situations, complex and/or expensive purchasing 
decisions usually involve teams of technical specialists and purchasing experts, so it 
would be worthwhile to design the experiment to enable two or more people to 
collaborate on the decision to see if joint decision making improved the ability to detect 
the counterfeit signals. Doing so would also provide insights into the priorities that 
different occupational specialties place on price, schedule and quality in purchasing 
decisions.  
Another opportunity for future research is related to understanding the relative 
importance of each of the counterfeit signals identified in Table 3.2, particularly as they 
relate to specific types of products or subcomponents. While the price being below the 
competitive range might be a universally relevant signal of potential counterfeiting, some 
of the other signals may be more or less relevant across different types of purchases. 
Incorrect lot or part number information would clearly not be relevant in a situation 
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where raw materials are being purchased. Developing and typologies or taxonomies of 
counterfeit signals would provide insights into the phenomena that would benefit 
practitioners and potentially enable tailoring of counterfeit prevention training and 
development of quality controls for purchasing decisions.    
A final recommended extension of this research stream is to assess the effects of 
prior experience with counterfeiting and training on counterfeits on the quality of the 
purchasing decision. This would provide additional insights into the guardianship of the 
supply chain that might improve the firm’s ability to avoid counterfeit infiltration. To be 
comprehensive, further research should examine what elements of training and 
experience have the most benefit to supply chains. 
From a methodological perspective, we employed a scenario-based experimental 
design because it allowed for control and ease of execution by means of distribution via 
email and participation in a distributed setting at a time that was convenient for 
participants. To broaden the understanding of the counterfeit problem in applied settings, 
case-based research and surveys could be employed as methods to explore the 
phenomenon. Case-based research would be particularly useful in refining the list of 
potential signals of counterfeits by working with companies that have experienced 
counterfeit problems in their supply chains. 
3.7  Conclusion 
 The goal of this research was to add to the body of knowledge in supply chain 
management regarding deceptive counterfeits, which is an important contemporary 
problem facing practitioners across all supply chains. Using a Signal Theory and Crime 
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Prevention theoretical lens to examine the problem, we constructed a realistic and 
effective set of scenarios to test whether purchasing and supply chain personnel could 
detect signals of counterfeits in purchasing decisions.  
Overall, our effort has contributed to answering the call to examine supply chain 
security issues, which is a growing stream of literature in our discipline that is of 
paramount importance to practitioners. This experiment successfully extends the work of 
Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich (2010) from the consumer into the B2B sector, testing a 
set of counterfeit signals proposed in the practitioner literature and knowledge base. We 
found that an increase in the collective level of signals of a potential counterfeit situation 
(e.g. parts obsolescence, item having been subject to counterfeiting in the past, priced 
below the competitive range, and missing and inaccurate proposal, part numbers and lot 
numbers) had the collective effect of causing participants to avoid selection of the 
counterfeit supplier.   
 While we also sought to understand the effects of time and workload pressure in 
the decision making process where counterfeits are concerned, we did not have sufficient 
power, largely the result of our small sample size, to find a meaningful relationship 
between these proposed sources of noise and the ability to successfully detect counterfeit 
signals. Future research should focus on refining the time and workload pressure 
measures and determining what types of adaptive and compensating behaviors assist in 
overcoming them. 
Due to our small sample size and frame, we recognize the limitations of the 
generalizability of the findings of our research. To improve the overall relevance and 
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reach of this work, future research efforts should test these scenarios using a broader 
sample of purchasing specialists. This research could also be improved by incorporating 
considerations for joint or team purchasing decisions by obtaining dyads of purchasing 
and technical team members and employing a multi-level mixed modeling approach to 
assess individual and team effects on decisions involving potential counterfeit situations.  
Counterfeits remain a real problem for supply chain managers, and we have only 
begun to explore this phenomenon. Because of the criminal nature of counterfeiting and 
the potential profits, perpetrators of the crime will continue to adapt and respond to the 
prevention and detection techniques used to protect supply chains. As such, the research 
in this area will need to keep pace and evolve over time to react and respond 
appropriately.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Essay Three: Objective Versus 
Perceptual Measures of Time 
Pressure: An Exploratory 
Methodological Note 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 This essay is a methodological note that explores the relationship of perceptual 
assessments of time pressure and measures of the observed amount of time spent in 
decision making to determine if these are strongly related to one another. It is also 
intended to provide insight into whether these two approaches for assessing time pressure 
are equally valuable in terms of their relationship to actual time constraints and decision 
quality in a scenario-based role playing experiment involving  a business-to-business 
purchasing situation. 
 Too often, purchasing specialists are burdened with time constraints, meaning 
they have only  a limited amount of time to spend on a purchasing decision as a result of 
large workloads or insufficient quantities of personnel in buying organizations.  
According to a 2014 analysis by Economic Modeling Specialists International in the Wall 
Street Journal, approximately half of purchasing manager positions advertised were 
going unfilled  (Weber, 2014). Given this shortfall, it is reasonable to conclude that 
existing staff are being asked either to do less purchasing or to spend less time 
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accomplishing the same purchasing tasks, calling into question the quality of the decision 
process.   Quality failures in supply chains are a relevant contemporary issue in supply 
chain management, with one of the most cited works in this area by Roth, Tsay, Pullman 
and Gray (2008) providing  a thorough discussion of supply chain quality management. 
There has been considerable research on the perception of time versus the actual 
passing of time in a variety of psychology and marketing books and research journals. 
Some of the most commonly cited examples include Hornik’s (1984) and Antonides, 
Verhoef, and Van Aalst’s (2002) works on consumers’ perceptions of time versus the 
actual time spent waiting in line. Focusing more specifically on the perception of time 
pressure and decision making are the works of Ben Zur and Breznitz (1981); Zakay and 
Wooler (1984); Hahn, Lawson and Lee (1992); and, more recently, Kocher, Pahlke and 
Trautmann (2013). We contend that a thorough understanding of the effect of time on 
decision making quality requires consideration of 1.) the actual amount of time spent 
making the purchasing decision, 2.) the perceived amount of time pressure on the part of 
the individual and 3.) whether actual time pressure (i. e. time constraint) is present in the 
decision process.  
While we found numerous articles related to time and decision making quality in 
organizational behavior, economics, consumer marketing, and psychology, we found a 
limited exploration of the combination of these concepts  in supply chain management 
literature. We seek to contribute to remedying this gap in the literature. Understanding 
the effect of time on the individual purchasing specialist’s decision making quality is an 
important behavioral operations management issue as buyers serve a critical role in 
96 
 
providing both financial and quality value to the supply chain. The decisions made by 
purchasing specialists and managers have a broad reach and, as such, are important to the 
success of a firm’s operations. Specifically, we seek to answer the following research 
questions: 
1. Do self-reported perceived time pressure responses correlate to the actual time 
spent making a decision, given a certain level of time pressure? 
2. Do the baseline reading time, age and gender of individuals affect the actual 
time spent on making a decision? 
3. Do time pressure (time constraint), perceived time pressure, and actual time 
spent in decision making affect the quality of a sourcing decision?  
4. Do time pressure (time constraint), perceived time pressure, and actual time 
spent in decision making affect the recollection of information from the 
decision process?    
In addition to contributing to the purchasing decision making body of knowledge, 
we also provide a methodological contribution by determining if perceptual measures of 
time pressure provide additional clarity to the decision making quality above and beyond 
the actual time spent making the decision. Understanding this relationship can help 
improve the design of behavioral experiments in supply chain management. 
To answer our research questions, we constructed an a priori model of our 
variables of interest. We gathered data for analysis as part of a scenario-based role 
playing experiment involving the selection of a supplier in a potential counterfeit risk 
situation. As part of the experiment, we obtained data on the baseline reading time for 
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participants as well as information on the amount of time they spent on the decision 
portion of the experiment. In addition to obtaining these measures, we randomly assigned 
participants to either a time pressured group or to a group without time pressure. After the 
selection decision, participants were provided with a questionnaire covering the factors 
that influenced their decision, their perceived time pressure, and their demographic 
information. The questionnaire items can be found in Appendix B. We then used this 
information to test our a priori model. 
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows. We present our a priori 
model, including the definitions of our time and demographic variables, and our 
hypotheses regarding their relationships to one another  and to decision quality and 
accuracy. After the model is introduced, we describe our data collection methods and 
present the results of our structural equation model analysis. We then assess the merits of 
our a priori model and present an alternative model in the Discussion Section, concluding 
this essay with a brief discussion regarding limitations and potential opportunities for 
additional research related to time and decision quality. 
4.2  A Priori Model 
 Based on information from our literature review, we constructed the structural 
model seen in Figure 4.1as our a priori model. This model contains our two time 
measurement variables, Decision Time (denotated as DecideTime in our model) and 
Baseline Time (BaseTime), and our independent variable, Time Pressure (TP), as well as 
our latent variable, perceived time pressure (denoted as PerceivedTimePress in our 
model). In addition to the time-related variables, we also include age and gender (denoted 
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as Female) in our model, as previous research has suggested that these demographic 
items are related to risk aversion and decision outcomes in time pressure situations 
(Kocher et al., 2013; Hahn et al., 2003). The outcome variables in our model are supplier 
selection decision quality and accuracy on manipulation check questions. 
Variable Definitions and Measurements 
Perceived time pressure is defined as the participant’s perception that there is 
insufficient time to complete the given amount of work, a definition that has been applied 
consistently in management literature (e.g. Cooper, Dewe, & O’Driscoll, 2001; Pearsall, 
Ellis, & Stein, 2009; Maruping, Venkatesh, Thatcher & Patel, 2015). We modeled this as 
a latent construct comprised of four items on a seven-point Likert response scale. The 
measures we used were: 
1. I felt like I had enough time to review the information provided for the 
selection decision. 
2. I felt rushed to make a selection decision. 
3. Overall, I felt a sense of time pressure when completing the experiment. 
4. I felt too rushed to adequately address the supplier selection in this 
experiment. 
Confirmatory factor analysis of our data revealed that these measures map consistently 
onto one factor (χ2 = 348.51, Prob> χ2 = 0.0000), with a factor Eigenvalue of 2.940 and 
proportion of explained variance of 1.0397 (unrotated). Factor loadings are provided in 
Table 4.1. 
Unrotated Principal Factors Analysis 
99 
 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 2.94014 2.88651 1.0397 1.0397 
Factor2 0.05363 0.11726 0.019 1.0586 
Factor3 -0.06363 0.0385 -0.0225 1.0361 
Factor4 -0.10213 . -0.0361 1 
N = 107 Chi2 = 348.51 Prob > Chi2 = 0.000 
 
     Factor Loadings (Pattern Matrix and Uniqueness) 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Uniqueness 
I felt like I had enough time to review the information 
provided for the selection decision. 
-0.7138 0.1625 0.4641 
I felt rushed to make a selection decision. 0.9394 0.0378 0.1162 
Overall, I felt a sense of time pressure when completing 
the experiment. 
0.8837 0.1494 0.1968 
I felt too rushed to adequately address the supplier 
selection in this experiment. 
0.876 -0.0589 0.2292 
TABLE 4.1 – CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS OF PERCEIVED TIME 
PRESSURE MEASURES 
 
For our objective measures of time, we gathered two data points for each 
participant. First, we obtained a measure of baseline time by monitoring the amount of 
time spent on the screen that provided the background information on the scenario. 
Software captured the start and end times for the page, so subtracting the start from the 
end calculated the amount of time spent on the page, which we termed Baseline Time. 
The second measure of time, which was gathered during the decision process page, was 
calculated in the same manner. We defined this as Decision Time. The rationale for 
obtaining these two time measures was to determine if general processing times, which 
vary based on the individual, have an effect on our outcome variables. If so, we can 
isolate and control for this effect.  
 The final time element in this model is time pressure, which is the actual time 
limited condition that was randomly assigned to participants in the experiment. In the 
time pressure condition, participants were given a written cue in the scenario that they 
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have five minutes to make the decision before a meeting. Additionally, a clock was 
displayed that counted up to five minutes. 
 The Female variable in our model was a dummy variable coded 0 for males and 1 
for females, based on the self-reported gender question in the post-experiment 
questionnaire. Age, which was measured in years, was also self-reported by the 
participant. 
 The outcome variables of interest in our model were selection decision quality 
and manipulation check accuracy. The selection decision quality was a binary outcome 
variable. In the scenario, one of the suppliers was a potential counterfeit supplier and the 
other was not. Participants who selected the counterfeit supplier were coded as 0, while 
participants who selected the non-counterfeit offer were coded as 1. Manipulation check 
accuracy was scored on a 4-point scale from 0 to 3, with a 0 indicating none of the 
manipulation checks were answered correctly and a 3 indicating that the participant 
answered all of the manipulation checks correctly. Manipulation check accuracy is a 
reasonable measure of decision accuracy because the questions assess whether the 
participant is able to recall the specifics of the particular scenario.  
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FIGURE 4.1 – A PRIORI MODEL OF TIME CONSIDERATIONS AND DECISION 
QUALITY AND ACCURACY 
 
Hypotheses 
 Based on our literature review, we developed ten hypotheses regarding the 
variables in our model. First, we addressed the expected relationships surrounding the 
actual time pressure condition and the decision time. We expected that assigning a time 
constraint would reduce the amount of time that participants would spend making the 
decision and that this response to the time constraint would be consistent with results 
observed by Kocher et al. (2013). Specifically, our hypothesis was: 
H1 – Participants in the time constrained condition will spend less time making 
the selection decision than the unconstrained condition. 
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In addition to spending less time making the decision, we anticipated that 
participants assigned to the time constrained condition would also report higher levels of 
perceived time pressure. In their experiment, Kocher et al. (2013) found that participants 
reported feeling more stress and perceived the decision task as more difficult than those 
in the unconstrained condition. It is reasonable to expect that participants may be 
overwhelmed by having to accomplish tasks in a short period of time, particularly those 
with high information loads, the impact of which will manifest in lower quality and 
accuracy in decision making (Hahn et al., 1992). If the information load is not high, then 
the time constraints should be less relevant in terms of the decision outcomes. As such, 
we hypothesize that: 
H2 – Participants in the time constrained condition will report higher levels of 
perceived time pressure than participants in the unconstrained condition. 
H3 - The perceived time pressure will be negatively related to the accuracy on the 
selection decision variable.  
H4 - The perceived time pressure will be negatively related to the accuracy on the 
manipulation check outcome variable.  
In general, we expect that participants who spend more time reviewing the 
information on the background and decision pages of the experiment will absorb more of 
the relevant information to use in the decision process. This should result in better 
decision outcomes. As such, we hypothesize: 
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H5 – Participants with lengthier baseline times will (a) spend more time making 
the selection decision and (b) make more accurate selection and manipulation 
check decisions.  
H6 – Participants who spend more time making the decision will exhibit more 
accuracy on the selection decision.  
H7 – Participants who spend more time making the decision will exhibit more 
accuracy on responses to Manipulation Checks  
 As mentioned when we defined our model variables, there are two demographic 
factors discussed in the literature that are potentially relevant to our study of time 
perception and pressure and decision quality. There is a substantial literature stream on 
age-related effects on cognitive and non-cognitive processing times (see Salthouse, 1996, 
as a seminal work). As this study used an adult population, we expect that the amount of 
time spent for both the baseline and decision times will be positively related to age. 
H8 – Age will be positively related to a) baseline time and b) time to decide, and 
negatively related to c) perceived time pressure. 
Another demographic consideration is gender. As Kocher and colleagues (2013) 
found, women are more risk averse in decision making than men. As such, it is 
reasonable to expect they may take more time to process information to assist in 
assessing the various risks associated with each supplier’s offer in the scenario. As such, 
the hypothesis for gender was:   
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H9 – Female participants will, on average, (a) spend more time on the selection 
decision than males, (b) have higher baseline times than males, and (c) report 
higher levels of perceived time pressure.  
4.2  Methods 
 As mentioned in the introduction, we used a scenario-based role playing 
experiment to collect our data. Specific details regarding the scenarios and the post-hoc 
questionnaire used in the experiment can be seen in Appendix B. The population of 
interest was purchasing and supply chain management specialists. Specifically, our 
sample was comprised of 104 members of the Logistics Officers Association, a 
professional association of logistics and acquisition personnel in the defense sector, both 
in military and private sector organizations, who responded to an email solicitation 
containing a hyperlink to the online experiment. We initially received 110 responses; 
however, as some participants declined to report age and/or gender responses, those cases 
were not included in our structural equation model analysis. This represents a response 
rate of approximately 3.5%, based on an email distribution to 2,971 active members of 
the organization.  
 In the online experiment, participants were provided a description of their role 
and the decision at hand, as well as some background information on the part they were 
purchasing, a specialized industrial fastener. Participants were then given information on 
the offers from two suppliers and asked to make a purchasing decision between them, one 
of which was designed to be a counterfeit provider and the other a legitimate one.  While 
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they were reviewing the background information and decision information, the software 
recorded the start and finish times for each page.   
After making their selections, participants were asked a series of post-hoc 
questions regarding the degree of supplier preference, the importance of various factors 
in their decision (e.g. quality, cost, delivery schedules), demographic questions and, most 
important for this research, the manipulation check and perceived time pressure 
questions. After the data were collected, we analyzed the set for outliers, finding two 
cases where the times for the decision time variable were more than 7 times greater 
(times in excess of 7000 seconds) than the next cluster of times. We eliminated these two 
outliers even though they had only a limited effect on the model.  In addition, the 
incomplete cases in regards to omission of age, gender and/or missing responses to 
perceived time pressure items were not included in our analysis. Our distribution of 
genders was also notably skewed, with the predominant number of participants being 
male. To analyze our data, we utilized Stata 12.0 software to construct our structural 
equation model and generate the structural and measurement components.   
4.3  Results  
 Figure 4.2 depicts our estimated model. While overall it possesses general 
goodness of fit for our data, many of the relationships we predicted in our hypotheses 
were not supported. We present our results in three areas: overall goodness of fit 
statistics, model estimates, and findings supporting our hypotheses. 
A Priori Model Goodness of Fit 
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 In general, our a priori model exhibits a satisfactory goodness of fit. The 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square for our model has a low χ2 value (χ2 = 46.923, p > χ2 = 
0.801), indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis that our model has perfect fit for 
the population of interest. Because the hypothesis that a model has perfect fit is largely 
implausible, additional assessments of fit should be analyzed (Kline, 2005).  
 Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is an index that is seen as 
“parsimony-adjusted,” meaning that this formula is structured with a correction for model 
complexity (see Kline (2005) for the RMSEA formula). As a result, when comparing two 
models with similar explanatory power, the RMSEA will show a preference for the 
simpler of the two. The RMSEA actually measures how poorly a model fits; thus, a value 
of zero for the RMSEA is considered desirable. The RMSEA value for our a priori model 
was 0.000, with a 90% confidence interval lower bound of 0.000 and an upper bound of 
0.041.  
 In addition to RMSEA, we examined the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual of our model (SRMSR). The CFI for our model 
was 1.000, and the SRMSR was 0.058, both of these values also indicating a reasonable 
fit. CFI values near 1.00 indicate good fit, and SRMSR values near 0 indicate that bad fit 
is absent (Kline, 2005). 
Model Estimates   
Table 4.2 lists the test results for each of the relationships in the structural model 
for our a priori model, including our hypothesized relationships. 
Structural Model Coef Std Err Z P > |z| 95% CI 
Decision Time → Select 0.000 0.000 0.670 0.501 0.000 0.001 
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Baseline Time → Select 0.000 0.000 -1.950 0.052* 0.000 0.000 
Perceived Time Pressure → Select -0.080 0.026 -3.060 0.002*** -0.130 -0.029 
Time Pressure → Select 0.011 0.101 0.110 0.915 -0.188 0.210 
Cons→ Select  0.608 0.109 5.600 0.000 0.395 0.821 
Decision Time → Manip Accuracy 0.000 0.000 -1.180 0.236 -0.001 0.000 
Baseline Time → Manip Accuracy 0.000 0.000 0.490 0.621 0.000 0.000 
Perceived Time Pressure → Manip 
Accuracy 
-0.071 0.041 -1.750 0.079* -0.151 0.008 
Time Pressure → Manip Accuracy -0.169 0.158 -1.070 0.284 -0.478 0.140 
Cons→ Manip Accuracy 2.673 0.155 17.270 0.000 2.370 2.977 
Baseline Time → Decision Time 0.000 0.004 0.000 1.000 -0.008 0.008 
Time Pressure → Decision Time -115.344 46.189 -2.500 0.013** -205.872 -24.815 
Age → Decision Time 4.214 1.840 2.290 0.022** 0.608 7.819 
Female → Decision Time -74.543 55.708 -1.340 0.181 -183.728 34.641 
Cons → Decision Time 203.041 81.738 2.480 0.013 42.837 363.245 
Age → Baseline Time 62.376 44.306 1.410 0.159 -24.461 149.214 
Female → Baseline Time 2501.597 1334.403 1.870 0.061* -113.784 5116.979 
Cons → Baseline Time -2371.976 1943.806 -1.220 0.222 -6181.765 1437.814 
Decision Time → Perceived Time 
Pressure 0.001 0.001 0.630 0.527 -0.001 0.002 
Time Pressure → Perceived Time 
Pressure 1.459 0.386 3.780 0.000*** 0.702 2.216 
Age→ Perceived Time Pressure -0.008 0.015 -0.510 0.612 -0.037 0.022 
Female → Perceived Time Pressure 0.451 0.450 1.000 0.316 -0.431 1.333 
Measurement Model Coef Std Err Z P > |z| 95% CI 
Perceived Time Pressure → Felt 
Rushed 
1 Constrained    
Cons → Felt Rushed 3.052 0.683 4.470 0.000 1.713 4.391 
Perceived Time Pressure → Felt 
Time Press 0.943 0.057 16.450 0.000*** 0.830 1.055 
Cons → Felt Time Press 3.305 0.649 5.090 0.000 2.033 4.577 
Perceived Time Pressure → Too 
Rushed 0.784 0.054 14.590 0.000*** 0.679 0.890 
Cons → Too Rushed 2.908 0.542 5.370 0.000 1.847 3.970 
Perceived Time Pressure → Enough 
Time -0.720 0.078 -9.200 0.000*** -0.873 -0.567 
Cons → Enough Time 5.128 0.513 9.990 0.000 4.122 6.134 
Measurement Model Variances Coef Std Err   95% CI 
Felt Rushed 0.291 0.118   0.132 0.645 
Felt Time Press 0.864 0.151   0.613 1.218 
Too Rushed 0.760 0.135   0.537 1.077 
Had Enough 2.078 0.306   1.557 2.774 
Select 0.213 0.030   0.162 0.281 
Manip Accuracy 0.519 0.073   0.394 0.683 
Decision Time 53134.450 7440.312   40381.660 69914.660 
Baseline Time 3.17E+07 4432711   2.41E+07 4.17E+07 
Perceived Time Pressure 3.336 0.521   2.456 4.532 
Measurement Model - Covariances Coef Std  
Err 
Z P > |z| 
95% CI 
Select ↔ Manip Accuracy 0.095 0.034 2.75 0.006*** 0.027 0.162 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p <.01 
TABLE 4.2 – A PRIORI SEM RESULTS 
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As detailed in this table, many of the paths that we predicted to be significant were not 
substantiated; moreover, we found some interesting findings that contradict our 
hypotheses in some cases. The most significant portion of our model is the measurement 
model for perceived time pressure, its relationship with actual time pressure, and its 
resultant effect on selection decision and manipulation check accuracy. The other portion 
of the model that deserves attention regards decision time and its relationships with two 
of its predictors, time pressure and age. Table 4.3 summarizes the results as applied to our 
hypotheses. We elaborate on the insights from each of these in the Discussion Section. 
Hypothesis Path Coeff P Value Conclusion 
H1 – Participants in the time 
constrained condition will spend less 
time making the selection decision 
than the unconstrained condition. 
Time Pressure → 
Decision Time 
-115.344 0.013** Supported 
H2 – Participants in the time 
constrained condition will report 
higher levels of perceived time 
pressure than participants in the 
unconstrained condition 
Time Pressure → 
Perceived Time Pressure 
1.459 0.000*** 
Strongly 
Supported 
H3 - The perceived time pressure will 
be negatively related to the accuracy 
on the selection decision variable.  
Perceived Time Pressure 
→ Select 
-0.080 0.002*** 
Strongly 
Supported 
H4 - The perceived time pressure will 
be negatively related to the accuracy 
on the manipulation check outcome 
variable.  
Perceived Time Pressure 
→ Manip Accuracy 
-0.071 0.079* 
Marginally 
Supported 
H5 – Participants with lengthier 
baseline times will (a) spend more 
time making the selection decision 
and (b) make more accurate selection 
and (c) manipulation check decisions.  
a. Baseline Time → 
Decision Time 
b. Baseline Time → 
Select 
c. Baseline Time → 
Manip Accuracy 
a. 0.000 
 
b. 0.000 
 
c. 0.000 
a.  1.000 
 
b. 0.052* 
 
c. 0.621 
a. Not 
Supported 
b. Not 
Supported 
c. Not 
Supported 
H6 – Participants who spend more 
time making the decision will have 
more accuracy on the Selection 
decision.  
Decision Time → Select 0.000 .501 
Not 
Supported 
H7 – Participants who spend more 
time making the decision will have 
more accuracy on responses to 
Manipulation Checks  
Decision Time → Manip 
Accuracy 
0.000 0.236 
Not 
Supported 
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H8 – Age will be positively related 
to: a) baseline time and b) time to 
decide, and negatively related to c) 
perceived time pressure 
a. Age → Baseline Time 
 
b. Age → Decision Time  
c. Age → Perceived 
Time Pressure 
a. 62.376 
 
b. 4.214 
c.  -0.008 
a. 0.159 
 
b. 0.022* 
c. 0.612 
a. Not 
Supported 
b. Supported 
c. Not 
Supported 
H9 – Female participants will, on 
average, (a) spend more time on the 
selection decision than males, (b) 
have higher baseline times than 
males, and (c) report higher levels of 
perceived time pressure. 
a. Female → Baseline 
Time 
b. Female → Decision 
Time  
c. Female → Perceived 
Time Pressure 
a. 
2501.597 
b. -74.543 
 
c.  .451 
a. 0.061 
 
b. 0.181 
 
c. 0.316 
a. Marginally 
Supported 
b. Not 
Supported 
c. Not 
Supported 
TABLE 4.3 – CONCLUSIONS FOR A PRIORI HYPOTHESES 
4.4  Discussion 
 
 At the start of this essay, we stated that our intended contributions were to provide 
insights into the relationships between time pressure, both actual and perceived, and 
purchasing decision quality, including examining the effects of gender and age as 
potential demographic variables of interest that might affect decision speed and quality of 
outcomes. In addition, we sought to make a methodological contribution by assessing the 
relationship between perceived time pressure and time spent making decisions. While our 
data do not permit us to provide insights into all dimensions of these research objectives, 
we have several noteworthy findings. We begin our discussion with a description of those 
findings and discuss some of the limitations of our research. We then transition our 
discussion toward future research opportunities, presenting a brief review of a simpler, 
more parsimonious model that appears to be a better fit for our data and conclude with 
opportunities for future research.   
Actual and Perceived Time Pressure and Their Effects on Decision Quality 
 
 Overall, our data suggest three important findings regarding time pressure, both 
actual and perceived. First, actual time pressure is detected by individuals and is related 
to their self-reported level of perceived time pressure. Our analysis suggests that being in 
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a time-constrained situation increases the perception of time pressure. In addition to the 
increased perception of time pressure, actual time pressure reduced the average amount 
of time spent making decisions, a finding consistent with those of Kocher and colleagues 
(2013). That said, we did not find support for a subsequent reduction in decision quality 
as a direct result of actual time pressure.  
Second, as predicted, our measures for assessing individuals’ perceptions of time 
pressure adequately map onto our single latent factor of perceived time pressure. Lastly, 
the perceived time pressure construct provides predictive power in the accuracy of 
decision making in terms of a supplier selection decision as well as in terms of 
recollection of information as measured by accuracy on manipulation checks, negatively 
affecting both outcomes.  
Our findings are consistent with those observed by Hahn and colleagues (1992) 
regarding time pressure, particularly in situations of information overload. These results 
suggest that perceived time pressure may affect the quality of purchasing decision 
outcomes. From a supply chain quality management perspective, purchasing specialists 
are posited to serve as guardians (Watson and Roth, 2015), ensuring that the material 
input into the firm’s supply chain is of suitable quality. Time pressures may negatively 
affect the quality of purchasing outcomes,  adding a quality risk to the supply chain. 
Baseline and Decision Times, Age and Gender  
 While extant literature led us to hypothesize that age, gender and baseline time 
spent reading the background would be related to decision times, we found support only 
for the relationship between age and decision time and marginal support for the 
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relationship between gender and baseline time. Similarly, our prediction that time spent 
making decisions would be positively related to more accurate results in supplier 
selection and manipulation check accuracy variables was also not substantiated by our 
data.  
There are two potential explanations for our findings providing only limited 
support for the relationships involving these variables. First, while we intended the 
measures of baseline times and decision times to represent the actual time spent 
accomplishing these tasks, it is possible that some participants were not actively engaged 
in the tasks for the entire duration the materials were on their computer screens. Since 
this experiment was conducted in a virtual forum, we have no way of  knowing if 
participants were distracted while accomplishing the tasks (e.g. taking phone calls, 
working on other activities, responding to emails) or engaged in such behaviors such as 
surfing the internet, engaging in small talk with coworkers, checking social media or 
texting on cell phones. It is possible that our direct measures of time have noise in them.  
Second, as mentioned at the beginning of this essay, our sample was drawn from a 
military professional organization and the gender distribution of our participants is 
skewed, with a larger proportion of males than is observed in other samples of purchasing 
and supply chain specialists. As such, our failure to find support for the hypothesized 
gender relationships may be a function of our sample characteristics. While we did not 
find support for the gender relationships observed in extant literature, we also cannot  say 
that our data conflict, merely that an observed relationship was not present in our data.  
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Comparing our a priori model against an alternative model helps to illustrate the 
true nature of the relationships of the variables in our data set. This simpler model has an 
overall better fit for our sample than our a priori model. 
A More Parsimonious Model 
 Figure 4.2 presents an alternative model for explaining the relationships observed  
in our data set.  
 
FIGURE 4.2 – ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF TIME PRESSURE AND PURCHASING 
DECISION QUALITY/ACCURACY 
 
To arrive at this model, we systematically and sequentially removed paths from the a 
priori model that were not statistically significant. The path loadings, measurement 
model, and test statistics for this model are provided in Table 4.4. As illustrated, there are 
far fewer paths in this model than in the a priori model while maintaining a similar 
goodness of fit. 
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The Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square for the alternative model is χ2 = 38.567, p > χ2 = 
0..703, which is lower than our a prior model’s value (χ2 = 46.923, p > χ2 = 0.801), and 
the RMSEA for the alternative model is 0.000  with an lower bound of 0.000 and an 
upper bound of 0.052. Our a prior model’s RMSEA is  0.000, with a 90% confidence 
interval lower bound of 0.000 and upper bound of 0.041. In addition to the RMSEA, we 
examined the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual 
of our model (SRMSR). The CFI for the alternative model was 1.000 and the SRMSR 
was 0.063. The CFI for our a priori model was 1.000 and the SRMSR was 0.058.  
Overall, the alternative model achieves a similar fit with fewer paths, making it a 
more parsimonious and elegant model for our data.   
 Structural Model Coef Std Err Z P > |z| 95% CI 
Baseline Time → Select -.000 7.77e-06 -2.17 0.030** -.000 -1.66e-06 
Perceived Time Pressure → Select -.083 .024 -3.41 0.001*** -.131 -.035 
Cons→ Select  .660 .053 12.48 0.000 .557 .764 
Female → Baseline Time 2257.996 1284.472 1.76 0.079* -259.522 4775.514 
Cons → Baseline Time 215.142 626.758 .034 0.731 -1013.281 1443.565 
Time Pressure → Perceived Time 
Pressure 1.415 .364 3.88 0.000*** .701 2.129 
Measurement Model Coef Std Err Z P > |z| 95% CI 
Perceived Time Pressure → Felt 
Rushed 
1 Constrained    
Cons → Felt Rushed 3.027 .256 11.85 0.00 2.526 3.528 
Perceived Time Pressure → Felt 
Time Press .951 .057 16.67 0.000*** .839 1.063 
Cons → Felt Time Press 3.280 .256 12.81 0.000 2.778 3.781 
Perceived Time Pressure → Too 
Rushed .797 .054 14.83 0.000*** .692 .902 
Cons → Too Rushed 2.900 .219 13.25 0.000 2.471 3.329 
 Perceived Time Pressure → Had 
Enough Time -.733 .078 -9.40 0.000*** -.885 -.580 
Cons → Had Enough Time 5.13 .236 21.78 0.000 4.670 5.594 
 Manip Accuracy → Perceived Time 
Pressure -.087 .038 -2.28 0.023** -.162 -.012 
Cons → Perceived Time Pressure 2.489 .079 31.31 0.000 2.333 2.644 
Measurement Model Variances Coef Std Err   95% CI 
Felt Rushed .315 .115   .155 .642 
Felt Time Press .835 .146   .593 1.177 
Too Rushed .738 .131   .521 1.044 
Had Enough 2.028 .296   1.523 2.670 
Select .213 .030   .162 .279 
Manip Accuracy .540 .075   .411 .708 
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Baseline Time 3.14e+07 4337206   2.40e+07 4.12e+07 
Perceived Time Pressure 3.255 .505   2.401 4.413 
Measurement Model - Covariances Coef Std  
Err 
Z P > |z| 
95% CI 
Select ↔ Manip Accuracy .088 .034 2.56 0.011** .021 .155 
N = 105, Log Likelihood -2072.194, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p <.01 
TABLE 4.4 – SEM RESULTS FOR ALTERNATIVE MODEL 
Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research 
 There are three noteworthy limitations to this research. First, our sample limits the 
generalizability of our findings. Our sample was obtained from a professional 
organization in the defense sector. The demographic composition of this sample is 
different from more general professional organizations of purchasing specialists in terms 
of gender and education level. As such, we recommend that this study be replicated using 
a sample that is more representative of our population of interest, purchasing and supply 
chain specialists. Replicating with a professional group, such as ISM, APICS, or 
CSCMP, with a broader industry range and more variety in education and gender 
representation would improve the generalizability of the findings. The second limitation 
of this research is that our sample size was relatively small and reflects a low response 
rate. Our small sample size likely contributed to a failure to obtain significance on some 
of the hypothesized relationships. The replication suggested would also address this 
limitation of our research. 
 As mentioned earlier in this discussion section, the third limitation of this research 
is the issue of not being able to state whether participants were actively engaged in 
reading the background and decision information their screens. As a result, it is possible 
that these time measures include a combination of active participation in the experiment 
and some inattentive behavior or distractions. To overcome this limitation, a future 
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experiment should be conducted in a lab environment via an alternative form (paper 
format) where the amount of inattention and the number of distractions could be 
minimized. Analyzing the results as a nested model would provide a means of comparing 
and controlling for inattention and distraction, eliminating noise from the objective 
measures of baseline and decision times.  
 In addition to the replications mentioned above, there are two other opportunities 
to extend this research. First, this model of time pressure does not account for familiarity 
with the subject matter in the decision, nor does it account for the effects of training and 
experience. To provide more actionable insights for practice, the model should be refined 
to test for these considerations. Second, we only assessed decision quality in terms of 
accuracy on the supplier selection and manipulation checks in an experiment. Decision 
quality is likely a multidimensional construct, and additional outcome variables should be 
designed and tested to present a more holistic picture of the influence of perceived and 
actual time pressure on purchasing decision outcomes. 
4.5  Conclusion 
 
 This research has demonstrated that time constraints and perceived time pressure 
are related constructs that negatively affect decision quality in a supplier selection 
decision. These results are consistent with previous studies (Kocher et al., 2013; Hahn et 
al., 1992) and extends their findings into the domain of purchasing and supply chain 
management decision making. While our a priori model was of satisfactory fit, we 
identified a more parsimonious alternative model that also fits our data by eliminating 
paths in the model that were not significant. Further research is warranted to extend this 
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initial set of findings into more actionable recommendations for managers and 
practitioners in the purchasing and supply chain management professions. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
The issue of counterfeits in supply chains is a critical contemporary issue that 
warrants continued attention by practitioners and further research by academia. To 
contribute this growing field of work, this dissertation focused on examining the 
counterfeiting issue from a supply chain quality management and behavioral operations 
perspective.  
5.1  Contributions 
In Essay One, we developed a conceptual model and research agenda to use to 
guide supply chain management researchers’ efforts in exploring the counterfeit 
phenomena. Through employing a comprehensive set of theories, including Normal 
Accident Theory and Crime Prevention Theory, we can gain a more thorough 
understanding of the complete set of antecedents to this vulnerability.  
We illustrated how the Six T’s framework can serve as a means to categorize the 
counterfeit mitigation options, to enable practitioners to select tailored strategies for their 
supply chain needs. Additionally, we constructed the typology in Appendix A to facilitate 
continued research on the various strategies proposed in the literature from a supply chain 
quality management perspective. Our typology suggests that more than one of the Six T’s 
can be reflected within a proposed mitigation strategy, which suggests that multiple 
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dimensions of supply chain quality can be addressed in a counterfeit mitigation strategy, 
which potentially can achieve synergistic improvements in supply chain quality.  
 Essay Two’s primary contribution was to confirm that purchasing specialists can 
detect signals of counterfeits in the purchasing decision process. We extended the work 
of Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich (2010) from the consumer marketing research into the 
supply chain management discipline, and successfully tested a set of counterfeit signals 
that were proposed in the practitioner literature and knowledge base. We observed that 
increased potential counterfeit situation caused purchasing specialists to avoid selection 
of the counterfeit supplier. This finding suggests that purchasing can act as a guardian of 
the supply chain, potentially helping to prevent the counterfeit crime from being 
perpetrated against the supply chain. 
 In Essay Three, we provided insights into the negative effects of time pressure 
and perceived time pressure in purchasing decision quality. This exploratory work serves 
to extend previous research into the supply chain discipline, and helps orient future 
research in understanding the actual and perceived effects of time pressure on sourcing 
decisions, which is an interesting and contemporary topic in the field of behavioral 
operations management.  
5.2  Implications for Practice 
 Throughout this dissertation, we observed several important findings that have 
relevance for the practice of supply chain management. First, we identified areas of 
vulnerability to counterfeits that supply chain managers can examine within their 
organizations to help identify and reduce risks.   
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A second implication from Essay One is that we proposed that counterfeit mitigation 
strategies can be tied to multiple dimensions of supply chain quality management, which 
means that firms can evaluate alternative strategies and obtain multiple quality benefits at 
the same time.  
 The primary implication for practice from Essay Two is that we find support for 
the role of purchasing specialists as guardians of the supply chain. Purchasing and supply 
chain specialists can detect signals of counterfeits in proposals and can avoid them in 
purchasing decisions. This suggests that the counterfeit signals proposed in practitioner 
literature are valid and that purchasing specialists should be trained to look for the 
specific signals that are relevant to their particular industry and purchasing decisions.  
 Turning to Essay Three, we find that perceived time pressure negatively effects 
decision quality in a purchasing decision. Given the fact that purchasing specialist 
positions are going unfilled across the country (Weber, 2014), it highlights that there is a 
decision quality risk that may occur as a result of manpower shortages in purchasing 
organizations. 
5.3  Future Research 
 This dissertation serves as an initial contribution towards understanding product 
counterfeit problem within the context of supply chain management research. There are 
multiple opportunities to grow this research stream. First, we propose that the conceptual 
model identified in Essay One be tested empirically to determine the validity of the 
proposed relationships and their value in predicting counterfeit vulnerability and impacts. 
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As part of this empirical testing, valid objective and perceptual measures would need to 
be developed and tested to ensure sufficient construct validity is present. 
 As mentioned in the discussion section of Essay 2, there are multiple ways to 
extend the experimental analysis of counterfeit signals in purchasing decisions, including 
using dyads of technical specialists and purchasing experts, examine how collaboration 
can affect the ability to detect the counterfeit signals, as well as offer insights into how 
different functions in an organization perceive the importance of price, schedule and 
quality in purchasing decisions.  
An additional future research mentioned in Essay 2 is to test the relative 
importance of each of the counterfeit signals identified in our research as they relate to 
specific types of products or subcomponents. Future research should develop 
categorizations of counterfeit signals that are industry or situation specific to enable 
development of tailored counterfeit prevention training and quality controls for 
purchasing decisions.    
A final recommendation for future research from Essay 2 is to test the effects of 
prior experience and training with counterfeiting in practice, in terms of their impacts on 
the quality of the purchasing decision. This would continue the exploration of the supply 
chain manager and purchasing specialist’s role as a guardian of the supply chain. 
In Essay Three, we observed several limitations with our research that offered 
opportunities for future research to replicate and extend our work. First, we proposed that 
our experiment should be replicated in a more controlled environment via an alternative 
form (paper format) to control for potential slacking behavior and distractions that could 
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be a source of noise in our objective measures of time. Testing the nested model would 
provide insight into the noise and potentially reduce the error in objective measures of 
time. 
To improve the practitioner relevance of our time pressure model, future research 
should examine if additional factors, such as time pressure coping mechanisms, training 
and experience interact with time pressure to mitigate its impact on decision quality. 
Finally, the decision quality variable in our model was only measured in terms of 
accuracy. Future research should assess the effect of time pressure on other aspects of 
decision quality, such as responsiveness or thoroughness of decision making. 
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Appendix A – Detailed Typology of Counterfeit Mitigation Strategies 
using the Six Ts of Supply Chain Quality Management (Roth et al, 
2009) 
 
Mitigation Strategy Source 
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Have an internal investigation division to 
monitor counterfeits 
Balfour et al 
2005 
X           
Establish fake companies to purchase 
counterfeit goods 
Becker 2003 X           
Employ private investigators Berman 2008 X           
Establish fake companies to purchase 
counterfeit goods 
Berman 2008 X           
Have an internal investigation division to 
monitor counterfeits 
Berman 2008 X           
Employ IP protections (trademarks, 
copyrights, patents) 
Berman 2008   X         
Consumer education programs on 
counterfeits 
Berman 2008           X 
Use product authentication technology in 
demand (consumer) side 
Berman 2008 X           
Use product authentication technology in 
supply side operations 
Berman 2008 X           
Publish information for consumers on how 
to validate authenticity of products 
Berman 2008           X 
Individual organization can develop 
advertising about the safety, performance 
and financial risks associated with 
counterfeits 
Berman 2008           X 
Trade group development of advertising 
about the safety, performance and financial 
risks associated with counterfeits 
Berman 2008           X 
Joint (firms, government and/or Trade 
group) development of advertising about 
the safety, performance and financial risks 
associated with counterfeits 
Berman 2008           X 
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Train customers to report counterfeit goods Berman 2008           X 
Employ anti-counterfeiting product 
markings and packaging 
Berman 2008 X           
Controlling outsourcing Berman 2008   X         
Select suppliers based on trust and past 
performance 
Berman 2008         X   
Ensure Outsourcers return tech, production, 
sales and marketing information 
Berman 2008 X           
Monitor outsourcing through surprise 
inspection 
Berman 2008         X   
Use partial outsourcing to prevent having 
all resources needed to replicate product 
Berman 2008 X           
Complete production at internal facilities Berman 2008 X           
Use website monitoring software to search 
for counterfeits 
Berman 2008 X X         
Take actions to shut down websites selling 
counterfeits 
Berman 2008   X         
Take legal action against counterfeiters Berman 2008 X           
Reduce gray market activity by 
withholding payment until product 
verification is complete 
Berman 2008 X           
Reduce gray market activity by not using 
wholesalers who also sell in secondary 
markets 
Berman 2008 X           
Require suppliers to return all seconds and 
out-of-spec items for disposal 
Berman 2008   X         
Develop Cloud-based low resource mobile 
product authentication systems 
Gogo 2010 X X         
Use product authentication technology in 
demand (consumer) side 
Lehtonen et al 
2007 
X           
Use product authentication technology in 
supply side operations 
Lehtonen et al 
2007 
X           
Continuously alter product/component 
characteristics to make it harder to imitate 
Minagawa, 
Trott and 
Hoecht 2007 
        X   
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Collaborate with alleged or suspected 
imitators to develop products for local sale 
which would be mutually beneficial in 
terms of accessing cheapest sources of 
manufacturing supplies and efficient 
distribution. 
Minagawa, 
Trott and 
Hoecht 2007 
  X     X   
Price products to attract more customers, 
which reduces the margin for counterfeits 
and increases demand 
Minagawa, 
Trott and 
Hoecht 2007 
  X         
Consider product imitation as part of 
strategic decision making. 
Minagawa, 
Trott and 
Hoecht 2007 
  X         
Focus on R&D efforts, since imitators don't 
have R&D capacity 
Minagawa, 
Trott and 
Hoecht 2007 
          X 
Employ private investigators Palmer 2006 X           
Do Nothing - sometimes this makes sense 
from a cost/benefit scenario 
Shultz and 
Saporito 1996 
  X         
Co-opt offenders - buy them out and make 
them part of the licit supply chain 
Shultz and 
Saporito 1996 
  X         
Educate stakeholders at the source - make 
source countries understand the problems 
of counterfeits related to their development 
Shultz and 
Saporito 1996 
          X 
Don't despise, advertise - train customers to 
be wary of counterfeits 
Shultz and 
Saporito 1996 
          X 
Investigation and surveillance 
Shultz and 
Saporito 1996 
X           
High Tech Labeling 
Shultz and 
Saporito 1996 
    X       
Create a moving target - keep changing 
product attributes, packaging, etc. 
Shultz and 
Saporito 1996 
      X     
Legislation 
Shultz and 
Saporito 1996 
        X   
Coalitions 
Shultz and 
Saporito 1996 
  X     X   
Cede the industry - developed countries 
will not keep industries that cannot be 
protected from IPR infringement 
Shultz and 
Saporito 1996 
        X   
Utilize industry standards for inspection 
and acceptance of parts sourced in the open 
market (such as IDEA-STD-1010A) 
Sood et al 2011           X 
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Use External Visual Inspection  Sood et al 2011     X       
Use X-Ray and other NDI of parts Sood et al 2011     X       
Use Material evaluation and 
characterization 
Sood et al 2011     X       
Use packaging evaluation Sood et al 2011     X       
Use Die Inspection on electronic parts Sood et al 2011     X       
Determine the market share of counterfeit 
goods 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
          X 
Investigate the characteristics of the 
counterfeit producers 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
          X 
Understand the properties of the illicit 
supply chain 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
          X 
Analyze the behavior of consumers of 
counterfeits 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
          X 
Conduct a risk analysis and assess the 
monetary loss 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
  X         
Analyze best practice strategies for anti-
counterfeiting from within and outside the 
industry 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
  X         
Setup or refine your brand and product 
protect task force 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
    X       
Implement defined monitoring and reaction 
processes 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
    X       
Assess and select preventative measures 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
X   X       
Consider the implementation of large scale 
product checks 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
    X       
Signal top-management support 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
  X     X   
Develop knowledge of the supply side of 
counterfeits 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
          X 
Develop country-specific knowledge of the 
counterfeit trade 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
          X 
Know the impact of counterfeit trade on 
your business 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
          X 
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Know the import roots of counterfeit 
producers 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
          X 
Know the quality of counterfeit producers 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
          X 
Know the profiles of consumers of 
counterfeits 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
          X 
Have defined processes to govern response 
to counterfeits 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
  X         
Have defined processes to monitor for 
existence of counterfeits 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
  X         
Standardize counterfeit reporting tools 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
  X         
Develop indicators to assess performance 
of anti-counterfeiting measures 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
  X         
Appoint NGOs to assist in counterfeit 
issues 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
  X         
Engage government to assist in counterfeit 
issues 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
  X         
Engage industry groups to assist in 
counterfeit issues 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
  X         
Protection technologies 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
X           
Legal actions 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
        X   
Supply-chain security measures 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
X           
Secure distribution systems 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
X           
Participation in industry groups 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
  X         
Make anti-counterfeiting knowledge 
explicit 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
          X 
Have multiple authorities across 
departments on counterfeits 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
          X 
Use websites to help consumers be able to 
identify counterfeits and risky supply 
channels 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
          X 
Educate purchasing departments, suppliers 
and vendors on how to spot counterfeits 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
          X 
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Use standardized processes, monitoring 
and analysis of counterfeits 
Staake and 
Fleisch 2008 
    X       
Employ anti-counterfeiting product 
markings and packaging 
Stumpf and 
Chaudhry 2010 
X   X       
Individual organization can develop 
advertising about the safety, performance 
and financial risks associated with 
counterfeits 
Stumpf and 
Chaudhry 2010 
          X 
Trade group development of advertising 
about the safety, performance and financial 
risks associated with counterfeits 
Stumpf and 
Chaudhry 2010 
          X 
International discourse on countering the 
problems 
Stumpf and 
Chaudhry 2010 
          X 
Use product authentication technology in 
supply side operations 
Stumpf and 
Chaudhry 2010 
X           
Work with media outlets to educate the 
public on the pervasive issues related to 
counterfeit foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, 
etc. 
Stumpf and 
Chaudhry 2010 
          X 
Work with global agencies such as World 
Bank to immobilize global flow of funds to 
support counterfeiting activities 
Stumpf and 
Chaudhry 2010 
          X 
Reduced Price / Rebate 
Stumpf and 
Chaudhry 2010 
        X   
Offer Site Licenses 
Stumpf and 
Chaudhry 2010 
        X   
Emphasize Warranties 
Stumpf and 
Chaudhry 2010 
          X 
Emphasize Benefits 
Stumpf and 
Chaudhry 2010 
          X 
Lists of Authorized Sellers 
Stumpf and 
Chaudhry 2010 
X       X   
Stress Harmful Effects of Counterfeits 
Stumpf and 
Chaudhry 2010 
          X 
Product Authentication Technologies Li 2012 X X X       
Product Tracking Technologies Li 2012 X           
Product Tracing Technologies Li 2012 X           
Inspections need to be accomplished in 
short time span to be effective 
Sood et al 2011       X     
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Reporting Counterfeits needs to happen 
quickly 
Berman 2008       X     
Re-acquiring obsolete products, 
incentivising returns by customers and 
meeting the costs of returns 
Stevenson and 
Busby 2015 
X       X X 
Requiring destruction of obsolete products 
and components, incentivising destruction, 
e.g. by paying for certificates of destruction 
or destroyed items, and providing 
resources for destruction processes 
Stevenson and 
Busby 2015 
X X     X   
Informing inadvertent suppliers of 
counterfeiters and incentivising them not to 
supply counterfeiters, paying for 
intelligence from suppliers, and designing 
appropriate and perhaps exclusive supply 
contracts 
Stevenson and 
Busby 2015 
X X     X   
In-sourcing the production of particularly 
critical materials 
Stevenson and 
Busby 2015 
X           
Incorporating the potential for ‘leakage’ in 
the supplier selection process 
Stevenson and 
Busby 2015 
        X   
Avoiding the over-rapid discontinuation of 
product lines 
Stevenson and 
Busby 2015 
      X     
Undermining physical functions and 
appearance, e.g. after a certain shelf life 
Stevenson and 
Busby 2015 
      X     
Making it costly for counterfeiters to 
change marks and labels that would show 
components and materials have been in 
prior use 
Stevenson and 
Busby 2015 
    X       
Designing contracts that prohibit dealings 
with counterfeiters 
Stevenson and 
Busby 2015 
        X   
Enforcing contracts with closer personal 
relationships, auditing and monitoring 
Stevenson and 
Busby 2015 
  X     X   
Incentivising conformant behaviour, such 
as by paying for intelligence about 
counterfeits 
Stevenson and 
B/usby 2015 
  X         
Providing suppliers with strict quantities of 
materials and components just in time 
Stevenson and 
Busby 2015 
X     X     
Forbidding unauthorised subcontracting by 
suppliers 
Stevenson and 
Busby 2015 
        X   
TOTALS 35 28 14 6 19 33 
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Appendix B – Experiment Scenarios and Questionnaire 
Welcome to the Buyer, Purchasing and Supply Chain 
Specialist Decision Making Experiment conducted by 
Clemson University. 
 
We know your time is precious and we greatly appreciate your participation 
in this effort. Thank you for your support of this research ! 
 
Department of Management 
 
Information about Being in a Research Study conducted by Clemson 
University Buyer, Purchasing and Supply Chain Specialist Decision Making 
Experiment 
 
Description of the Study and Your Part in It 
 
Jillian T. Watson and Dr. Aleda V. Roth are inviting you to take part in a research study. 
Jillian T. Watson, a graduate student at Clemson University is the Project Director, and 
working with Dr. Aleda V. Roth, Distinguished Professor of Supply Chain Management at 
Clemson University. The purpose of this research is to examine decision making by 
purchasing and supply chain management professionals given a variety of information about 
two notional suppliers, including market research documents, industry analyses and 
responses to requests for proposals. 
 
Your part in the study will be to serve in the role of a supply chain manager for an automotive 
parts manufacturer, who has to select a supplier to replace a current supplier that is no 
longer able to produce the components you require to manufacture your products. It will 
take you about 15-20 minutes to participate in this role-playing experiment. 
 
Risks and Discomforts - We do not know of any risks or discomforts to you in this research 
study. 
 
Possible Benefits - We do not know of any way you would benefit directly from taking part in 
this study. However, this research may help us to understand how certain types of 
information and incentives affect purchasing and supply chain managers’ supplier selection 
decisions. 
 
Protection of Privacy and Confidentiality -  We will do everything we can to protect your 
privacy and confidentiality. As such, we don't collect any personally identifiable information 
during this experiment. 
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Choosing to be in the Study -  Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to take 
part and you may choose to stop taking part at any time. You will not be penalized in any way if you 
decide not to participate in the study or stop taking part in the study. 
 
Contact Information -  If you have any questions or concerns about this study or if any problems arise, 
please contact Jillian T. Watson at Clemson University at 571-334-8019, jilliad@g.clemson.edu. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about your rights in this research study, please contact the 
Clemson University Office of Research Compliance (ORC) at 864-656-0636 or irb@clemson.edu. If 
you are outside of the Upstate South Carolina area, please use the ORC’s toll-free number, 866-297- 
3071. 
 
Clicking on the "I agree" button indicates that: 
 
• You have read the above information 
• You voluntarily agree to participate 
• You are at least 18 years of age 
 
You may print a copy of this informational letter for your files. 
Please select whether or not you agree to participate in this effort using the 
buttons below. 
I AGREE 
 
I DO NOT AGREE 
 
 
B2 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – LOW COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, LOW 
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, LOW TIME PRESSURE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting 
between two potential suppliers for the component. 
 
YOUR ROLE – A PURCHASING SPECIALIST 
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive 
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by 
automotive manufacturers, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You manage the purchase 
of approximately 100 components that are used by your company. 
 
YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT 
 
Your job is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information to help you understand 
your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision between two suppliers, 
Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. After reviewing the documentation, you will be asked a 
series of questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select each supplier. 
Following the experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal demographics, experience 
and education. 
 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
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Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
 
 
FASTENER BACKGROUND 
 
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a 
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer 
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and 
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy 
equipment supply stores. The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of 
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits. 
Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US 
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused 
a substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the 
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing. 
 
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization 
principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough 
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an 
interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal 
supplier is able to resume operations. 
 
The table below summarizes the history of this part, including the previous sources, their part 
numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity lows, averages and highs for your recent 
purchases of these fasteners. 
 
Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months 
 Supplier 
Name 
Type of 
Supplier 
Supplier 
Part Number 
Supplier Lot 
Numbers 
 
Current 
Supplier: 
Fasten- 
nation 
Components 
 
Manufacturer 
FNC-82- 
57894A 
 
1086 – 3484 
Previous 
Supplier 
(Original 
Equipment 
Manufacturer 
- Now out of 
business): 
 
 
Zenith Component 
Manufacturing 
 
 
 
Manufacturer 
 
 
 
ZEN-82-57894 
 
 
11200 - 11565 
 
Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months 
Average Quantity 
Procured 
569 
Average Price Per 
Item 
$1.37 
Quantity Range 
Procured 
450-1200 Price Range Per Item $1.25 - $1.65 
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THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS 
 
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have 
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request 
for proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you 
to make an informed decision. 
 
Supplier Agata Solutions Adurmis Fabrication 
Location City of Industry, CA Fresno, CA 
Type of Supplier 
Parts 
Distributor 
Manufacturer 
Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894 ZEN-82-57894 
 
Lot Number Offered 
 
11462 and 11504 
New Lot Numbers 
beginning with A to 
indicate manufacturing 
at Adurmis 
 
Technical Solution 
Use inventory 
from another source 
Manufactured under 
short term license from 
current supplier 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Certification 
Parts are American 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant 
 
ISO 9001 Certified 
 
 
Parts are American 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant 
 
Information SAE AS5553 
(Counterfeit Electronic 
Parts; Avoidance, 
Detection, Mitigation 
and Disposition) - 
Compliant 
ISO 9001 Certified 
 
Better Business 
Bureau - A+ Rating 
Price per fastener $1.38 $1.40 
Total Price (including 
shipping and taxes 
$6,106.40 $6,206.00 
Delivery Timeline 
Beginning 2 weeks 
after order 
Beginning 2 - 3 
weeks after order 
 
SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION 
 
Request for quote Agata solutions proposal Adurmis fabrication proposal
 Demand history data v2 Background 
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These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
 
Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files 
I have reviewed the supporting data files. 
 
Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you 
select? 
Agata Solutions Adurmis Manufacturing 
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B3 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – LOW COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, LOW 
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, HIGH TIME PRESSURE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting 
between two potential suppliers for the component. 
 
YOUR ROLE – A PURCHASING SPECIALIST 
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive 
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by 
automotive manufacturers, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You manage the purchase 
of approximately 100 components that are used by your company. 
 
YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT 
 
Your job is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information to help you understand 
your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision between two suppliers, 
Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. After reviewing the documentation, you will be asked a 
series of questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select each supplier. 
Following the experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal demographics, experience 
and education. 
 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
 
FASTENER BACKGROUND 
 
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a 
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer 
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and 
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy 
equipment supply stores. The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of 
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits. 
Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders place with US 
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused 
a substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the 
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing. 
 
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization 
principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough 
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an 
interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal 
supplier is able to resume operations. 
 
The table below summarizes the history of this part, including the previous sources, their part 
numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity lows, averages and highs for your recent 
purchases of these fasteners. 
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Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months 
 Supplier 
Name 
Type of 
Supplier 
Supplier 
Part Number 
Supplier Lot 
Numbers 
Current Fasten- 
 
FNC-82- 
 
 
Supplier: 
nation 
Components 
Manufacturer 57894A 1086 – 3484 
Previous 
Supplier 
(Original 
Equipment 
Manufacturer 
- Now out of 
business): 
 
 
Zenith Component 
Manufacturing 
 
 
 
Manufacturer 
 
 
 
ZEN-82-57894 
 
 
11200 - 11565 
 
Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months 
Average Quantity 
Procured 
569 
Average Price Per 
Item 
$1.37 
Quantity Range 
Procured 
450 – 1200 Price Range Per Item $1.25 - $1.65 
 
 
THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS 
 
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have 
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request 
for proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you 
to make an informed decision. You have an end-of-day team meeting, so you only have five minutes 
to complete this review and make a decision. 
 
Supplier Agata Solutions Adurmis Fabrication 
Location City of Industry, CA Fresno, CA 
Type of Supplier 
Parts 
Distributor 
Manufacturer 
Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894 ZEN-82-57894 
 
Lot Number Offered 
 
11462 and 11504 
New Lot Numbers 
beginning with A to 
indicate manufacturing 
at Adurmis 
 
Technical Solution 
Use inventory 
from another source 
Manufactured under 
short term license from 
current supplier. 
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Certification 
 
Parts are American 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant 
 
ISO 9001 Certified 
 
 
 
Parts are American 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant. 
 
Information  
SAE AS5553 
(Counterfeit Electronic 
Parts; Avoidance, 
Detection, Mitigation 
and Disposition) - 
Compliant 
 
ISO 9001 Certified 
 
Better Business 
Bureau - A+ Rating 
Price per fastener $1.38 $1.40 
Total Price (including 
shipping and taxes 
$6,106.40 $6,206.00 
Delivery Timeline 
Beginning 2 weeks 
after order 
Beginning 2 - 3 weeks 
after order 
 
SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION 
 
Request for quote Agata solutions proposal Adurmis fabrication proposal
 Demand history data v2 Background 
 
 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
 
  
 
  
 
Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files 
I have reviewed the supporting data files. 
 
Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you 
select? 
Agata Solutions Adurmis Manufacturing 
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B4 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – LOW COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, HIGH 
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, LOW TIME PRESSURE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting 
between two potential suppliers for the component. 
 
YOUR ROLE – AN OVERWORKED PURCHASING SPECIALIST WITH A SUPPLY 
CHAIN PROBLEM 
 
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive 
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by 
automotive manufacturers, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You are a very busy buyer, 
managing the purchasing of over 100 components that are used by your company, which is twice the 
normal amount for a buyer. Your workload is demanding and requires you to make numerous 
purchasing decisions every day, and your supervisor is constantly reminding you of your to-do list and 
the need to "get those orders filled for our production line". 
 
YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT 
 
Your job (amongst all of the other tasks mounting on your desk between emails and phone calls from 
customers and your supervisor) is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information 
to help you understand your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision 
between two suppliers, Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. . After reviewing the documentation, 
you will be asked a series of questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select 
each supplier. Following the experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal 
demographics, experience and education. 
 
 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
 
FASTENER BACKGROUND 
 
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a 
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer 
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and 
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy 
equipment supply stores. The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of 
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits. 
Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US 
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused 
a substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the 
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing. 
 
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization 
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principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough 
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an 
interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal 
supplier is able to resume operations. 
The table below summarizes the history of this part, including the previous sources, their part 
numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity lows, averages and highs for your recent 
purchases of these fasteners. 
 
Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months 
 Supplier 
Name 
Type of 
Supplier 
Supplier 
Part Number 
Supplier Lot 
Numbers 
Current 
Supplier: 
Fasten- 
nation 
Components 
 
Manufacturer 
FNC-82- 
57894A 
 
1086 – 3484 
Previous 
Supplier 
(Original 
Equipment 
Manufacturer 
- 
No longer in 
business): 
 
 
 
Zenith Component 
Manufacturing 
 
 
 
Manufacturer 
 
 
 
ZEN-82-57894 
 
 
 
11200 - 11565 
 
Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months 
Average Quantity 
Procured 
569 
Average Price Per 
Item 
$1.37 
Quantity Range 
Procured 
450 – 1200 Price Range Per Item $1.25 - $1.65 
 
THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS 
 
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have 
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request 
for proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you 
to make an informed decision. Your supervisor is reminding you to get this decision done ASAP 
because he’s got other tasks for you that will need to be completed before you leave tonight. 
 
Supplier Agata Solutions Adurmis Fabrication 
Location City of Industry, CA Fresno, CA 
Type of Supplier 
Parts 
Distributor 
Manufacturer 
Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894 ZEN-82-57894 
 
Lot Number Offered 
 
11462 and 11504 
New Lot Numbers 
beginning with A to 
indicate manufacturing 
at Adurmis 
 
Use inventory Manufactured under 
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Technical Solution 
from another source short term license from 
current supplier 
 
 
 
 
Certification 
Information 
States parts are ANSI 
specification compliant 
ISO 9001 Certified 
SAE AS5553 
(Counterfeit Electronic 
Parts; Avoidance, 
Detection, Mitigation 
and Disposition) - 
Compliant 
 
Parts are built 
American National 
Standards Institute 
specification compliant 
 
ISO 9001 Certified 
 
Better Business 
Bureau - A+ Rating 
Price per fastener $1.38 $1.40 
Total Price (including 
shipping and taxes 
$6,106.40 $6,206.00 
Delivery Timeline 
Beginning 2 weeks 
after order 
Beginning 2 - 3 
weeks after order 
 
SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION 
 
Request for quote Agata solutions proposal Adurmis fabrication proposal Demand 
history data v2 Background 
 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
 
 
 
Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files 
I have reviewed the supporting data files. 
 
Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you 
select? 
Agata Solutions Adurmis Manufacturing 
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B5 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – LOW COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, HIGH 
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, HIGH TIME PRESSURE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting 
between two potential suppliers for the component. 
 
YOUR ROLE – AN OVERWORKED PURCHASING SPECIALIST WITH A SUPPLY 
CHAIN PROBLEM 
 
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive 
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by 
automotive manufacturers, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You are a very busy buyer, 
managing the purchasing of over 100 components that are used by your company, which is twice the 
normal amount for a buyer. Your workload is demanding and requires you to make numerous 
purchasing decisions every day, and your supervisor is constantly reminding you of your to-do list and 
the need to "get those orders filled for our production line". 
 
YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT 
 
Your job (amongst all of the other tasks mounting on your desk between emails and phone calls from 
customers and your supervisor) is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information 
to help you understand your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision 
between two suppliers, Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. After reviewing the documentation, 
you will be asked a series of questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select 
each supplier. Following the experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal 
demographics, experience and education. 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
 
FASTENER BACKGROUND 
 
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a 
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer 
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and 
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy 
equipment supply stores.The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of 
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits. 
Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US 
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused 
a substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the 
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing. 
 
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization 
principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough 
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an 
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interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal 
supplier is able to resume operations. 
 
The table below summarizes the history of this part, including the previous sources, their part 
numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity lows, averages and highs for your recent 
purchases of these fasteners. 
 
Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months 
 Supplier 
Name 
Type of 
Supplier 
Supplier 
Part Number 
Supplier Lot 
Numbers 
Current 
Supplier: 
Fasten- 
nation 
Components 
 
Manufacturer 
FNC-82- 
57894A 
 
1086 – 3484 
Previous 
Supplier 
(Original 
Equipment 
Manufacturer 
- 
No longer in 
business): 
 
 
 
Zenith Component 
Manufacturing 
 
 
 
Manufacturer 
 
 
 
ZEN-82-57894 
 
 
 
11200 - 11565 
 
Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months 
Average Quantity 
Procured 
569 
Average Price Per 
Item 
$1.37 
Quantity Range 
Procured 
450 – 1200 High Price Per Item $1.25 - $1.65 
 
THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS 
 
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have 
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request 
for proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you 
to make an informed decision. Your supervisor is reminding you to get this decision done ASAP 
because he’s got other tasks for you that will need to be completed before you leave tonight. You also 
have an end-of-day team meeting, so you only have five minutes to complete this review and make a 
decision. 
 
Supplier Agata Solutions Adurmis Fabrication 
Location City of Industry, CA Fresno, CA 
Type of Supplier 
Parts 
Distributor 
Manufacturer 
Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894 ZEN-82-57894 
  
New Lot Numbers 
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Lot Number Offered 
 
11462 and 11504 
beginning with A to 
indicate manufacturing 
at Adurmis 
 
Technical Solution 
Use inventory 
from another source 
Manufactured under 
short term license from 
current supplier. 
 
 
 
 
 
Certification 
Information 
Parts are American 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant 
ISO 9001 Certified 
SAE AS5553 
(Counterfeit Electronic 
Parts; Avoidance, 
Detection, Mitigation 
and Disposition) - 
Compliant 
 
 
Parts are American 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant 
 
ISO 9001 Certified 
 
Better Business 
Bureau - A+ Rating 
Price per fastener $1.38 $1.40 
Total Price (including 
shipping and taxes 
$6,106.40 $6,206.00 
Delivery Timeline 
Beginning 2 weeks 
after order 
Beginning 2 - 3 
weeks after order 
 
SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION 
 
Request for quote Agata solutions proposal Adurmis fabrication proposal Demand 
history data v2 Background 
 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
 
  
 
  
 
Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files 
I have reviewed the supporting data files. 
Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you select? 
Agata Solutions Adurmis Manufacturing 
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B6 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – HIGH COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, LOW 
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, LOW TIME PRESSURE 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting 
between two potential suppliers for the component. 
 
YOUR ROLE – A PURCHASING SPECIALIST 
 
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive 
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by 
automotive manufacturers, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You manage the purchase 
of approximately 100 components that are used by your company. 
 
YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT 
 
Your job is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information to help you understand 
your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision between two suppliers. 
They are Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. Adurmis is a manufacturer and Agata is an 
independent parts distributor. After reviewing the documentation, you will be asked a series of 
questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select each supplier. Following the 
experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal demographics, experience and 
education. 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
 
FASTENER BACKGROUND 
 
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a 
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer 
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and 
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy 
equipment supply stores.The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of 
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits. 
Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US 
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused a 
substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the 
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing. 
 
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization 
principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough 
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an 
interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal 
supplier is able to resume operations. 
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PARTS INFORMATION: The parts that Fasten-Nation supplies to you are considered “obsolete 
parts” because the design is not currently manufactured by the original equipment 
manufacturer. The number of suppliers still manufacturing this type of part is very small and 
sourcing has been problematic for your company. The table below summarizes the history of this 
part, including the previous sources, their part numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity 
lows, averages and highs for your recent purchases of these fasteners. 
 
 
 
Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months 
 Supplier 
Name 
Type of 
Supplier 
Supplier 
Part Number 
Supplier Lot 
Numbers 
Current 
Supplier: 
Fasten- 
nation 
Components 
 
Manufacturer 
FNC-82- 
57894A 
 
1086 – 3484 
Previous 
Supplier 
(Original 
Equipment 
Manufacturer 
- 
No longer in 
business): 
 
 
 
Zenith Component 
Manufacturing 
 
 
 
Manufacturer 
 
 
 
ZEN-82-57894 
 
 
 
11200 - 11565 
 
Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months 
Average Quantity 
Procured 
569 
Average Price Per 
Item 
$1.37 
Quantity Range 
Procured 
450 – 1200 Price Range Per Item $1.25 - $1.65 
 
THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS 
 
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have 
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request for 
proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you to 
make an informed decision. 
 
Supplier Agata Solutions Adurmis Fabrication 
   
Location City of Industry, CA Fresno, CA 
Type of Supplier 
Independent Parts 
Distributor 
Manufacturer 
Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894 ZEN-82-57894 
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Lot Number Offered 
 
Z35012 
New Lot Numbers 
beginning with A to 
indicate manufacturing 
at Adurmis 
 
Technical Solution 
Use excess inventory 
from another source 
Manufactured under 
short term license from 
current supplier. 
 
 
 
Certification 
Information 
 
 
Parts are American 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant 
Parts are American 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant 
 
ISO 9001 Certified 
 
Better Business 
Bureau - A+ Rating 
Price per fastener $1.15 $1.40 
Total Price (including 
shipping and taxes 
$4,817.80 $6,206.00 
Delivery Timeline 
Beginning 2 weeks 
after order 
Beginning 2- 3 
weeks after order 
 
SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION 
 
Request for quote Agata proposal Adurmis fabrication proposal Demand history 
data v2 Background 
 
 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
 
 
Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files 
I have reviewed the supporting data files. 
 
Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you select? 
Agata Solutions Adurmis Manufacturing 
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B7 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – HIGH COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, LOW 
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, HIGH TIME PRESSURE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting 
between two potential suppliers for the component. 
 
YOUR ROLE – A PURCHASING SPECIALIST 
 
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive 
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by 
automotive manufacturesr, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You manage the purchase 
of approximately 100 components that are used by your company. 
 
YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT 
 
Your job is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information to help you understand 
your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision between two suppliers. 
They are Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. Adurmis is a manufacturer and Agata is an 
independent parts distributor. After reviewing the documentation, you will be asked a series of 
questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select each supplier. Following the 
experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal demographics, experience and 
education. 
 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
 
FASTENER BACKGROUND 
 
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a 
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer 
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and 
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy 
equipment supply stores. The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of 
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits. 
Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US 
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused a 
substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the 
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing. 
 
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization 
principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough 
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an 
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interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal 
supplier is able to resume operations. 
 
PARTS INFORMATION: The parts that Fasten-Nation supplies to you are considered “obsolete 
parts” because the design is not currently manufactured by the original equipment 
manufacturer. The number of suppliers still manufacturing this type of part is very small and 
sourcing has been problematic for your company. The table below summarizes the history of this 
part, including the previous sources, their part numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity 
lows, averages and highs for your recent purchases of these fasteners. 
 
 
 
Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months 
 Supplier 
Name 
Type of 
Supplier 
Supplier 
Part Number 
Supplier Lot 
Numbers 
Current 
Supplier: 
Fasten- 
nation 
Components 
 
Manufacturer 
FNC-82- 
57894A 
 
1086 – 3484 
Previous 
Supplier 
(Original 
Equipment 
Manufacturer 
- 
No longer in 
business): 
 
 
 
Zenith Component 
Manufacturing 
 
 
 
Manufacturer 
 
 
 
ZEN-82-57894 
 
 
 
11200 - 11565 
 
Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months 
Average Quantity 
Procured 
569 
Average Price Per 
Item 
$1.37 
Quantity Range 
Procured 
450 - 1200 Price Range Per Item $1.25 - $1.65 
 
 
THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS 
 
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have 
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request for 
proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you to 
make an informed decision. 
 
Supplier Agata Solutions Adurmis Fabrication 
   
Location City of Industry, CA Fresno, CA 
Type of Supplier 
Independent Parts 
Distributor 
Manufacturer 
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Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894 ZEN-82-57894 
 
 
Lot Number Offered 
 
 
Z35012 
New Lot Numbers 
beginning with A to 
indicate 
manufacturing 
at Adurmis 
 
Technical Solution 
Use excess inventory 
from another source 
Manufactured under 
short term license from 
current supplier 
 
 
 
Certification 
Information 
 
 
Parts are American 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant. 
Parts are American 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant. 
 
ISO 9001 Certified 
 
Better Business 
Bureau - A+ Rating 
Price per fastener $1.15 $1.40 
Total Price (including 
shipping and taxes 
$4,817.80 $6,206.00 
Delivery Timeline 
Beginning 2 weeks 
after order 
Beginning 2 - 3 
weeks after order 
 
SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION 
 
Request for quote Agata proposal Adurmis fabrication proposal Demand history 
data v2 Background 
 
 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
 
  
 
Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files 
I have reviewed the supporting data files. 
 
 
 
Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you select? 
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Agata Solutions Adurmis Manufacturing 
 
  
 
 
 
 
B8 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – HIGH COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, HIGH 
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, LOW TIME PRESSURE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting 
between two potential suppliers for the component. 
 
YOUR ROLE – AN OVERWORKED PURCHASING SPECIALIST WITH A SUPPLY 
CHAIN PROBLEM 
 
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive 
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by 
automotive manufacturers, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You are a very busy buyer, 
managing the purchasing of over 100 components that are used by your company, which is twice the 
normal amount for a buyer. Your workload is demanding and requires you to make numerous 
purchasing decisions every day, and your supervisor is constantly reminding you of your to-do list and 
the need to "get those orders filled for our production line". 
 
YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT 
 
Your job (amongst all of the other tasks mounting on your desk between emails and phone calls from 
customers and your supervisor) is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information 
to help you understand your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision 
between two suppliers. They are Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. Adurmis is a manufacturer 
and Agata is an independent parts distributor. After reviewing the documentation, you will be asked a 
series of questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select each supplier. 
Following the experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal demographics, experience 
and education. 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
 
FASTENER BACKGROUND 
 
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a 
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer 
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and 
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy 
equipment supply stores. The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of 
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits. 
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Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US 
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused 
a substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the 
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing. 
 
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization 
principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough 
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an 
interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal 
supplier is able to resume operations. 
 
 
PARTS INFORMATION: The parts that Fasten-Nation supplies to you are considered “obsolete 
parts” because the design is not currently manufactured by the original equipment 
manufacturer. The number of suppliers still manufacturing this type of part is very small and 
sourcing has been problematic for your company. The table below summarizes the history of this 
part, including the previous sources, their part numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity 
lows, averages and highs for your recent purchases of these fasteners. 
 
Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months 
 Supplier 
Name 
Type of 
Supplier 
Supplier 
Part Number 
Supplier Lot 
Numbers 
Current 
Supplier: 
Fasten- 
nation 
Components 
 
Manufacturer 
FNC-82- 
57894A 
 
1086 – 3484 
Previous 
Supplier 
(Original 
Equipment 
Manufacturer 
- 
No longer in 
business): 
 
 
 
Zenith Component 
Manufacturing 
 
 
 
Manufacturer 
 
 
 
ZEN-82-57894 
 
 
 
11200 - 11565 
 
Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months 
Average Quantity 
Procured 
569 
Average Price Per 
Item 
$1.37 
Quantity Range 
Procured 
450 – 1200 Price Range Per Item $1.25 - $1.65 
 
THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS 
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have 
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request 
for proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you 
to make an informed decision. Your supervisor is reminding you to get this decision done ASAP 
because he’s got other tasks for you that will need to be completed before you leave tonight. 
 
Supplier Agata Solutions Adurmis Fabrication 
Location City of Industry, CA Fresno, CA 
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Type of Supplier 
Independent Parts 
Distributor 
Manufacturer 
Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894 ZEN-82-57894 
 
Lot Number Offered 
 
Z35012 
New Lot Numbers 
beginning with A to 
indicate manufacturing 
at Adurmis 
 
Technical Solution 
Use excess inventory 
from another source 
Manufactured under 
short term license from 
current supplier 
 
 
 
Certification 
Information 
 
 
Parts are American 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant. 
Parts are American 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant. 
 
ISO 9001 Certified 
 
Better Business 
Bureau - A+ Rating 
Price per fastener $1.15 $1.40 
Total Price (including 
shipping and taxes 
$4,817.80 $6,206.00 
Delivery Timeline 
Beginning 2 weeks 
after order 
Beginning 2 - 3 
weeks after order 
 
SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION 
 
Request for quote Agata proposal Adurmis fabrication proposal Demand history 
data v2 Background 
 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
 
Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files 
I have reviewed the supporting data files. 
 
Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you select? 
Agata Solutions Adurmis Manufacturing 
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B9 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – HIGH COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, HIGH 
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, HIGH TIME PRESSURE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting 
between two potential suppliers for the component. 
 
YOUR ROLE – AN OVERWORKED PURCHASING SPECIALIST WITH A SUPPLY 
CHAIN PROBLEM 
 
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive 
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by 
automotive manufacturers, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You are a very busy buyer, 
managing the purchasing of over 100 components that are used by your company, which is twice the 
normal amount for a buyer. Your workload is demanding and requires you to make numerous 
purchasing decisions every day, and your supervisor is constantly reminding you of your to-do list and 
the need to "get those orders filled for our production line". 
 
YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT 
 
Your job (amongst all of the other tasks mounting on your desk between emails and phone calls from 
customers and your supervisor) is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information 
to help you understand your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision 
between two suppliers. They are Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. Adurmis is a manufacturer 
and Agata is an independent parts distributor. After reviewing the documentation, you will be asked a 
series of questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select each supplier. 
Following the experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal demographics, experience 
and education. 
 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
 
 
FASTENER BACKGROUND 
 
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a 
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natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer 
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and 
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy 
equipment supply stores. The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of 
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits. 
Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US 
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused 
a substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the 
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing. 
 
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization 
principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough 
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an 
interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal 
supplier is able to resume operations. 
 
PARTS INFORMATION: The parts that Fasten-Nation supplies to you are considered “obsolete 
parts” because the design is not currently manufactured by the original equipment 
manufacturer. The number of suppliers still manufacturing this type of part is very small and 
sourcing has been problematic for your company. The table below summarizes the history of this 
part, including the previous sources, their part numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity 
lows, averages and highs for your recent purchases of these fasteners. 
 
Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months 
 Supplier 
Name 
Type of 
Supplier 
Supplier 
Part Number 
Supplier Lot 
Numbers 
Current 
Supplier: 
Fasten- 
nation 
Components 
 
Manufacturer 
FNC-82- 
57894A 
 
1086 – 3484 
Previous 
Supplier 
(Original 
Equipment 
Manufacturer 
- 
No longer in 
business): 
 
 
 
Zenith Component 
Manufacturing 
 
 
 
Manufacturer 
 
 
 
ZEN-82-57894 
 
 
 
11200 - 11565 
 
Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months 
Average Quantity 
Procured 
569 
Average Price Per 
Item 
$1.37 
 
 
THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS 
 
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have 
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request for 
proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you to 
make an informed decision. Your supervisor is reminding you to get this decision done ASAP 
because he’s got other tasks for you that will need to be completed before you leave tonight. 
You also have an end-of-day team meeting, so you only have five minutes to complete this 
Quantity Range 
Procured 
450 - 1200 Price Range Per Item $1.25 - $1.65 
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review and make a decision. 
 
Supplier Agata Solutions Adurmis Fabrication 
Location City of Industry, CA Fresno, CA 
Type of Supplier 
Independent Parts 
Distributor 
Manufacturer 
Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894 ZEN-82-57894 
 
Lot Number Offered 
 
Z35012 
New Lot Numbers 
beginning with A to 
indicate manufacturing 
at Adurmis 
 
Technical Solution 
Use excess inventory 
from another source 
Manufactured under 
short term license from 
current supplier 
 
 
 
Certification 
Information 
 
 
Parts are American 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant 
Parts are American 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant 
 
ISO 9001 Certified 
 
Better Business 
Bureau - A + Rating 
Price per fastener $1.15 $1.40 
Total Price (including 
shipping and taxes 
$4,817.80 $6,206.00 
Delivery Timeline 
Beginning 2 weeks 
after order 
Beginning 2 - 3 
weeks after order 
SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION 
 
Request for quote Agata proposal Adurmis fabrication proposal Demand history 
data v2 Background 
 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
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Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files 
I have reviewed the supporting data files. 
 
 
 
Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you select? 
Agata Solutions Adurmis Manufacturing 
 
  
B10 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – MEDIUM COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, LOW 
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, LOW TIME PRESSURE 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting 
between two potential suppliers for the component. 
 
YOUR ROLE – A PURCHASING SPECIALIST 
 
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive 
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by 
automotive manufacturers, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You manage the purchase 
of approximately 100 components that are used by your company. 
 
YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT 
 
Your job is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information to help you understand 
your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision between two suppliers. 
They are Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. Adurmis is a manufacturer and Agata is an 
independent parts distributor. After reviewing the documentation, you will be asked a series of 
questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select each supplier. Following the 
experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal demographics, experience and 
education. 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
 
FASTENER BACKGROUND 
 
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a 
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer 
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and 
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy 
equipment supply stores.The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of 
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits. 
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Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US 
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused 
a substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the 
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing. 
 
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization 
principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough 
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an 
interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal 
supplier is able to resume operations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PARTS INFORMATION: The parts that Fasten-Nation supplies to you are considered “obsolete 
parts” because the design is not currently manufactured by the original equipment 
manufacturer. The number of suppliers still manufacturing this type of part is very small and 
sourcing has been problematic for your company. The table below summarizes the history of this 
part, including the previous sources, their part numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity 
lows, averages and highs for your recent purchases of these fasteners. 
 
Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months 
 Supplier 
Name 
Type of 
Supplier 
Supplier 
Part Number 
Supplier Lot 
Numbers 
Current 
Supplier: 
Fasten- 
nation 
Components 
 
Manufacturer 
FNC-82- 
57894A 
 
1086 – 3484 
Previous 
Supplier 
(Original 
Equipment 
Manufacturer 
- 
No longer in 
 
 
Zenith Component 
Manufacturing 
 
 
 
Manufacturer 
 
 
 
ZEN-82-57894 
 
 
11200 - 11565 
 
 
Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months 
Average Quantity 
Procured 
569 
Average Price Per 
Item 
$1.37 
Quantity Range 
Procured 
450 - 1200 Price Range Per Item $1.25 - $1.65 
 
THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS 
 
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have 
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request for 
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proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you to 
make an informed decision. 
 
Supplier Agata Solutions Adurmis Fabrication 
Location City of Industry, CA Fresno, CA 
Type of Supplier 
Independent Parts 
Distributor 
Manufacturer 
Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894 ZEN-82-57894 
 
Lot Number Offered 
 
Z35012 
New Lot Numbers 
beginning with A to 
indicate manufacturing 
at Adurmis 
 
Technical Solution 
Use excess inventory 
from another source 
Manufactured under 
short term license from 
current supplier. 
 
 
 
Certification 
Information 
 
 
Parts are American 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant 
Parts are American 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant 
 
ISO 9001 Certified 
 
Better Business 
Bureau - A+ Rating 
Price per fastener $1.38 $1.40 
Total Price (including $6,106.40 $6,206.00 
shipping and taxes 
  
Delivery Timeline 
Beginning 2 weeks 
after order 
Beginning 2- 3 
weeks after order 
 
SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION 
 
Request for quote Agata response Adurmis fabrication proposal Demand history 
data v2 Background 
 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
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Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files 
I have reviewed the supporting data files. 
 
 
 
Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you select? 
Agata Solutions Adurmis Manufacturing 
 
  
 
B11 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – MEDIUM COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, LOW 
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, HIGH TIME PRESSURE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting 
between two potential suppliers for the component. 
 
YOUR ROLE – A PURCHASING SPECIALIST 
 
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive 
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by 
automotive manufacturesr, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You manage the purchase 
of approximately 100 components that are used by your company. 
 
YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT 
 
Your job is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information to help you understand 
your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision between two suppliers. 
They are Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. Adurmis is a manufacturer and Agata is an 
independent parts distributor. After reviewing the documentation, you will be asked a series of 
questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select each supplier. Following the 
experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal demographics, experience and education. 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
 
FASTENER BACKGROUND 
 
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a 
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer 
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and 
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy 
equipment supply stores. The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of 
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits. 
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Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US 
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused a 
substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the 
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing. 
 
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization 
principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough 
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an 
interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal 
supplier is able to resume operations. 
 
PARTS INFORMATION: The parts that Fasten-Nation supplies to you are considered “obsolete 
parts” because the design is not currently manufactured by the original equipment 
manufacturer. The number of suppliers still manufacturing this type of part is very small and 
sourcing has been problematic for your company. The table below summarizes the history of this 
part, including the previous sources, their part numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity 
lows, averages and highs for your recent purchases of these fasteners. 
 
 
Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months 
 Supplier 
Name 
Type of 
Supplier 
Supplier 
Part Number 
Supplier Lot 
Numbers 
Current 
Supplier: 
Fasten- 
nation 
Components 
 
Manufacturer 
FNC-82- 
57894A 
 
1086 – 3484 
Previous 
Supplier 
(Original 
Equipment 
Manufacturer 
- 
No longer in 
 
 
Zenith Component 
Manufacturing 
 
 
 
Manufacturer 
 
 
 
ZEN-82-57894 
 
 
11200 - 11565 
 
 
Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months 
Average Quantity 
Procured 
569 
Average Price Per 
Item 
$1.37 
Quantity Range 
Procured 
450 – 1200 Price Range Per Item $1.25 - $1.65 
 
THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS 
 
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have 
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request for 
proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you to 
make an informed decision. 
 
Supplier Agata Solutions Adurmis Fabrication 
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Location City of Industry, CA Fresno, CA 
Type of Supplier 
Independent Parts 
Distributor 
Manufacturer 
Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894 ZEN-82-57894 
 
 
Lot Number Offered 
 
 
Z35012 
New Lot Numbers 
beginning with A to 
indicate 
manufacturing 
at Adurmis 
 
Technical Solution 
Use excess inventory 
from another source 
Manufactured under 
short term license from 
current supplier 
 
 
 
Certification 
Information 
 
 
Parts are American 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant. 
Parts are American 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant. 
 
ISO 9001 Certified 
 
Better Business 
Bureau - A+ Rating 
   
Price per fastener $1.38 $1.40 
Total Price (including 
shipping and taxes 
$6,106.40 $6,206.00 
Delivery Timeline 
Beginning 2 weeks 
after order 
Beginning 2 - 3 
weeks after order 
 
SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION 
 
Request for quote Agata response Adurmis fabrication proposal Demand history 
data v2 Background 
 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
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Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files 
I have reviewed the supporting data files. 
 
 
 
Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you select? 
Agata Solutions Adurmis Manufacturing 
 
  
 
 
 
B12 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – MEDIUM COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, HIGH 
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, LOW TIME PRESSURE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting 
between two potential suppliers for the component. 
 
YOUR ROLE – AN OVERWORKED PURCHASING SPECIALIST WITH A SUPPLY 
CHAIN PROBLEM 
 
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive 
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by 
automotive manufacturers, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You are a very busy buyer, 
managing the purchasing of over 100 components that are used by your company, which is twice the 
normal amount for a buyer. Your workload is demanding and requires you to make numerous 
purchasing decisions every day, and your supervisor is constantly reminding you of your to-do list and 
the need to "get those orders filled for our production line". 
 
YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT 
 
Your job (amongst all of the other tasks mounting on your desk between emails and phone calls from 
customers and your supervisor) is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information 
to help you understand your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision 
between two suppliers. They are Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. Adurmis is a manufacturer 
and Agata is an independent parts distributor. After reviewing the documentation, you will be asked a 
series of questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select each supplier. 
Following the experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal demographics, experience 
and education. 
 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
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BACKGROUND 
 
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a 
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer 
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and 
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy 
equipment supply stores. The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of 
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits. 
Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US 
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused 
a substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the 
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing. 
 
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization 
principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough 
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an 
interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal 
supplier is able to resume operations. 
 
PARTS INFORMATION: The parts that Fasten-Nation supplies to you are considered “obsolete 
parts” because the design is not currently manufactured by the original equipment 
manufacturer. The number of suppliers still manufacturing this type of part is very small and 
sourcing has been problematic for your company. The table below summarizes the history of this 
part, including the previous sources, their part numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity 
lows, averages and highs for your recent purchases of these fasteners. 
 
 
Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months 
 Supplier 
Name 
Type of 
Supplier 
Supplier 
Part Number 
Supplier Lot 
Numbers 
Current 
Supplier: 
Fasten- 
nation 
Components 
 
Manufacturer 
FNC-82- 
57894A 
 
1086 – 3484 
Previous 
Supplier 
(Original 
Equipment 
Manufacturer 
- 
No longer in 
business): 
 
 
 
Zenith Component 
Manufacturing 
 
 
 
Manufacturer 
 
 
 
ZEN-82-57894 
 
 
 
11200 - 11565 
 
Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months 
Average Quantity 
Procured 
569 
Average Price Per 
Item 
$1.37 
Quantity Range 
Procured 
450 – 1200 Price Range Per Item $1.25 - $1.65 
 
THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS 
 
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have 
 164 
 
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request 
for proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you 
to make an informed decision. Your supervisor is reminding you to get this decision done ASAP 
because he’s got other tasks for you that will need to be completed before you leave tonight. 
 
Supplier Agata Solutions Adurmis Fabrication 
Location City of Industry, CA Fresno, CA 
Type of Supplier 
Independent Parts 
Distributor 
Manufacturer 
Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894 ZEN-82-57894 
 
Lot Number Offered 
 
Z35012 
New Lot Numbers 
beginning with A to 
indicate manufacturing 
at Adurmis 
 
Technical Solution 
Use excess inventory 
from another source 
Manufactured under 
short term license from 
current supplier 
  Parts are American 
 
 
 
 
Certification 
Information 
 
 
Parts are American 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant. 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant. 
 
ISO 9001 Certified 
 
Better Business 
Bureau - A+ Rating 
Price per fastener $1.38 $1.40 
Total Price (including 
shipping and taxes 
$6,106.40 $6,206.00 
Delivery Timeline 
Beginning 2 weeks 
after order 
Beginning 2 - 3 
weeks after order 
 
SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION 
 
Request for quote Agata response Adurmis fabrication proposal Demand history 
data v2 Background 
 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
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Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files 
I have reviewed the supporting data files. 
 
 
 
Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you 
select? 
Agata Solutions Adurmis Manufacturing 
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B13 - SCENARIO INFORMATION – MEDIUM COUNTERFEIT SIGNAL, HIGH 
WORKLOAD PRESSURE, HIGH TIME PRESSURE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This experiment involves reading a scenario about a particular purchasing decision and then selecting 
between two potential suppliers for the component. 
 
YOUR ROLE – AN OVERWORKED PURCHASING SPECIALIST WITH A SUPPLY 
CHAIN PROBLEM 
 
In this role-playing scenario, you are serving as the purchasing specialist for Alpha Automotive 
Accessories, a parts manufacturer that produces brakes, airbags, and powertrain accessories used by 
automotive manufacturers, repair stations, and retail automotive stores. You are a very busy buyer, 
managing the purchasing of over 100 components that are used by your company, which is twice the 
normal amount for a buyer. Your workload is demanding and requires you to make numerous 
purchasing decisions every day, and your supervisor is constantly reminding you of your to-do list and 
the need to "get those orders filled for our production line". 
 
YOUR TASK - DECIDE BETWEEN TWO SUPPLIERS FOR A COMPONENT 
 
Your job (amongst all of the other tasks mounting on your desk between emails and phone calls from 
customers and your supervisor) is to evaluate the purchasing situation, review supporting information 
to help you understand your industry, the suppliers and their offers and make a purchasing decision 
between two suppliers. They are Adurmis Fabrication and Agata Solutions. Adurmis is a manufacturer 
and Agata is an independent parts distributor. After reviewing the documentation, you will be asked a 
series of questions about which supplier to select and why you did or did not select each supplier. 
Following the experiment, you will be asked questions about your personal demographics, experience 
and education. 
 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
FASTENER BACKGROUND 
 
Your normal trusted supplier of specialized fasteners, Fasten-Nation Components, has experienced a 
natural disaster which destroyed their primary production facility and they won’t be able to fill customer 
orders for three months. Your company uses these fasteners on parts for late model vehicles and 
heavy equipment. Your product line is sold at numerous auto parts stores, dealerships and heavy 
equipment supply stores. The industrial fastener marketplace has had some problems in terms of 
quality historically, including substandard materials, product quality inconsistencies and counterfeits. 
Because of volatility of capacity demands, there is no guarantee that orders placed with US 
manufacturers will actually be produced domestically. The outsourcing of manufacturing has caused 
a substantial migration of demand to China, and recent trends show that the domestic sources for the 
specific type of fasteners you require are diminishing. 
 
Your supply chain management operations have been focused on lean and inventory minimization 
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principles to help keep operational costs down. Unfortunately, this means that you only have enough 
stock on hand to continue manufacturing for two weeks. Your supervisor has asked you to select an 
interim supplier for a limited time supply arrangement as a solution to the problem until your normal 
supplier is able to resume operations. 
 
PARTS INFORMATION: The parts that Fasten-Nation supplies to you are considered “obsolete 
parts” because the design is not currently manufactured by the original equipment 
manufacturer. The number of suppliers still manufacturing this type of part is very small and 
sourcing has been problematic for your company. The table below summarizes the history of this 
part, including the previous sources, their part numbers, lot numbers, and the pricing and quantity lows, 
averages and highs for your recent purchases of these fasteners. 
 
Supplier History Information – Previous 24 Months 
 Supplier 
Name 
Type of 
Supplier 
Supplier 
Part Number 
Supplier Lot 
Numbers 
Current 
Supplier: 
Fasten- 
nation 
Components 
 
Manufacturer 
FNC-82- 
57894A 
 
1086 – 3484 
Previous 
Supplier 
(Original 
Equipment 
Manufacturer 
- 
No longer in 
business): 
 
 
 
Zenith Component 
Manufacturing 
 
 
 
Manufacturer 
 
 
 
ZEN-82-57894 
 
 
 
11200 - 11565 
 
Quantity and Price Information – Previous 24 months 
Average Quantity 
Procured 
569 
Average Price Per 
Item 
$1.37 
Quantity Range 
Procured 
450 – 1200 Price Range Per Item $1.25 - $1.65 
 
THE DECISION TO MAKE - DECIDING BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS 
 
You have sent out a request for proposal for new suppliers of the specialized fasteners, and you have 
received two responses. The table below summarizes the two proposals. Hyperlinks to your request for 
proposal, the two responses, as well as your demand history data are also provided to enable you to 
make an informed decision. Your supervisor is reminding you to get this decision done ASAP 
because he’s got other tasks for you that will need to be completed before you leave tonight. 
You also have an end-of-day team meeting, so you only have five minutes to complete this 
review and make a decision. 
 
Supplier Agata Solutions Adurmis Fabrication 
Location City of Industry, CA Fresno, CA 
Type of Supplier 
Independent Parts 
Distributor 
Manufacturer 
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Part Number Offered ZEN-82-57894 ZEN-82-57894 
  
New Lot Numbers 
 
 
Lot Number Offered 
 
Z35012 
beginning with A to 
indicate manufacturing 
at Adurmis 
 
Technical Solution 
Use excess inventory 
from another source 
Manufactured under 
short term license from 
current supplier 
 
 
 
Certification 
Information 
 
 
Parts are American 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant 
Parts are American 
National Standards 
Institute specification 
compliant 
 
ISO 9001 Certified 
 
Better Business 
Bureau - A + Rating 
Price per fastener $1.38 $1.40 
Total Price (including 
shipping and taxes 
$6,106.40 $6,206.00 
Delivery Timeline 
Beginning 2 weeks 
after order 
Beginning 2 - 3 
weeks after order 
 
SUPPORTING DATA FILES FOR USE IN YOUR DECISION 
 
Request for quote Agata response Adurmis fabrication proposal Demand history 
data v2 Background 
 
These page timer metrics will not be displayed to the recipient. 
First Click: 0 seconds 
Last Click: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingPageSubmit#: 0 seconds 
#QuestionText, TimingClickCount#: 0 clicks 
 
  
 
  
Please check after you have reviewed the supporting files 
I have reviewed the supporting data files. 
 
Based on your review of the suppliers’ proposals, which supplier do you 
select? 
Agata Solutions Adurmis Manufacturing 
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B14 – POST-HOC QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
To what extent do you prefer your selected supplier over the supplier you did 
not select? Please rate your preference. 
 
1 - No real      7 - Greatly 
preference 2 3 4 5 6 Prefer 
 
       
 
 
Please identify how important each of the following factors was in your 
decision. 
 
 
 
 
I specifically considered that one of suppliers proposals might be an offer 
for counterfeit parts. 
Yes 
 
No 
 
 
1 - Not 
 
at all 2    
7 - Very 
 
The supplier’s price was the lowest 
offered. 
The supplier’s ability to meet the required
delivery date 
The quality of the fasteners offered
The technical approach (make or use 
excess inventory) offered by the supplier 
The risk that the fasteners are counterfeit
parts 
The part history information provided by
the supplier 
The fact that the part was an obsolete
item 
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Please describe your level of 
agreement with each of the 
following statements regarding 
the supplier you DID NOT 
SELECT 
 
The price offered by the supplier was 
too high. 
The price offered was so low that I 
thought the product might be a 
counterfeit. 
The price offered was so low that the 
quality of the product was questionable. 
The delivery schedule was not 
acceptable 
The delivery schedule was too slow for 
the requirement. 
The quality of the item was inadequate 
for the requirement. 
The fastener has a high chance of 
being a counterfeit part 
The fastener might be a non- 
conforming part 
There was insufficient information about 
where the item was produced, which 
was a great cause for concern in my 
decision 
There is likely to be quality risk 
associated with selecting the lower cost 
supplier 
Low cost is more important than quality 
in this purchasing decision 
Quality is less important than schedule in 
this purchasing decision. 
My concerns about the prospects of 
receiving counterfeit products 
overweighed my beliefs about the 
importance of other operational factors, 
such as cost and delivery 
My concerns about the costs and 
consequences of counterfeit product 
outweighed my feeling about lower unit 
costs 
I believe that it is possible to control or 
manage situations that involved 
counterfeit products. 
I believe that it is possible to stop 
opportunistic supplier behaviors, such 
as supplying counterfeit products, in a 
contract 
 
 
1 - 
Strongly 
Disagree 2 3 
4 - 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 5 6 
7 - 
Strongly 
Agree 
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Please answer the following questions regarding the realism of this scenario. 
 
 
 
 
Please select your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the 
following statements. 
1 - 
Strongly
   
4 - 
Neither
Agree
nor
   
7 - 
Agree 
The scenario described 
in the study is realistic. 
I took my role described
in the scenario
seriously. 
In my work, I rarely
encounter the issues
discussed in these
scenarios. 
I am highly aware of the
issues raised in this
scenario. 
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There was a timer displayed in this experiment. 
Yes 
 
No 
1 - 
Strongly
   
4 - 
Neither
Agree
nor
   
7 - 
Agree 
I felt like I had enough 
time to review the
information provided for
the selection decision. 
I felt rushed to make a
selection decision 
Overall, I felt a sense of
time pressure when
completing the
experiment 
I felt too rushed to
adequately address the
supplier selection in this
experiment 
When I am confronted
with a problem, I can
usually find several
solutions. 
I can solve most
problems if I invest the
necessary effort. 
I am confident that I
could deal efficiently
with unexpected events. 
I can always manage to
solve difficult problems
if I try hard enough 
I felt like a buyer who
was overworked in this
scenario. 
As I completed the
experiment, I felt there
was a large quantity of
work that needed to be
done. 
As I went through the
scenario, I thought the
buyer had too much
work to do. 
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The fasteners you needed to purchase in this experiment were obsolete parts. 
Yes 
No 
 
 
One of the suppliers in this scenario was an independent parts distributor. 
Yes 
 
No 
 
 
 
What is your job title? 
 
 
 
 
 
What level of training have you had regarding counterfeit parts issues? 
I have no training on counterfeit parts issues 
 
I have a little training on counterfeit parts issues  
I have some training on counterfeit parts issues 
I have substantial training on counterfeit parts issues 
 
I have extensive training on counterfeit parts issues 
 
 
 
To what degree do you think counterfeit parts are a problem for supply chains? 
 
Counterfeit parts 
are not a problem 
for supply chains 
 
Counterfeit parts are 
a minor problem for 
supply chains 
Counterfeit parts 
are a considerable 
problem for supply 
chains 
Counterfeit parts 
are a substantial 
program for supply 
chains 
Counterfeit parts 
are an extensive 
program for supply 
chains 
 
     
 
 
In your own work experience, have you ever personally dealt with a counterfeit 
parts situation? Check all that apply. 
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I have unknowingly purchase a counterfeit product 
 I have knowingly purchased a counterfeit product 
I know someone who has unknowingly purchased a counterfeit product 
  I know some someone who has knowingly purchased a counterfeit product 
My company has received counterfeit products 
 
In your work experience, have you ever dealt with a counterfeit parts 
situation? 
Never One time A few times An ongoing 
problem 
 
    
In your work during the past year, how many purchasing decisions 
have you made (include both individual and team decisions)? 
 
 
 
What industry or government sector do you work in? 
Which of the following best describes your current position 
Top management   Middle management  Supervisor  Professional  Other 
 
If you selected "Other" as your position level, please describe the 
position. 
 
 
 
How many years of professional work experience do you have? 
 
 
 
How many years have you worked in supply chain management or 
logistics? 
 
 
 
How many years have you worked in purchasing? 
 
 
 
What is the approximate annual dollar volume of purchases you are 
responsible for? 
< $25,000 
 
$25,001 - $50,000 
$50,001 - $75,000 
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$75,001 - $100,000 
 
> $100,000 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
High School / GED  Some college  Associate's Degree  Bachelor's Degree 
Master's Degree  Post-Master's Degree Doctoral Degree 
What is your gender? 
Male Female 
Is English your native language? 
Yes  No 
Please select your level of agreement with the following statement. 
Exemptions from required childhood vaccinations should only be on the 
basis of medical necessity. 
Strongly Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 
Agree 
 
Strongly Agree 
 
What is your age in years? 
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